




**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***



## **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED**

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

19980120 042

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-001

### CONTENTS

10 January 1992

#### MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Yeltsin Meeting With Military Leaders [S. Filatov; MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, 12 Dec 91] .....	1
Yeltsin Meeting at Defense Ministry [R. Zaripov; MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, 12 Dec 91] .....	1
Vyrodov Cited on Yeltsin, Generals Meeting [I. Vyrodov; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 28 Dec 91] .....	2
Lopatin, Tsalko on Russian Defense Committee [A. Tsalko; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 Dec 91] ....	3
Afghan Veterans Pledge Mutual Aid [S. Khabirov; TRUD, 1 Jan 92] .....	4
Special Unit Handling Deserters [S. Chernous; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Dec 91] .....	4
Muscovites Polled on Chances of Coup [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Dec 91] .....	5
Coup Cases Viewed; Military Budget Outlined [V. Yermolin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Dec 91] .....	6
Editorial Blasts Treatment of Military [V. Yermolin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Dec 91] .....	6
Social Problems in Military Discussed [S. Prokofyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Dec 91] .....	8
Proliferation of Weapons Criticized [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Jan 92] .....	9
Kazakhs Support Unitary Nuclear Command [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Dec 91] .....	10
General Comments on Army's Right to Self-Defense [L. Ivashov; Moscow Radio, 14 Dec 91] .....	10
Kaliningrad Battalion Demands More Housing [V. Gromak; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Dec 91] .....	11
Bank Note Shortage Disrupts Soldiers' Pay [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Dec 91] .....	11

#### REPUBLIC MILITARY ISSUES

Armenia To Conduct Call-Up [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Dec 91] .....	13
Azerbaijan PVO Post 'Nationalized' [A. Ibanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Dec 91] .....	13
Nagorno-Karabakh Withdrawal Called For [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 17 Dec 91] .....	13
Belarus Appoints Defense Minister [P. Chernenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Dec 91] .....	13
Nuclear Weapons Surround Tartu [J. Liim; RAHVA HAAL, 22 Nov 91] .....	14
Demands for Latvian OMON Chiefs Release [A. Petrov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Dec 91] .....	15
Yeltsin Issues Decree on Military Pay [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 11 Dec 91] .....	15
Navy Officer on Coup Plan To Seize Yeltsin [A. Putko; KURANTY, 12 Dec 91] .....	15
Moscow, Military Collaborate To Improve Conditions [Yu. Luzhkov and V. Toporov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Dec 91] .....	17
Ukraine National Guard Chief Interviewed [V. Kukharets; VECHERNIY KIEV, 19 Nov 91] .....	20
Building of Ukraine Military Viewed [V. Smirnov; VECHERNIY KIEV, 19 Nov 91] .....	21
Ukraine Parliament on Defense Structure [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 17 Dec 91] .....	22
Military Developments in Ukraine .....	22
Kravchuk Becomes Commander in Chief [A. Polyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Dec 91] .....	22
Commanders, Kravchuk Discuss Ukrainian Army [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Dec 91] .....	22
Ukrainian 'Self-Defense' Unit Forms [A. Druzhkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Dec 91] .....	22

#### ARMED FORCES

Shaposhnikov on Army Status, Lobov Removal [O. Vladykin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Dec 91] .....	23
New Defense Ministry Appointments .....	24
Decree on Chief of General Staff [KRASNAYA ZVESDA, 10 Dec 91] .....	24
Samsonov Biographical Data [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Dec 91] .....	24
Rear Services Chief Fuzhenko Biography [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Dec 91] .....	24
District Commander Named for Leningrad [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Dec 91] .....	25
Army Paper Profiles New Turkistan MD Commander [G.G. Kondratyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Dec 91] .....	25
Transcaucasus MD Report Itemizes Stolen Weapons [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Dec 91] .....	25
Business Training For WGF Troops In Germany [V. Chistyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 Dec 91] ....	26
Expenditures on Arms Continue to Decrease [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 3 Dec 91] .....	27
Cases of HIV Infection in Army Reported [V. Mukhin; NEZAMVISIMAYA GAZETA, 3 Dec 91] .....	27

## AIR FORCES, AIR DEFENSE TROOPS

- Need for Improving Aviation Reserves Outlined [K. Tikhanovich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Dec 91] .. 29  
System for Training PVO Radar Troops Criticized [G. Dubrov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Dec 91] ..... 29

## NAVAL FORCES

- Division of Former USSR Fleet Decried [V. Pyrkh; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 17 Dec 91] ..... 31  
Controversy over Ship Names Viewed [V. Luchko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Jan 92] ..... 31  
Northern Fleet Preparations for Winter [S. Pykhach; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Dec 91] ..... 32  
New Mooring for New Northern Fleet Aircraft Carrier  
[V. Masalskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Dec 91] ..... 33

## STRATEGIC MISSILE TROOPS

- President, Kobets Roles in Nuclear Control [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 Nov 91] ..... 35  
Missile Troops 'Ecological' Units Formed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Jan 92] ..... 35

## REAR SERVICES, LOGISTICS

- Northern Group Housing Needs Unmet [O. Sargsyan; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Dec 91] ..... 36  
Belarus Military Housing Finished [P. Chernenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Dec 91] ..... 36  
Col Gen Chekov on Problems of Homeless Servicemen [N. Chekov; PRAVDA, 12 Dec 91] ..... 36  
Defense Aide on 'Housing Catastrophe' [L.N. Kotov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Dec 91] ..... 38  
Navy Rear Services Chief Heads Privatized Supply Company  
[A. Danilin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Dec 91] ..... 40

## MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES

- Spring Draft Problems [L. Grinchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Dec 91] ..... 41  
Naval Specialist Shortages Noted [V. Yerosyan; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Dec 91] ..... 42  
Protection for Servicemen After Discharge  
[V. Frontov and M. Matskovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Dec 91] ..... 42  
Military Contract System [A. Ivashchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Dec 91] ..... 44

## MILITARY EDUCATION

- Future of Military Training Institutions Considered  
[N. Dvoynishnikova; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 19 Dec 91] ..... 46

## DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION

- Conversion at Chelyabinsk-70 Nuclear Weapons Facility [G. Shcherbina; IZVESTIYA, 25 Nov 91] ..... 47

## MAIN AND CENTRAL DIRECTORATES

- Military Counterintelligence Chief on Methods, Tasks  
[Yu. Bulygin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Dec 91] ..... 49

## SECURITY TROOPS

- Head of Ukrainian Military Counterintelligence Interviewed  
[O. Skipalskyy; MOLOD UKRAYINY, 17 Oct 91] ..... 52  
OMON Officers on Corruption, Persecution [S. Karkhanin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 17 Dec 91] ..... 54  
MVD Official Argues for Withdrawal from Transcaucasus  
[A. Kulikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Dec 91] ..... 55  
Barannikov Addresses Security Personnel [TRUD, 24 Dec 91] ..... 57

### Yeltsin Meeting With Military Leaders

92UM0254B Moscow MOSKOVSKIY  
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 1

[Interview with Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, by Yuliya Khaytina; place and date not given: "The Military Are With Yeltsin"]

[Text] To be more precise, the result of Boris Yeltsin's meeting with the commanders of arms of the service, the military districts, and so forth was in the words of Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, formulated as follows: "There was complete understanding." The Russian president told the military of the history of the emergence of the agreement of the three and of the document itself, and as a result the latter fully supported the idea of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

"I believe," Sergey Filatov said, "that this was a big victory. This conversation will help stabilize the situation in the armed forces, which had reached crisis point of late. Take if only the meeting in the Frunze Academy—questions of the possibility of the use of weapons were put to the government directly. The military did not understand: They had given their oath to one country, but today it no longer existed, it seemed. It had to be explained that it had not disappeared, not vanished into thin air, but was switching to a different character."

[Khaytina] Sergey Aleksandrovich, on the eve of the meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha Boris Yeltsin signed a decree which spoke of a 90 percent increase as of 1 January 1992 in the salaries of servicemen of the USSR Defense Ministry and in the wage rates and salary scales of the employees of military units, institutions, and other structures related to the military department. One suspects that this step was not taken without an ulterior motive....

[Filatov] No, this is not the case. Had the "Triple Union" been thought up prior to the trip to Brest, Nazarbayev would have been in the company of the leaders of the three Slav states also, I believe. On the eve of the trip the leadership of the Russian parliament met with Boris Nikolayevich. We spoke about the fact that without Ukraine the Union was impossible and that something had to be devised. Yeltsin said that he would go to meet with Kravchuk and Shushkevich in Minsk to discuss this question.

[Khaytina] Does it not seem to you that Nazarbayev could take strong exception to such a surprise?

[Filatov] I have today learned, incidentally, that the president of Kazakhstan is prepared to sign the agreement.

[Khaytina] Gorbachev met with military leaders recently also. And some of them, like, for example, General of the Army Yuriy Maksimov, commander of the strategic deterrent forces, consider the president of the USSR "master of the situation"....

[Filatov] Speaking of the need for a referendum and congresses, which, in his opinion, our republics should conduct, he is in principle right, unless it is considered that delay today threatens death: We took a risky step in postponing the introduction of price liberalization for two weeks as it was. But as far as the fact that the agreement is essentially an intention is concerned, this is right, and for this reason the document itself contains wording to the effect that the USSR has not ceased, but is ceasing to exist. Some coordinating structures will evidently be required for the transitional period, the process of transformations is not a matter of just one day. And I believe that for the president of the USSR it is a matter of honor to participate in it.

[Khaytina] Sergey Aleksandrovich, what, in your view, does the USSR Supreme Soviet represent at this moment? A void or that same coordinating body?

[Filatov] No longer anything, I believe. A day ago at my meeting with deputies of the Union parliament I asked them to end all preparations for any congress.

[Khaytina] In addition, the constitutional law enacted at the last Union congress abolishes it de jure....

[Filatov] If, therefore, the Russian parliament ratifies the agreement, we will recall our deputies from the Union parliament.

### Yeltsin Meeting at Defense Ministry

92UM0254A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY  
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Ravil Zaripov: "'Ninth Wave' on the Frunze Embankment"]

[Text] There was a meeting yesterday between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the USSR Defense Ministry Board and district commanders. The meeting was originally to have been held in the Russian White House, but at the last moment someone made a bold lateral move, and the event took place in the USSR Defense Ministry. Not only the foreign but also the Soviet press remained thereby on the sidelines of the event.

The information gleaned from various places about this meeting has proven sparse. Those in the know formed quite a small group, evidently. Russian structures alluded to their lack of information or gave the conspiratorial assurance that "everything was normal." Yegor Gaydar told journalists the following: "As far as I understand it, there was mutual understanding at the meeting. Everyone realized that the solution to the crisis which has been proposed is the way to stabilization, not destabilization."

The results of the meeting are all the more interesting and important inasmuch as personnel shuffles have been under way for several days in the Defense Ministry. Lobov has been dismissed as chief of the General Staff, and Deputy Defense Ministers Arkhipov and Chekov



are out of a job. An analysis of the situation permits the conclusion that all these shuffles were inspired not by the Defense Ministry but from above and were, to all appearances, connected with recent events.

In principle it is not so much the specific personnel shuffles as determining the trend of these shuffles, from whom it emanates (the Union or republic level), and what its nature is that is important and necessary. Former General Staff Chief Lobov was considered a man of progressive views and a military figure of a liberal cast of mind. Samsonov, who has come to replace him, does not conceal his conservatism, and if he has a gravitation toward the center, it is from the right side. One official version of the dismissal of Lobov (prevalent among the military) was Zhirinovskiy's appearance in the General Staff Academy. Such an appearance did, indeed, take place at the end of last week. Vladimir Volfovich assured the generals, eyewitnesses say, that when he had ascended the "throne," each of those present in the room would see an extra star on his shoulder board. The purport of his promises was the fact that the generals would obtain not luxury apartments exactly, but cottages would be built for them ("the Turks will build them"). Nor did Zhirinovskiy omit to mention the military's food supply ("Popov does not know where to get food from, but I do"), and he assured the latter that their wages would be in accordance with the highest standard. As the eyewitnesses say, Zhirinovskiy's speech was greeted with acclaim, and his every point was accompanied by applause. There is also another version of Lobov's removal, which is not widespread. In the course of a check on the fulfillment of the agreements and treaties with the American side, Lobov concluded, apparently, that we were fulfilling them meticulously, but the Americans were being in no hurry. The USSR was thereby surrendering its positions unilaterally, as it were. But this is only a version.

It has become known from well-informed sources that Admiral Chernavin, commander in chief of the country's Navy, was dismissed yesterday. A number of leaders of the USSR Navy were relieved of their posts also. These are obviously not the last personnel shuffles. The "ninth wave" is hitting the USSR Defense Ministry. The answer to the question of who will occupy the chairs of those who have gone will partially clarify the situation. We will not have long to wait.

#### **Vyrodov Cited on Yeltsin, Generals Meeting**

*PM3012141591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Dec 91 First Edition p 5*

[Interview with Professor I. Vyrodov by correspondent Sergey Nagayev; date and place of interview not stated; first two paragraphs are introduction: "Generals Warmed Before Our Eyes"]

[Text] As is well known, the policy of the Russian president recently finally met with understanding and support from the army leadership. The decisive turning

point in that sense was Boris Yeltsin's meeting with the generals 11 December in the Defense Ministry.

Representatives of the mass media were not admitted to the meeting and so it is not surprising that this event was rather meagerly reported. Today our correspondent talks with Professor I. Vyrodov, who took part in the meeting.

[Nagayev] Ivan Yakovlevich, in the days preceding the Russian president's talk with the leaders of the Armed Forces, many people were in a state of some suspicion: Against the background of the statements of some of those removed from power (we will soon wreak revenge on the democrats, they said) there were persistent rumors of the possibility that the meeting would have grim consequences, almost a repetition of August...

[Vyrodov] I admit that I shared these fears. I was present at the meeting as a member of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president's expert analysis group for questions of defense and security. I knew in advance that it was planned to hold this meeting in the White House but on the last day something changed: In the evening there was a telephone call from the president's office and it was announced that the venue for the meeting was being switched to the main building of the USSR Defense Ministry.

Our group arrived at the designated entrance to the ministry in good time but for some reason we were not let in for a long time. Generals passed by with preoccupied expressions and many of the military leaders with whom we were acquainted did not greet us. I felt uncomfortable and I could not help thinking alarming thoughts, after all the lists admitting us had been issued in advance, as agreed. They only admitted us at the last moment, and then in fact with a guarantee from Dmitriy Volkogonov...

The auditorium was full and, having found seats with difficulty, we looked round. The mood of the audience seemed to me to be cautiously restrained and the atmosphere cold. At exactly 0800 hours President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Marshal Shaposhnikov entered the auditorium. The president began his speech amidst complete silence.

[Nagayev] What questions were touched on during the meeting?

[Vyrodov] Boris Nikolayevich began with a brief analysis of the situation in Russia and other republics. He described the results of the meeting of the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in Brest. He convincingly justified the legality and importance of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] which had been created and stressed that this historic act is a constructive step toward the unification of the republics of the former Soviet Union on a new basis.

Then talk turned to military problems. Understand me correctly, not everything said at the meeting can be made public, so I shall not go into details. In general there was

talk of fundamental problems of military reform, the reorganization of the Armed Forces, the reduction of the military budget, ways of improving our defense system, and the strengthening of the army.

**Lopatin, Tsalko on Russian Defense Committee**  
92UM0265A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 2

[Interview with Major-General of Aviation A.V. Tsalko by Aleksandr Putko; place and date not given: "Does Russia Have a State Committee for Defense Issues? Its Leaders Think Not"]

[Text] Colonel Vladimir Lopatin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Issues, recently declared that this body, which was created more than a year ago, exists... only on paper. This was also confirmed by another deputy chairman, Aleksandr Tsalko, Major-General of Aviation: "It is only six-percent staffed, and we have no communications, premises, or the requisite equipment. The government organ is obviously unfit for work."

In order to understand the reason for this at first sight odd phenomenon let us go back to its sources—to August 1990. The sovereignty parade was rumbling by, military reform was ripe, and people had already begun to talk about a possible division of the Armed Forces. At the same time, however, people's deputies were expressing serious concern in connection with the monopolism of the USSR Defense Ministry, as always inviolable and reliably protected by a wall of secrecy.

"We will not permit it," the people's deputies resolutely declared. "We need our own working body which, in possession of the necessary information, would bring it to our attention."

A decision to form a Russian Defense Department was adopted. V. Lopatin, who had been appointed to the office of deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Public Safety and Cooperation With the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR KGB, embarked on organizational work in August 1990. Since that time the name of the committee has undergone five changes, and the top officials on it have been changed four times. But the government organ has not in fact been created. There have been powerful braking levers.

But perhaps the USSR Defense Ministry can solve its problems itself? And what problems confront it today? I put all these questions to Gen. A.V. Tsalko.

"We have found ourselves in the role of switchmen on duty, on whom a shower of documents has been rained down all at once," A.V. Tsalko said. "Servicemen without accommodations are writing to us. We are getting a multitude of letters from the parents of servicemen, who are demanding an end to the so-called non-regulation relationships in the Army and are emphatically protesting against their sons being sent to

the scenes of interethnic conflict. Thousands of servicemen are dying in peacetime or sustaining crippling injuries on account of inadequate combat equipment and its inept use. We are getting very many letters from the local authorities also. Specifically, it is a question of the land temporarily transferred for Defense Ministry use. This land is not being returned or is being returned in an appalling condition."

[Putko] But does the Defense Ministry not know this? They are its problems, after all.

[Tsalko] It tackles its problems one-sidedly, proceeding from its own interests. How, for example, are the forces being withdrawn from the East European countries being stationed on the territory of Russia? By arbitrary decision, more often than not. The military department simply confronts the local Soviet with a fait accompli.

Another example. The Defense Ministry itself plans the production of military equipment and evaluates it and accepts it itself. There is no alternative evaluation. As a result we have a tremendous number of modifications of long obsolescent arms systems. We increase the efficiency of a submarine five percent, but its cost is tripled.

[Putko] But there is, after all, a government, which should....

[Tsalko] The government was, as you know, headed by Ivan Stepanovich Silayev—a person closely connected with the military-industrial complex. I attempted to meet with him, but understood that the premier did not wish to listen to me. And why should he? Our committee would only have gotten in his way and would have created new problems.

[Putko] Has the situation now changed?

[Tsalko] We have not sensed this as yet. But our committee is needed now more than ever. The Defense Ministry is once again implementing military reform in a monopoly fashion, and attempts are being made in the republics to privatize armed forces. The situation is truly explosive. Like any state structure, the Committee for Defense Issues should in this situation be an effective instrument of the Russian parliament. And for this it should be fully staffed and endowed with command authority. Unfortunately, far from everyone understands this. And some deputies believe that there should be no military people on the committee. Finances should be handled by financial experts, health care by physicians, education by teachers. No one questions this. But problems of the Army should, in the opinion of some people, be handled by civilians. Why? They give a simple explanation—we officers are dependent on our ministry and, consequently, are its lobbyists.

[Putko] Let us imagine that the committee has, nonetheless, been formed and can operate at full strength. With what would you begin?

[Tsalko] With the budget. According to our calculations Russia is spending on defense approximately 100 billion

rubles in old prices. Aside from the resources allocated in the Union budget, much military spending is concealed in various departments. All this needs to be thoroughly investigated. We could bring in independent experts and present the Supreme Soviet of the Federation with computations which are close to the truth. A great deal of work is essential also in the field of legislation connected with Army problems. Particularly now, when attempts are being made to divide up the Armed Forces.

[Putko] Are you for a unified Armed Forces?

[Tsalko] Of course. I am convinced that it cannot be otherwise. For this reason I also believe that the republics do not need defense ministries but committees. But each sovereign republic will decide this question for itself, of course.

### **Afghan Veterans Pledge Mutual Aid**

92UM0301A Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Jan 92 p 4

[Interview with Salavat Khabirov, chairman of an association of Afghan War veterans, by Yu. Dmitriyev; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Mini-Interviews": "You Remember, Comrade!"]

[Text] An association of Afghan War veterans has been formed in the town of Odintsovo near Moscow. Its chairman, Reserve Officer Salavat Khabirov, says:

[Khabirov] All the appreciative names that have been heaped on us! Glorious warriors-internationalists! Brave defenders of our southern borders, which are ostensibly threatened by the imperialist Hydra!... But as soon as this cruel and senseless war ended, our guys came home. And... we were instantly forgotten, let alone those who had been brought back to cemeteries on home soil by the Black Tulip of sad fame. We have not even been given legal status equal to that of the participants of World War II. Parliament members are arguing and making noise, but nothing has come out of it to this day.

Therefore, now former "Afgantsy" [Afghan War veterans] are banding together in various commercial associations, cooperatives, and brigades, so that they can earn their daily bread for themselves and help relatives and loved ones of those who died in the field or disabled colleagues.

[Dmitriyev] What specific form does this help take?

[Khabirov] We have such an association operating in our town of Odintsovo, which sent over 500 of its young people to this wretched Afghanistan. We opened up a store, called Veteran, and started a shop that produces mixed fodder... On New Year's Eve we gathered in our alma mater, School No. 7, the mothers of soldiers and relatives of those lost and presented them with flowers and gifts. In addition, we gave each parent 1,000 rubles [R], and R500 to each orphaned child. Before this, at the end of summer, we gave R3,000 to each soldier's family out of money earned by the association. Now we are

planning to erect a monument in the city in memory of our combat friends. We have collected the money and purchased the granite. The next thing to do is the design...

### **Special Unit Handling Deserters**

92UM0220B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Major S. Chernous: "...But the Deserters Are Getting Fat"]

[Text] The subunit that Major G. Shapovalenko commands was not envisaged either in the organizational-position schedule or in military reform ideas. It was created in our troubled times under the influence of the movement of soldiers' mothers and the letters of servicemen's parents.

Deserters, who left their units for various reasons, were assembled in the subunit.

"The 'travel permit' to come here is issued by the procurator of the district," said Major Shapovalenko. "This is after the deserter, who is arrested or who voluntarily appears before the procurator, writes an explanatory note..."

I had occasion to become acquainted with the contents of many explanatory notes. And here is what struck the eye: They are as alike each other as two peas in a pod. The main reason for leaving a unit: beatings and humiliation of one group by another. The explanatory note is the basis for initiating criminal proceedings, which at times last for months. What do the deserters do all of this time?

"They are getting fat," Colonel B. Dagoyev, commander of the unit, said in a temper. "You cannot pick another expression for it. You cannot put them on detail, and even less so on guard duty..."

"Sensing their privileged position, they begin to get insolent. There is no keeping them in check," complained Lieutenant Colonel G. Borodin.

From the moment this collection point for soldier deserters was established, the surrounding villages have had no peace. More than 50 criminal cases were filed recently against deserters for misdemeanors. Literally the other day, the procuracy of Novochoerkassk brought criminal charges against Privates M. Drygin and S. Petryu, who, being absent without leave, committed a crime; Private S. Mikhaylov in Rostov-na-Donu hijacked a motor vehicle and destroyed it. Was it worth it for the soldier to flee from Estonia to come here in order to sit in jail in his native country? Since August, Private N. Chernykh has been wandering in the vicinity of the garrison. Sometimes he will come for a day or two, and he deserts again. Private A. Banadnsev has been absent for two weeks. When such a "volunteer" soldier is

caught, he immediately tells the procuracy: He says, they were insulting me, and so I left. But now try to figure it out...

Hundreds of people have gone through this "special" subunit. The command element of the unit studied each one carefully. Alas, a few indicated the true reason for the desertion.

Basically, the contingent of the subunit consists of inveterate violators of military discipline," emphasized Colonel Dagoyev.

The question automatically comes up: Why bring violators of law and order from all ends of the country here to the territory of the North Caucasus Military District? Is it not better for servicemen who leave their units to go to their place of service immediately so that there, on the spot, the workers of the military procurators can determine the true reasons for the desertion. Let the collection point for servicemen function there where they deserted from their units in the SKVO [North Caucasus Military District]. In such a case, military jurists could conduct an investigation into the facts of the desertion, and they would be able in a timely way to protect those who suffered insults and humiliation. But, in the meantime, the bacillus of slovenliness and permissiveness that reigns among the deserters is penetrating the subunits of the regiment. The lack of punishment for the commitment of crimes by some leads to apathy in the service of others.

### Muscovites Polled on Chances of Coup

92UM0291A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Once Bitten...?"]

[Text] Politicians are making gloomy predictions of yet another coup d'etat in our country. Is this a once bitten, twice shy phenomenon?

Let us not try to guess if their predictions are well-grounded or if the politicians who appear in public with such statements are well-informed. Let us turn to public opinion. On Monday 9 December a group of correspondents and social scientists manned the contact telephone of our newspaper's "hot line" for several hours. They were polling readers as they called the number. Responses to the question: "Do you consider an attempt at a military or some other coup to be probable?" fell into the following groups (given in percentages):

Yes, I think it is probable	75.5
No, I do not think so	22.5
I did not think about it	2.0

Some of our readers' statements were not as terse. Almost every person who called tried to explain why this gloomy forecast had become possible. What is looming behind this fear?

Here is the percentage of those who said "Yes, I think it is probable" seeing the forecasted events as:

the people's protest	52.6
a natural transition	15.8
the authorities' resignation	10.5
something that had already taken place on 8 December	5.3
necessary even if it does not take place	5.3
other	10.5

The percentage of those who said "No, I do not think so" who:

are afraid of a coup because it may lead to total destruction	27.2
are convinced it would not happen as there is no one to lead it	18.2
wish for extraordinary measures instead of a coup	18.2
are convinced that there would not be any coup	18.2
consider all talk of a coup as provocation	18.2

It must be mentioned that 18.4 percent of the telephone calls were anonymous, in other words almost one out of five people were afraid to discuss this topic openly—our people continue to suspect that someone may use their words to harm them if the occasion arises. This, obviously, is not an accident: 45 percent of those polled are people of retirement age. The other 55 percent of the poll participants are workers, engineers, mechanics, and white-collar employees. There was a call from one foreigner.

We would like to quote the most typical pronouncements made by our readers.

Neokladova, retiree. A coup is inevitable if our present government does not change its position; it can hardly stay in power.

I. Kuzmin, retired captain, 2nd group invalid. We need any coup to chase out the democrats. We need the USSR. We will support the people who are going to do it.

Yu. Volynayev, 56. The probability of a coup depends on the situation with the economy in the country.

Z. Dubenkova. The unbelieving ones should stand in lines and listen to the people. We have been so humiliated recently!

An employed communications worker. Once they abandon the Soviet Union, there will be a coup. They had a referendum in March, the people expressed their opinion, and now some two or three persons are entering into some commonwealth.



M. Ivanova, retiree. It would be better without a coup so that everything is quiet, but nobody is asking us whether we want capitalism or a price hike or anything. But everybody is speaking in the name of the people.

N. Kolashan, housewife. What is going to change if there is a coup? There will not be more food. The people will still have no rights. The only thing to happen will be more bloodshed.

A retired serviceman. The people are dissatisfied with the authorities. Stealing and corruption are everywhere, society is breaking into separate tiers. Those who do not work are eating. But those who work do not have anything. We should be on our guard.

A. Yegorov, 60. We cannot go on living like this! There will be no coup, but we need one. I would have gone out into the streets too. To remove those who do not know how to be leaders.

V. Vavanova, Ye. Barinova, Urusov, engineers from the same collective. People's dissatisfaction and the mood among officers and soldiers may be exploited. The government has to stay closer to the military who can support the people. If there is a coup, all of us may perish.

E. Obrosova, publishing house artist. Given the unsettled situation with the military who were removed from East European countries, I think a coup is possible even though I think that the people have calmed down.

These direct contacts with our readers proved that the time of unanimous opinions and views is really gone. Every separate conversation showed a different concept of the balance of forces in our society. Most people talk openly and frankly, and have a sober opinion of the events around them. The scope of people's thinking has expanded, their feeling of the responsibility of a citizen has intensified. This means that the reader of today can actively participate in managing our country and be independent in defining its destiny. We hope that our mutual contacts with readers will continue.

### Coup Cases Viewed; Military Budget Outlined

92UM0289B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 28 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "From the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: Fewer Weapons, More Apartments"]

[Text] In the morning, when the issue of the agenda was discussed, members of parliament also allocated time for a request by the Russian Federation Procuracy. Procurator of Russia V. Stepankov sought the consent of the Supreme Soviet to file criminal charges against Colonel General V. Achalov, people's deputy of the republic and former USSR deputy minister of defense. In the opinion of the procurator, there are grounds to believe that

Achalov was involved in the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case.

A number of issues immediately arose. One of them has now become cardinal for members of the military—is it possible to bring criminal charges against a serviceman if he followed the orders of his superior? Achalov is a combat general; he commanded Airborne Troops. During the days of the GKChP's operations he was USSR deputy minister of defense, that is, not a member of the government at all, but strictly a subordinate.

V. Stepankov responded to this question: The investigative team has reasons to believe that General Achalov was not at all a secondary executor of the will of the plotters. Deputy S. Baburin saw fit to raise the issue as follows: Since the USSR does not exist anymore, should the investigation of the people accused of treason to this now nonexistent state be continued? The answer was that the members of the GKChP are not charged with treason to the Motherland but rather with conspiracy to seize power and depose the president...

Everything hinged on the absence of Achalov himself from the floor, due to a commonplace injury. They resolved to postpone the consideration of the issue until such time as the general is able to explain his position to the deputies, either in writing or verbally. V. Stepankov also refuted rumors which appeared in the mass media to the effect that another six serviceman-people's deputies of Russia are potential inmates of the Matrosskaya Tishina prison.

Ye. Gaydar, deputy chairman of the government of Russia and minister of economics and finance, spoke before the deputies later. He familiarized the members of parliament with the main directives for developing the budget for the first quarter of 1992. The minister's report amounted to something akin to a budgetary briefing. It provided a certain outline of the expenditure policy of the new government. In particular, one of the items of expenditure, defense spending, will be cut back as much as possible due to the restricting of the procurement of weapons and combat materiel and the winding down of defense production. On the other hand, it is envisaged to increase expenditures for the social needs of servicemen as well as those of retirees.

The plan is to substantially reduce subsidies to production sectors, with the exception of coal mining and the dairy industry. Subsidies for health care, education, and culture will remain at the previous level. In the opinion of the government, the rest of the subsidy system should undergo changes in the direction of a sharp reduction of outlays.

### Editorial Blasts Treatment of Military

92UM0215A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin in the column "A View From the Editorial Office": "Let the State Take an Oath to the Soldier Too"]

[Text] A captain called the editorial office and told us that they wanted to assign him to serve in Tbilisi whereas he resisted this turn of events in his life. In the matter, the captain had his reasons: The doctors advise against a change of climate—this may affect the health of his child. However, the command insisted on having its way, reminding the captain about his duty as a soldier and being faithful to the military oath. The Officer Assembly was being brought in to have a word with a fellow regimental officer about the officer's honor. Perhaps, under the circumstances, there is only one thing for the captain to take solace in—there is no political department in tandem with the party committee to give him a hard time. However, on occasion precisely these strict echelons brought out human feelings in commanders. However, this is beside the point.

I am trying to visualize the following situation, and I cannot do it: Any free citizen, be he a worker, a cooperative member, a scientist, or even a broker, is suddenly uprooted from his accustomed location with approximately the following justification: "The interests of the Motherland require this. We do not promise you an apartment, or good money. Incidentally, we do not promise security to either your family or you personally. There is one thing we promise—it is going to be rough. But, after all, you are a worker (a cooperative member, a scientist, a broker, and so on)." A timid attempt to avoid the payment of one's debt to society is harshly suppressed by his superiors and colleagues. So, here he is, a free citizen, en route to wherever they assigned him, ennobled by the gratitude of the Motherland.

Indeed, this is an outrageously improbable picture. You cannot pull a stunt like this with a free citizen. Both the law and public opinion will protect him against such tyranny. As far as conversations about one's duty to some Motherland are concerned, they would not be received even as a joke. However, as soon as we start talking about a member of the military in the same context, there will be no irony, and no bewilderment on account of rights which have been violated. Our vocabulary changes, and notions such as "freedom of personality," "interests of an individual," "profitable-unprofitable," "plurality of opinions," and so on, altogether disappear from circulation. No matter how you slice it, it ultimately turns out that in existing reality, only one category of citizens remains for which the word "duty" still has a meaning. They are servicemen. Nobody owes anybody anything anymore. Only the men in uniform are forever in debt to the state, the existence of which many are already doubting.

The cheerful Mikhail Zhvanetskiy recently shared the secret of his feeling great on the first channel of Central Television: He is happy because he is free. As far as the rest is concerned, he said, canned foods will help him out. I was happy for him: At least someone was doing all right in our times. However, given my accursed profession, in my mind I immediately turned to those whose lives and existence I know firsthand. When will you, my comrade, an engineer on a nuclear-powered missile

vessel, who has changed five apartments and at age 40 was left without a roof over your head, be happy? Or you, a captain of Air Defense Troops, whose "post" has been under siege for a second year now because, as bad luck would have it, it is in a republic which has gained freedom? When will your lucky number come up, so you will be able to move your family to where bullets do not fly? When will you finally feel a free man, a major of the Internal Troops who has been tossed by the "grateful Motherland" for the third year now from Stepanakert to Baku, from Baku to Osh, from Osh to Gyandzha, and from Gyandzha... When will the path end and how? Perhaps, this has to do with the fact that, to use Zhvanetskiy's words once again, the universal welfare formula does not apply: "We have what we guard." Do the defenders of the Motherland cornered in the Baltics, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan guard what they no longer have? It would be interesting to know whether they now feel like soldiers, not even of a mighty power, but of just any state which is capable of taking care of them and not leaving them one on one with the lawlessness of national idiotism.

Hardly a day goes by without our learning that a military unit was robbed somewhere, military vehicles were stolen somewhere else, and in yet another place, servicemen were beaten up and had their weapons taken away from them. I share the indignation of front line veterans who respond to such incidents unequivocally: In our time, we had a firmer grasp on our weapons. Esteemed veterans, you indeed had a firm grip on your weapons, but you had your native hearths behind your backs, and an enemy in front of you. The arrangement is different in the case of your children and grandchildren. In the last two or three years, they have gained some experience: Do not hasten to display military valor when politicians make a "mess" because, in the long run, your chances of ending up behind bars are too high. Those who now go against you in a bandit-like manner, weapons in hand, will be called the "conscience of the people" tomorrow, and you will be branded a murderer and a criminal. Somehow I cannot recall a single case in recent years when those guilty of attacking servicemen in Transcaucasia were arrested and tried. Quite the opposite, the life of a soldier, warrant officer, or officer in the Transcaucasian Military District is less protected with every passing day. Without exaggeration, we may say that just as our servicemen over there do not feel support from the state, bandits of various stripes who attack military units have behind them the secure rear areas of their independent republics. Otherwise, why this overt and arrogant terror against the Armed Forces—forces which at present are incapable even of defending themselves?

Major Berilev was killed as his wife and daughter looked on. This was not the first barbaric crime against men in uniform, nor is there a guarantee that it will be the last. This was a quite common occurrence in our "space." The press did not get excited; not even a slight ripple was registered in governmental circles; the parliaments did



not shudder. They certainly put the ransacked "service quarters" where the major and his family huddled, in regulation order, and it awaits the next "table-of-organization assignment." Could it be the captain we have mentioned above?

Actually, the captain resists going to Tbilisi. We need to consider this fact, stupefying as it may be for martinet personnel officers, from a different angle than we did yesterday. Before we try to convince the officer that the health of his son is a trifle compared to the interests of the service, that performing his military duty is the main thing rather than his wife and his son, before we break, intimidate, and persecute him, and reproach him for dishonorable conduct, why should we not ask ourselves a simple question: Why is he supposed to remain a "cog" in this "unified economic space" at a time when none of his fellow citizens, with the exception of himself and his kind, wish to be such "cogs?" After all, not a whole lot is needed at present—for starters, to change the tone and system of arguments. Having said "You must!" and "You have a duty!", definitely say, "The state owes you. The state has a duty to you." Our native state should now swear loyalty to its armed defenders: "As I, the State, summon you, the Citizen, for difficult and dangerous military labor, I swear..." Nothing special is necessary beyond a guarantee of normal, human living conditions for the servicemen and their families. Plus a guarantee that the state, whatever it might become, will never, under any circumstances, betray them and hurl them into the inferno as a chip in a political game.

I do not know what the case is in other countries, but why is it that in our country the serviceman is forever the victim of duty? Why must he endlessly sacrifice the welfare of his family on the altar of his duty, and turn his own existence into a string of commonplace difficulties of life? To be sure, military service is not a pleasurable occupation. In any country, it presupposes a high degree of dedication and readiness for self-sacrifice. However, this is precisely why it would be natural to expect that society will try to offset the difficulties and hardship of the service with the joys of living. As I see it, a shift in public consciousness in this direction is not even emerging at present. Even a slight, measured pay increase for the servicemen results in a wave of phone calls to the editorial office the essence of which may be summed up by the expression: "Parasites; they have it too good!"

At a recent meeting of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Government Ye. Gaydar said approximately the following: We are not going to economize on solving the social problems of servicemen. Not a single individual who devoted himself to the army should come to regret it.

In recent years, the army has heard a great deal of promises. However, at some point the words should stop being just words...

### Social Problems in Military Discussed

92UM0257A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel S. Prokofyev, candidate of philosophical sciences: "You Cannot Get Along Without Sociology; Military Reform: Problems and Proposals"]

[Text] I learned from the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of the reconstitution of the Center for Sociopsychological Research under the USSR Ministry of Defense and of the formation of an association of military sociologists. While giving due credit for the decisions that were made, I cannot help but express sincere regret over the extent of their delay.

There is no doubt that during the reformation of the armed forces it will be necessary to raise the sociological service qualitatively as well. After all, sociologists have been working in modern armies and fundamentally in the interests of defense for a long time. In this connection, it is sufficient to mention just these works of American researchers: "The Professional Soldier," "Soldiers of the State," "The American Private," and others that played a decisive role in harmonizing the relations of society and the army, in increasing the social status and prestige of servicemen, but, mainly, in professionalizing military work and creating a professional army.

In talking about our military sociologists, we, as previously, involve ourselves primarily in describing social processes and social practices in the army, not having an adequate research base and a data bank of primary information for purposeful research work. But the fact that it is circumscribed, as the saying goes, is obvious. And is not this the reason for the long time that it is taking to construct a concept of new military reform? After all, there is still no complete clarity on the question concerning the ultimate objectives of the reorganization of the army. Or, let us take, for example, a narrower, but as previously, a very critical problem, like "dedovshchina" [hazing of recruits] and interethnic conflicts in military collectives. Who will resolve this in the new army and how?

If one proceeds from the reports concerning the work of the commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the elimination of military-political organs and structures for work with personnel, then the resolution of relations that are at variance with regulations in the company (group)-battalion link, apparently, rests on the shoulders of the assistant commander for personnel work, who is deprived of authoritative powers. Given very limited rights, will he be able to reduce to naught phenomena that a whole staff of political workers could not cope with? And especially if the previous forms and methods of work in this direction will be utilized, inasmuch as former political workers, possessing the same baggage of knowledge and experience, will begin to work in the new positions. After all, the proposed quick reorientation of yesterday's political worker in mastering the knowledge

of social psychology is possible only theoretically. The right to such an assertion is given to me by many years of analysis of the work among troops who graduated from higher military-political schools. In addition, the subject of social psychology is new and rather complicated (by virtue of its specificity) not only for officers and cadets, but even for teachers of a VUZ [higher educational institution].

It will not be an exaggeration to say that the failure in fighting relations at variance with regulations in many ways is explained precisely by the lack of officers' knowledge of the sociological methods of collecting and processing primary information, and by existing prohibitions on the conduct of this kind of work on the part of the higher command. Meanwhile, specific sociological research regularly conducted in subunits and units (two-three times a month) could be a unique barometer of the sociopsychological climate in the military environment, and it would facilitate the concentration of the efforts of commanders-leaders not on the effects, but on the causes that engender various phenomena and conflicts. Knowledge by the officers of military sociology would help resolve many and many questions of academic and operational training of troops and mutual relations in military collectives.

I am confident that the respecialization of former political workers should follow the path most of all of their mastering the principles of military sociology and methods of sociological research. But the regiments need staff sociologists with appropriate qualifications and training, and divisions (armies) need a sociological support service. Apparently, it is necessary for assistant commanders for personnel work to organize special courses for retraining and to publish appropriate reference and methodological literature.

Of course, this work will take not just a day or two and not just a month. However, without the creation of a solid sociological support service in troop units, and without mastery by officers of military sociological knowledge and methods of sociological research, it will hardly be possible to talk about educational work in the army and in the navy, about the professionalization of military work, and about increasing the social status of the "person with the rifle."

Soldiers of the army and navy have a right to qualified management—the kind that ensures not only a growth in professionalism and competence, but also an improvement in the conditions of military work and daily living. Herein lies the managerial usefulness of sociology. For it is based not simply on experience, but on systematic observation, study, and, to the extent possible, "measurement" of social processes and phenomena of social reality. Until very recently, the comprehension of social reality among the troops was tolerated exclusively on the basis of projecting quotations from Marxism-Leninism and subsequent party decisions on facts in real life. And, if in the future we start to use this method again, spurning even the new quotes, but which, as before, are

raised to the rank of the highest truth, then we will still attain the very same results.

### Proliferation of Weapons Criticized

92UM0301C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Politicians, Please Understand: It Fires!"]

[Text] It is a theatrical maxim that if there is a gun on the stage, it must be fired during the play. If the political stage becomes flooded with a mass of "free-floating" arms not controlled by any stable government structures, this is a harbinger of bloodshed.

Alas, there is more than enough evidence to support this: Tbilisi, Nagornyy Karabakh, South Ossetiya... Every day brings news from these "hot spots"—news of new skirmishes, clashes, casualties. The scale of the warfare and the number of casualties sustained by the parties involved in the conflict are comparable to that of small, local, but nevertheless real wars.

Each conflict has its own underpinnings and reasons, but they have one thing in common: The shootings and the killings are accomplished mostly with firearms stolen from Army or Internal Troops units, the militia, or the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Collaboration with the Army, Air Force, and Navy].

Today we are reaping the fruits of a thoughtless, irresponsible policy: on the one hand, of those who, in a struggle for a seemingly noble idea of national revival, are not squeamish about relying on stolen weapons, and, on the other, those who, while pontificating about "consensus" and "new thinking," calmly watched illegal combat formations multiply and grow literally in front of our eyes.

Some are now reproaching the military for not doing everything possible to protect their weapons, to keep the machine guns, grenades, and ammunition out of strangers' hands... Yes, some of the blame is fair: Servicemen often were unprepared to resist. We have to keep in mind, though, that they had to deal—and still do—not with solitary attacks but with what amounted to a wide-scale weapons hunt. And that in this situation it is difficult to count on assistance from local law enforcement organs. Rather the opposite.

Finally, the Army was continuously put in an ambiguous situation by the ambiguous position of the center. Let us recall, for example, the story with Gorbachev's decree of July 1990 on disarming illegal formations. The decree was written in a seemingly decisive tone, but did not contain any specific mechanisms and, even worse, was not backed up by the political will to see it implemented. First, it was decreed to implement the disarming within 15 days; then the deadline was extended; and then it seemed that everybody forgot about the decree... Had it

indeed been implemented, perhaps the current large-scale bloodshed would not be happening.

Weapons are like a genie that should not be let out of the bottle. A characteristic trend noticed by many commentators: In Tbilisi, where former allies in the struggle against the center are ferociously battling each other, the majority of population, frightened and alienated, are simply waiting for the outcome. They are not the ones making policy. It appears that policy is not even being made anymore by any strata, classes, or clans pursuing their own interests. To a large extent policy is being made by weapons, which under certain circumstances acquire a self-sufficient role and spontaneous destructive power...

It would be good if those who are vested with the right to make political decisions understood this. Understood and learned a lesson. Because these same "free," uncontrolled weapons are already spilling over the borders of the current "hot spots." In many not yet "hot" places various sorts of "guards," self-defense squads, and militarized organizations are growing and multiplying. There are some who are again scoring points from this, try to prop up their political positions in this way... What if it reaches critical mass here, too?

There is no doubt that the current CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] leaders have inherited a heavy burden from the former center. Piles of problems, and not all can be addressed right away. But the problem of weapons floating around the former Union belongs on a list of priorities. It requires urgent and coordinated action. So that there will not be ever more new Karabakhs.

### Chronicle of Events

#### Tbilisi

On 1 January an intensive exchange of fire started in downtown Tbilisi; by 1500, Government House had been shelled by fire from antiaircraft guns. A new attempt to storm the Government House was undertaken during the night of 1-2 January, but was not successful.

Skirmishes continue in various areas of Tbilisi. The center of the city is practically destroyed. According to some reports, the number of casualties on both sides has reached about 200 people.

\*\*\*

"Extremely grave"—this was the way Georgiy Arveladze, the newly appointed deputy military commandant of Tbilisi, described the situation on 3 January, the first day of the declared state of emergency. In his interview to the Russian Information Agency, he said that tremendous quantities of weapons are now in the hands of the populace. In his words, the new military authorities intend "to do everything possible to confiscate them." From now on, a special permit from the

commandant will be required for carrying arms. Georgiy Arveladze believes that the main tasks of the new authorities are to stabilize the situation in Tbilisi, ensure the safety of residents, and restore the normal functioning of fire and ambulance services. He noted that the new authorities already have the center of the city under control and expressed the hope that the current negotiations with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs will be successful and that the militia will obey the new authorities.

#### South Ossetiya

The night of 2-3 January went by relatively quietly on the territory of South Ossetiya. However, in the seats of the crisis—at remote approaches to Tskhinval and in Znaurskiy Rayon—the confrontation between the Georgian and Ossetian sides continued, with occasional shots being fired.

In the opinion of Oleg Teziyev, commander of the South Ossetian armed forces, the temporary quiet is the result of the fact that a number of shock troops—supporters of the president of Georgia—had been redeployed in Tbilisi.

#### Kazakhs Support Unitary Nuclear Command

92UM0220D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 12 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Kazakhstan Does Not Need a Nuclear Button"]

[Text] "Kazakhstan does not need a nuclear button," declared Lieutenant General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, chairman of the State Defense Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which was recently established by an ukase of the president. In an interview with the newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, he asserted that Kazakhstan supports a unified military-strategic space. Therefore, strategic forces should be under a unified collective command, with a unified Ministry of Defense and General Staff.

#### General Comments on Army's Right to Self-Defense

LD1912093691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak  
Network in Russian 1622 GMT 14 Dec 91

[Interview with Lieutenant General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov, head of administration at the Ministry of Defense, by correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova; place and date not given; from the "Panorama" program—recorded]

[Text]

[Chemodanova] Leonid Grigoryevich, servicemen are being killed in many parts of our country, especially in the Transcaucasus. It would seem that the Army, which is supposed to defend the country against attack, is now

forced to defend itself and members of service families. What can one do in such a situation?

[Ivashov] The issue is a simple one, I think. Firstly, every individual, every citizen has the right to self-defense. I think that servicemen are no exception. In fact this is what many units and garrisons are already doing in a number of places. They are taking both collective and individual measures to defend their own lives and the lives of members of their families.

They also have to defend military installations. We are governed by military regulations. Nobody has rescinded them. Military regulations apply to sentry duties at garrisons. These give sentries the right to use their weapons if a military installation is attacked. But the fact that many more of these sentries now have to be posted is a different matter. The minister of defense resolutely requires that commanders of formations and units take steps, in accordance with existing laws, to prevent attacks and, especially, the death of servicemen and members of their families. So, these measures will be taken. If it becomes necessary, weapons and ammunition will probably be issued to officers and men.

But I wish to stress yet again that everyone has a right to see to his own security. It is the duty of every commander to safeguard the security of his subordinates and to take steps to enforce this. So, everything will be done in the context of the laws which govern us today, within the framework, the confines of necessary defense.

[Chemodanova] There is evidence, especially in the Transcaucasus, that Army weapons are being pilfered. They are being stolen from armories. In spite of the guard on such buildings, these weapons are falling into the hands of extremists and people who are prepared to do anything, even kill servicemen, to get their hands on weapons.

[Ivashov] Yes, that is unfortunately the case these days. You mentioned the Transcaucasus. Let me give you a few figures. So far this year one tank, one armored personnel carrier, seven rocket launchers, 272 automatic weapons, four machine guns, and 109 pistols have been taken in the Transcaucasus. Most of them were taken during attacks on armories, sentries and individual servicemen, and in hijackings of our vehicles. Well, security measures may have been inadequate. But the minister of defense has now ordered that every vehicle carrying servicemen or military goods in transit be guarded properly, that in the event of attack servicemen must behave exactly as they would if a military installation were attacked.

Well, we know why these weapons are sought. They are wanted for all kinds of crime, for the establishment of extremist guerrilla organizations and even for the equipping of national armies. But I stress yet again that the Ministry of Defense will take decisive action.

### **Kaliningrad Battalion Demands More Housing**

92UM0246A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "Military Engineers Give the City an Ultimatum"]

[Text] The combat engineer battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Belous has repeatedly taken part in defusing explosive objects which are found in great numbers in the territory of Kaliningrad and Kaliningrad Oblast to this day.

Military engineers find and defuse especially many lethal mementos of the war on sites where residential buildings are erected. However, military engineers themselves live under conditions which are far from favorable. Only 20 percent of the officers and warrant officers have their own housing. In the past two years, not a single apartment has been allocated to the battalion.

Recently an Officer Assembly was held in the unit. It resolved as follows: Unless the executive committees of Leningradskiy, Oktyabrskiy, and Tsentralnyy Rayons of Kaliningrad allocate at least one apartment each before 20 January, the military engineers of the battalion refuse to go out on mine removal calls. The engineers also demand that they be paid for each call.

### **Bank Note Shortage Disrupts Soldiers' Pay**

92UM0289A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Dec 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "There Is No Money in the Bank..."]

[Text] Novosibirsk—Arriving on the appointed days to receive their monthly pay, servicemen from the units and establishments of the Novosibirsk garrison heard the phrase which has now become customary: "There is no money in the bank."

This was the case not only with officers and warrant officers, but with enlisted men too. The latter were forced to seek support... from their parents. However, it is not always possible to receive cash at the post offices of Novosibirsk either.

As Lieutenant Colonel V. Vasilevskiy, chief of the financial service department of the Siberian Military District, said, monetary funds allocated for the needs of the troops have been transferred to the appropriate bank accounts. However, we have learned that Novosibirsk

Oblast is experiencing a catastrophic cash shortage. Simply put, there is no regular paper money and bank notes.

This is how G. Kutnyakova, chief of the operations directorate of the RSFSR Central Bank for Novosibirsk Oblast, described the existing situation:

"Servicemen were not the only ones to fail to receive their pay. Other organizations financed from the state budget were left without wages, and retirees were left without retirement benefits. We do not have printing presses here. As soon as the notes are delivered from Moscow, the servicemen will receive their pay. This may happen in the last days of this year."



### Armenia To Conduct Call-Up

92UM0224D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by an unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Draft in Armenia"]

[Text] Yerevan—A solemn ceremony of oath taking by new recruits who will serve in national army structures was held in Yerevan. According to a parliamentary resolution, a draft was also conducted in the territory of the republic into the units of the Soviet Army deployed in Armenia, as well as Air Defense, Border Guard, and Civil Defense units. Commentators point out that this will make it possible to bring the share of Armenians in the units of the Soviet Army to between 75 and 90 percent within one and a half to two years. Alternative service within the organization of the internal troops and at key facilities of the national economy, especially in the earthquake zone, is also envisaged.

### Azerbaijan PVO Post 'Nationalized'

92UM0224A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Major A. Ibanov: "From the Air Defense Troops—A Company Has Been 'Nationalized'"]

[Text] At noon on 10 December, eight armed individuals arrived at a separate radar company stationed not far from Nakhichevan. Having produced documents, they announced that, on orders from the republic leadership, they would immediately embark on taking an inventory of all military gear and materiel of the unit and nationalizing it. Threatening company commander Captain V. Isayev with weapons, they made him open up a room in which secret documents are kept, and drew up a list of everything found there. They left upon impounding the control post of the company, the radar, and the motor vehicles. The unit was thus left without communications, and unable to engage in the service of monitoring the situation in the air in the assigned sector.

Unfortunately, we have become accustomed to such episodes recently. However, in this case, we cannot ignore the titles of those engaging in arbitrary acts. This time, the following interfered with the performance of the combat mission to protect the air borders of the state: M. Aliyev, chief of staff of the People's Front of the Nakhichevan Republic; T. Magiyev, deputy chief of the rayon militia department; Z. Ismailov, a functionary of the rayon department of state security; and S. Kuliyeu,

deputy of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet. The officials were sure that such arbitrariness was their direct responsibility.

### Nagorno-Karabakh Withdrawal Called For

92UM0253A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article under the rubric "News": "The Gordian Knot"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Vasilii Savvin, commander of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, stated: "As far as the further stationing of troops in Nagorno-Karabakh is concerned, it does not make sense. If the troops remain politicians will never cut the knot of problems which have piled up in the region."

The commander stressed: "I am firmly convinced that our soldiers and officers should not be the ones to solve political problems. The presence of the troops merely delays them. The servicemen have found themselves in a difficult situation: Both opposing parties wish to win them over as allies whereas we should be intermediaries and act as peacemakers.

"At present, servicemen who are slated to be discharged to the reserves before the end of the year are leaving Nagorno-Karabakh. There are no plans to replace them."

### Belarus Appoints Defense Minister

92UM0224B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Colonel P. Chernenko: "Minister for Defense Affairs of Belarus"]

[Text] Minsk—the Supreme Soviet of Belarus appointed Lieutenant General Petr Grigoryevich Chaus minister for the defense affairs of the republic. He is Belarussian. He was born on 7 January 1939 in the village of Starina, Okopotkevichskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast. In 1960, Chaus graduated from the Tashkent General Military Command School. He commanded a platoon, company, battalion, and regiment, and was the deputy commander of a division. From October 1991, he was chief of staff and deputy chief of USSR Civil Defense. He graduated by correspondence from the Military Political Academy and the Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

In his first presentation at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, Lieutenant General P. Chaus outlined the ways to establish the armed forces of Belarus and prospects for the development of a military reform.



**Nuclear Weapons Surround Tartu***92UN0535F Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,  
22 Nov 91 p 1*

[Article by Jüri Liim: "Taaratown's Nuclear Power"]

[Text] When I disclosed the secrets of Paldiski, I also mentioned briefly that there are nuclear bombs near Tartu. It seemed to me that this information was not taken seriously. Apparently it is not believed because Soviet marshals keep asserting: There are no nuclear weapons in the Baltic area. The same way they recently denied the existence of the reactors in Paldiski. It is too bad that the promises and fairy-tales of the Soviet general staff are still taken for truth, and that these men are being believed. They are believed, primarily, because the agreement with the United States has one item that reads: Atomic weaponry is to be removed from the Baltics. Yes, from time to time, demands have been made on high enough levels to declare the Baltic area free of nuclear weapons, but there has been no detailed review of the situation.

Residents of the Tartu area have been exposed to a lot of grief and psychological stress by the noise, low flying and bustling about caused by the winged killing-machines based on the outskirts of Taaratown [ancient name of Tartu].

Two different kinds of them are located there: Long distance TU-22 bombers and IL-76M transport planes. There are 15 of the first, and 25 to 30 of the other, depending on the situation.

Seven people make up the crew of a transport plane dealing primarily with the hauling of airborne troops. Each load can take 120 soldiers and, depending on need, two armored vehicles or one tank. These could be taken to Europe, or even further.

When speed is of essence, heavy technology is thrown out of the plane with parachutes, the same way the airborne troops are. Not too long ago, in order to gain time, tanks were tossed out along with the crew. However, 90 percent of the time such tossing resulted in reducing the technology into scrap metal and, just as frequently, crippling or killing the crew members. Despite generous awards, the number of those volunteering to sit in a falling tank kept dwindling. Thus the experiments for "speedy battle arrivals" were suspended.

There is another "trick to fool the enemy" that has become very fashionable lately. Namely, the army transport planes are painted in the colors of Aeroflot. This way, it would seem we are no longer dealing with military planes, but rather with a peace-oriented "safe, useful and convenient" civilian air force. In Tartu you can see the same thing. This would be like painting a red cross on the tank and passing it off for an ambulance.

The TU-22 bomber takes a 5-meter long winged rocket with a nuclear head under each wing, and two magazines

in the container, each holding two relatively small tactical nuclear bombs. Thus, there are four of the latter in each plane. All "readiness" maintenance, and release and flight controls are naturally in the hands of the four-member crew.

As I have said before, the chief combat task of the Tartu bombers, in the case of war, is to deliver a blow to the straits of Denmark, and to the objects and settlements there. The Yuryev [Russian name of Tartu] aces will be assisted in their endeavor by their comrades-in-arms from Pskov and St. Petersburg.

Naturally, Tartu's fliers are making their practice flights with training rockets and bombs, i.e. they learn to balance the load on the plane. Their battle drops, however, are done with regular combat bombs.

Well-trained eagles fly with the aforementioned atomic load. Two TU-22 bombers thus armed are on air duty at all times, flying over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorus, also skirting Russia. After that they return to their base location. Sometimes these flights take them out further. Tartu has such patrol duty for 24 hours, and is then relieved by the aforementioned airfields near Pskov and St. Petersburg, until it is Tartu's turn again. Of course, there are also exceptional cases, where one unit or another must make longer flights. I would like to mention in passing that bombing raids to Afghanistan, in their day, were made successfully out of Tartu. This was a significant polygon for purposes of enhancing the combat training of the men. This way, our university town has also made its contribution to the international effort.

I have been asked if there is a nuclear arsenal in Tartu. I can say that it is right on the airfield. The preliminary information received has been confirmed by more detailed data. Also, I have kept my silence up until now, because I had to document the object.

The arsenal is located in three underground hangars, where nuclear warheads and bombs for winged rockets are kept in separate rooms. Both kinds of "merchandise" are encased in lead and packed separately. Of course, the rooms are also furnished/secured accordingly. To my knowledge, there is an arsenal of close to 300 units.

There are only five officers who have access to the arsenal. In addition to these, there is a transport brigade consisting of 30 people, who take the units to the planes in special cars, and load the magazines. The warheads are placed on the winged rockets by specialists.

Located in the same area are the combat units for the winged rockets. Part of them, for lack of space, are camped outside under the tarpaulin, along with the training ammunition.

The whole complex is under special guard and surrounded by its own security fence, in addition to the barbed wire of the airfield. The place is guarded day and night but, somebody with enough patience can find out more, by taking advantage of the moment. Actually, I would not recommend it, because it could lead to shooting.

I also measured the radiation level, which was within the norm, as it was near the reactor buildings at Paldiski. This is due to safety measures mentioned earlier.

#### **Demands for Latvian OMON Chiefs Release**

92UM0220E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Major A. Petrov: "Rally in Defense of S. Parfenov Conducted at the Kremlin Wall"]

[Text] Another rally in defense of Sergey Parfenov, the deputy commander of the former Riga (now Tyumen) OMON [special purpose militia detachment], was held Sunday, 8 December, at the mission of the Latvian Republic.

The wife of Sergey Parfenov—Olga Rodionovna, the mother of four children—spoke to those who had assembled, and there were several thousand of them. "I want to know," she said, "on what grounds my husband, a citizen of the Soviet Union—and no one has yet dissolved the Union—was handed over to a foreign state?" No matter where Olga Parfenova turned, both in Russia and Latvia, she did not get an answer to this question.

Of course, the rally was its own answer. It was not accidental that the ralliers were also addressed by His Excellency Archbishop Lazar of the Moscow and Kashirskaya True Orthodox Church, USSR people's deputies Colonels V. Alksnis and N. Petrushenko, and the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, V. Zhirinovskiy.

Rally participants unanimously adopted a resolution which expressed resolve to achieve the freedom of S. Parfenov at all costs. Within two weeks, 22 December, they intend to return to the question on the fate of the Riga OMON member during a protest march to the television center in Ostankino. If Latvia does not return S. Parfenov, then the most resolute measures will be undertaken. Down to and including obstructing trains heading in the direction of Riga. Judging by the speeches, the gas workers and oil workers of Tyumen promised "to have their weighty say."

And how did the representatives of the Latvian Government react to all of this? None of them, of course, dared to appear before the indignant crowd.

The organizers of the rally did not restrict themselves to protests at the Latvian mission. From the streets of Chaplygin, the participants headed for Red Square.

#### **Yeltsin Issues Decree on Military Pay**

92UM0220C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 11 Dec 91 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "Did You Hear? Did You Read?"]

[Text] Starting on 1 January 1992, by Decree of RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin, the rates of pay of servicemen of the USSR Ministry of Defense will be increased by 90

percent. The rates of pay and position pay will increase in the same amount for workers of military units and establishments, and military training institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense and organs of military administration.

#### **Navy Officer on Coup Plan To Seize Yeltsin**

92UM0253C Moscow KURANTY in Russian  
12 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Putko: "They Were Preparing To Seize Yeltsin in Belbek"]

[Text] At his first press conference after his captivity in Foros, President M. Gorbachev noted that the Black Sea Fleet did not take part in the conspiracy. Subsequently, the supreme command of the fleet has repeated these words many times as the weightiest argument in its favor. FLAG RODINY, the newspaper of the Black Sea Fleet Military Council, wrote that Navy personnel ensured the landing of a plane carrying an RSFSR Government delegation, and even received a citation expressing gratitude for ensuring the protection and departure of the USSR president from the Belbek airfield. However, participants in the operation know how Yeltsin's seizure was prepared in Belbek.

On the morning of 21 August, Brigade Commander Colonel A. Kocheshkov, who now paints himself as a supporter and protector of President M. Gorbachev, ordered that his portraits be removed from the walls of all premises. The company of presidential guards was disbanded. A. Kocheshkov explained his order thus: "There is nobody to guard anymore." He was more blunt with an officer who expressed his bewilderment on this account: "What are you, a democrat? Are you going to defend Gorbachev?"

I have been given an opportunity to hear and record on audio tape the narrations of two servicemen—Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Shulga, chief of intelligence of the shore troops of the Black Sea Fleet, and Sergeant G.G. Filippov.

I.A. Shulga: "They ran a powerful anti-Yeltsin campaign in our fleet ahead of time. It was initiated by the military-political organs and the supreme command. During the summer, articles directed against Gorbachev also began to appear in the local military press. It is easy to imagine what was said aloud. For this reason, the servicemen were morally conditioned for the events of August. They received the putsch quite calmly. We should also take into account the fact that our marines had previously happened to take part in the well-known Baku events.

"Nobody was surprised when a higher state of combat readiness was announced on the morning of 21 August. Major General V. Romanenko, chief of the fleet's shore troops, who had come back from a conference held by the fleet commander, communicated in a triumphant

tone of voice that Yeltsin, Sobchak, Popov, and other democrats had been arrested. The order followed for personnel of the reconnaissance battalion to be issued ammunition and bulletproof vests, and to subsequently depart to the airfield in Belbek."

The talk was that an unsanctioned arrival of some plane was expected, perhaps even from Turkey. There was also another version: The arrival of an armed detachment aiming to free Gorbachev was expected.

Around 0300 hours, the airfield was blocked by a marine company commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Shchegolkov. By morning, it was reinforced by a reconnaissance unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Groshchev. Overall, there were about 300 men, a platoon of grenade launchers, and 12 armored vehicles; each soldier was issued 180 rounds for automatic weapons. Twenty boxes of grenades were delivered. They prepared for the operation in earnest. The men were posted, zones of fire were assigned; fire was to commence on the signal "shark." Officers and warrant officers were warned that, if they failed to carry out the "fire" order they would be dealt with under the provisions of martial law.

Colonel A. Kocheshkov, commander of the marine brigade, and Major General V. Romanenko, chief of the fleet shore troops, were present at the airfield and were in charge of the action. Admiral Khronopulo, commander of the fleet, and N. Bagrov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, were there as well.

The order was unambiguous: To seize the plane, and if there was resistance, to proceed to destroy it...

Could it be that the command was not aware which plane this concerned, and who was supposed to fly in on it? Let us listen to the narration of Sergeant Gennadiy Filippov.

G.G. Filippov: "At 0800 hours on 21 August, the battalion formed up on combat alert; Seaman Styukhin and I were ordered to fit out, get equipped, and report to the brigade commander to guard him. We left in Colonel Kocheshkov's car. Major Krivoy, I, Seaman Styukhin, and a driver were in the car. En route, we were given short instructions: If we refused to open fire when ordered we would be destroyed ourselves.

"When we arrived at the Belbek airfield, Major General Romanenko assigned a combat mission. He said that a plane was to make an unauthorized landing at the airfield. The mission of the 3d Company, 1st Marine Battalion and the reconnaissance battalion was to seize the plane, and if there was resistance, to proceed to destroy it. Subsequently, Colonel Kocheshkov and I set out for the company of Senior Lieutenant Onopriyenko to assign a mission and post personnel. Major General Romanenko ordered that an additional allowance of ammunition, as well as grenades, be brought from the brigade.

"At 1300 hours, the general had a meeting with Admiral Khronopulo. This meeting was held right there, at the airfield, in the government cottage. Seaman Styukhin and I were there together with Colonel Kocheshkov, Admiral Khronopulo, and Colonel Kovtunenkov. They discussed plans for seizing the plane and said who was going to fly in on it. Admiral Khronopulo said that, perhaps, Yeltsin would fly in or someone on his team.

"Later, he said that he had just gotten a call from Moscow and had been told that a plane carrying Yazov had taken off. However, Yazov was one of them. The general said: 'This may be a canard, though over there, at the headquarters, they should not deceive us.'

"Around 1500 hours the plane carrying Yazov landed. Khronopulo met him, and they left. We were once again given the order to 'prepare to block the runway': A plane was flying to Belbek and, it seemed, was preparing to land. Colonel Kocheshkov said that this time around, we would definitely get to fire. However, once again the order was to 'stand down' because, according to information coming in, the second plane was empty.

"Colonel Kocheshkov grumbled that the general was an indecisive man, and that if we intended to take the plane, we should take it; if we intended to destroy it, we should destroy it. Otherwise, we were giving back-and-forth orders to the people.

"Around 1600 hours we watched a meeting of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, at which Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin spoke, on TV at the government cottage. From his speech we learned that a plane had been sent from Moscow to Belbek. This was the third plane. However, Yeltsin would not be taking this plane—the deputies did not allow this.

"At 1900 hours the chief of the airfield walked up to Colonel Kocheshkov and said that the commander of the 8th Army, to whom this airfield reports, had called from Kiev and ordered that the runway be cleared. Kocheshkov was outraged: 'What a mess! Block it one minute, clear it the next. It is just that all airfield employees should be arrested.' He told Major General Romanenko so. The latter got in touch with Admiral Khronopulo and reported to him on the situation. However, Khronopulo also ordered that the runway be cleared, that the materiel and personnel be hidden, and that nobody dare to show himself when the third plane landed.

"This was done. After the plane landed, all personnel were inconspicuously sent to the brigade. Rutskoy, Silayev, and the rest of the delegation arrived in Belbek, along with about 40 men in military uniforms with automatic weapons."

Well, by this time it had become clear that the putsch had failed and that they had failed to lure Yeltsin to the Belbek trap. The generals who were itching to shoot so badly had to change their orientation promptly. Later, Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, said: "There is an opinion that the Navy took part

in the blockade, and that Admiral Khronopulo assisted the putschists. This is a false accusation. Admiral Khronopulo was precisely the one to offer, on my instructions, assistance to the leadership of Russia, which we organized in order for them to meet with the president as soon as possible. The president noted that the Navy personnel tried to help him. I am grateful to him for this."

What can we say about this? Either the admiral is being sly, or he was deceived, and the operation in Belbek proceeded without his knowledge. However, this begs the following legitimate question: What kind of supreme leadership is it without whose knowledge such actions may be mounted involving large combat units, materiel, and even an amphibious warfare ship which, on orders of persons unknown, was at sea not far from Foros at the time with a fully equipped marine company on board? It is hard to believe that the commander in chief was twisted round someone's little finger, and he knew nothing about what was happening.

However, as is known, the truth will out. Certain things have already surfaced. Admiral Khronopulo was removed from his position for a reason. But so far everything has been restricted to just this. The rest of the "heroes" of the Belbek saga still hold their positions. Having learned about the failure of the putsch, they rushed to cover the tracks.

G.G. Filippov: "After the events I have described, I was sent to the garrison to practice parachute jumps. In the morning the battalion commander came and gave me short instructions. It turned out that correspondents had already arrived in the brigade following these events, and had been trying to find me and Seaman Styukhin in order to interview us. The instructions were as follows: To answer all questions by saying that we knew nothing, and had seen and heard nothing. Brigade Commander Colonel Kocheshkov personally came to us the next day. He also gave us instructions and stated that if we talked about the events, they would institute a criminal case against us, accuse us of lying, and pack us away. He said that we were nothing in this matter. Subsequently, he ordered that we be confined to the guardhouse and not allowed to go anywhere from there."

I.A. Shulga: "Belbek is a very serious charge against the supreme leadership of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as N. Bagrov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and Commander in Chief V. Chernavin. This is why this entire episode is shrouded in lies. The very next day after the putsch was put down, those who had ordered M. Gorbachev's portraits removed were hastily putting them back up. Participants in a meeting of the party committee of the Black Sea Fleet demanded that the CPSU Central Committee make a political assessment of the actions of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee associated with the events of 19 through 21 August. At a meeting of the officer corps, they urgently adopted an appeal to the USSR president, the RSFSR

president, and the USSR State Council which also included the following lines: 'We believe that there is nothing criminal about all of our activities, nor can anything be found to be so...' They collected signatures by making the rounds. They talked to everyone separately. Nonetheless, two-thirds of the officers and warrant officers did not vote in favor of adopting this document, as they were ashamed. Then the leadership engaged in outright falsification; they wrote that 130 people were in favor, one person was against, and one abstained, and they slapped the stamp of a military unit on it.

"Even now, pressure is brought to bear on officers and warrant officers who do not wish to be silent. Many of the defiant ones have been transferred to other units. Some who could not stand it anymore have requested discharges. Colonel Kocheshkov told company commander Onopriyenko directly: 'Your future service depends on whether or not you keep silent.' Captain Baranov, who stated that the Navy personnel were made accomplices in a crime, has already submitted a request for discharge. The position of the principled and honest Colonel A. Melnikov, who stated that the leadership of the Black Sea Fleet supported the conspirators, was no longer authorized. Many other similar examples may be given.

"I have tried to write about all of this to high echelons. However, my letter was forwarded to Admiral V. Chernavin for a response. He wrote to me that under the current situation, 'a subjective approach to evaluating the actions of officials is undesirable.' The personnel chief has already received instructions to verify my professional fitness and to sort things out with me. I expect to be discharged, despite having accumulated no end of citations and merit awards during my years in the service, and my performance evaluations having always been favorable."

The participants in the Belbek events do not intend to remain silent, and it is to be expected that we will yet learn many curious things. Perhaps, we will hear an answer to the main question in this entire episode: Why do those who supported the conspiracy still hold their positions whereas honest people with integrity are forced out of the Army? Why are they not defended by the Russian leaders who flew to Belbek where they were indeed getting ready to either seize or destroy a plane which, fortunately, was not carrying B.N. Yeltsin?

**P.S. As this issue was being typeset, it became known that Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, had been removed from his post.**

### **Moscow, Military Collaborate To Improve Conditions**

*92UM0258A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Dec 91 First Edition pp 1, 2*

[Interview with Moscow Vice Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and Colonel General V. Toporov, chief of the Moscow Garrison, by Colonel A. Oliynik, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA



senior permanent correspondent for the Moscow Military District, and Colonel V. Guryanov, chief of the Moscow Military District press center: "The Road of Cooperation: the Moscow Garrison and the Mayoralty"]

[Text] More than three months have passed since RSFSR President B. Yeltsin signed the decision "On Strengthening the Social Protection of the Military Serving on the Territory of the RSFSR." This document, which became the foundation for cooperation between military structures and local executive organs, is very important.

How is the interaction between the Moscow government and the Moscow Garrison command working today toward creating the conditions and providing the guarantees for people in uniform to successfully carry out their military duty? What are the problems, and what positive results have been achieved? This is the topic of our correspondent's conversation with Moscow Vice Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and Colonel General V. Toporov, chief of the Moscow Garrison and commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Our readers are interested: What has already been done by the government of Moscow in respect to implementing this decision?

[Luzhkov] The process of the disintegration of the unitary state has caused chaos in our economy, and has led to a sharp deterioration in supplying the army with needed provisions. In my opinion, the Russian president's decision is an attempt to lay a foundation for a new socioeconomic policy in respect to our Armed Forces. I want to emphasize that our cooperation with the command of the Moscow Military District and other army structures is being put on a firm economic track. An example of that is the produce harvest this year. Suffice it to say that 35,000 to 40,000 military and about 1,600 units of heavy equipment were deployed in Moscow area fields daily for two and a half months. Thanks to the discipline and high productivity of the military, for the first time in many years the harvesting was completed in September. This season, also through the efforts of soldiers and officers, more than 220,000 tons of agricultural production were stockpiled for the needs of the city.

My remark that we have approached mutual cooperation on a principally new basis was not accidental, however. For each day of work in the fields, we paid each soldier 25 rubles [R], and each officer R50. We also backed up this money with consumer goods. To a certain degree, this is also a factor in the social protection of soldiers and officers.

[Toporov] Close interaction between the chiefs of military garrisons and local authorities is an urgent demand of the times. I also want to emphasize that now the Moscow Military District commander is a member of the Moscow capital collegium; naturally, this helps to resolve problems more speedily and effectively. Also, the commanders of the district's units and formations are

members of working local organs of executive power. For instance, in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

Such cooperation helps. Here is a recent example. At the initiative of the Moscow leadership, the Government of Russia has speeded up the decision on increasing housing allowances for apartment rents for military members who do not have their own apartments. In the past, a family of four in Moscow received a R90 allowance; now it will be R270. I think this will be of substantial help to officers' families.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, some Muscovites frequently voice the opinion that the military is allocated housing at the expense of city residents.

[Luzhkov] This is not true, of course. For instance, the Moscow Committee on Construction is about 40,000 workers short right now. There are no people to work at construction sites; skilled specialists have shifted over to cooperatives. To find a way out of this difficult situation, we made an agreement that the Moscow Military District will assign 1,500 people to us. We pay soldiers and officers for the work done, plus allocate 150 apartments to the district.

Not too long ago, we signed an agreement with the district command whereby they undertook an obligation to participate in "finishing up" housing and consumer services facilities. Starting next year, the district will put into use about 100,000 square meters of housing this way. In addition, in order to speed up construction-assembly work, our construction organizations will receive some military equipment and part of the government allocation for construction materials. We can name many examples of such mutual cooperation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Still, we would like to talk in more detail about how the housing problem in Moscow is being resolved. After all, at this point it is the most acute and painful problem of all. About 9,500 servicemen are on the waiting lists right now...

[Luzhkov] I will give you some more concrete figures. In accordance with the RSFSR president's instruction of 28 August 1991, the committee on housing policy has included in its plans that in 1992-1995 the Ministry of Defense will receive 277,000 square meters of total dwelling area annually to distribute to servicemen on waiting lists. Speaking about the current year, the Ministry of Defense will receive 130,500 square meters of total dwelling area to distribute this way. As of 1 December, 107,100 square meters have been allocated. The government of Moscow is confident that this year's plan for housing construction will be fulfilled. All in all, during the 11 months of 1991, more than 1,800 military personnel on waiting lists received their own apartments. This pace needs to be accelerated.

[Toporov] Of course, new housing construction is the main avenue for resolving the housing problem. It is not the only one, however. We could make the situation less acute through allocating to us space in the dormitories

belonging to some Moscow enterprises. A military family could, at least temporarily, receive shelter this way. One more point. Since the military draft offices and civil defense staffs are being transferred to RSFSR jurisdiction, it would be logical to make it the responsibility of the city structures to provide housing for officers serving in these organizations.

I should mention that we have considerably increased housing construction using our own resources. In the past, we built an average of 166 apartments a year; now it is more than 1,700. I should also point out that we are observing a sharp decrease in the number of officers who do not already have housing and residence permits here moving into the garrison. This year, only 583 families arrived here, while in the past we had 2,000 coming annually.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One more topical question—the charge-free privatization of housing that is currently going on in Moscow. There are so many rumors and conjectures surrounding it. Naturally, the servicemen are also worried about this complicated issue.

[Luzhkov] In my opinion, officers and their families should have no reason for concern. There will not be any significant privatization-related changes in providing housing for the military. Of course, there are many questions in regard to the privatization of the existing stocks. However, we can already say that the privatization of housing will simplify, for instance, apartment swapping and the resolution of other issues related to housing in Moscow; a multitude of bureaucratic obstacles that for decades ruined people's lives will now be removed.

By the way, in a few days there will be a meeting of the capital collegium, which will be devoted to implementation of the social program, including the military.

[Toporov] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, we are also preparing for this meeting of the capital collegium. In my opinion, military personnel need to be included in the list of categories for preferential treatment in assessing real estate tax, and not only those currently in active service, but also USSR Ministry of Defense retirees. There is also a proposal to make these categories entirely tax-exempt. We also believe it would be fair to exclude the USSR Ministry of Defense from the Moscow prime minister's order to introduce tariffs on services provided by the committee on housing policy for processing housing-related documents. Each document now has to be paid for, and quite a bit. For instance, to process and issue an authorization costs R150.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yes, social protection of the military includes many components. What other issues related to it need coordination between the government of Moscow and the Moscow garrison command?

[Toporov] One of the most acute issues of the day is the shortage of food and consumer goods. I think that the military bears the greatest brunt of this. We do have not

have a fixed workday, and are not able to stand in lines. Military commissaries cannot solve all the problems. The stocks they receive from the Moscow retail system are diminishing every year. By now, they are no longer receiving the planned volume of goods. For instance, in accordance with the government of Moscow's decision, 340 tons of meat was allocated for the district in September. However, the Moscow city association of the Russian Meat and Dairy Trade Administration refused to deliver this amount of meat before year's end. The situation with sugar, margarine, consumer goods, and, most importantly, children's goods is no better. What is the solution? Perhaps, the government of Moscow will decide to move the district retail administration from the category of "other" trade organizations (this is the way it is listed right now in the city retail pecking order). In short, there are quite a few such routine points that require coordination.

[Luzhkov] I must say that the RSFSR president's instruction does envisage clear channels of coordination between the military command and the local authorities. For instance, participation in joint transportation campaigns and construction enterprises. For instance, we have agreed to bring military aviation transport into delivering food, medicines, and other goods to the city. The first results of conversion are also showing. Military enterprises will produce small-scale street cleaning and fire fighting equipment for the needs of the city. We have placed a total of 100 orders with defense enterprises.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Last question. Come the new year, we will all feel what price liberalization means in practice. In your opinion, what additional steps aimed at social protection of the military are necessary right now?

[Luzhkov] The socioeconomic situation of many officers and petty officers is tough, to put it mildly. The average monthly pay of a squad commander today, taking all the latest additions into account, is about R700. A family of three. The wife does not work or cannot find work in her field; it is not always possible to place the child in day care. In short, it comes to R230 per person. That is, below the poverty level. How can we help such families?

Of course, we will be doing everything we can using district resources. We have seven military sovkhozes and 533 auxiliary entities. They produce agricultural output capable of providing district personnel with a two-and-a-half-months supply of meat and a four-months supply of vegetables and potatoes each year. The USSR Minister of Defense has just signed orders on an 1.9-times military pay increase and on issuing common-to-all-troops rations to all officers starting 1 January 1992. I think it will be of considerable help to military families in the environment of liberalized prices. However, we also hope that the city authorities will help us provide the military with what it needs.

In conclusion, I would like to express an opinion which, I think, is shared by Yuriy Mikhaylovich: The good seeds in the area of cooperation between the district and the



mayoralty and the government of Moscow will serve as an example of cooperation between the military and the leadership of republics, krays, and oblasts of the Russian Federation.

By the way, the Military Council recently sent a special letter on this subject to the heads of administrations in the 18 oblasts on whose territory district troops are stationed, as well as to garrison chiefs, and called on them to establish closer ties in resolving all problems, including those involving social protection of the military personnel.

**All we can add is that these are only the first positive steps in cooperation between the military and city authorities in the new sociopolitical conditions. Let us hope they are not the last ones. We also want very much to believe that after the meeting of the capital collegium the military will receive more concrete answers to the questions which concern them most.**

#### **Ukraine National Guard Chief Interviewed**

92UM0298A Kiev *VECHERNIY KIEV* in Russian  
19 Nov 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Colonel V.A. Kukharets, commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, by correspondent Anatoliy Smetanin; place and date not given: "'I Would Like To Join the Guard...'" ]

[Text] Guardsmen have always been noted for their high soldierly prowess and they personify all that is best that has been accumulated over the years of the existence of armies of all times and peoples. And now the time has come for independent Ukraine to organize its National Guard. Colonel Vladimir Alekseyevich Kukharets, its first commander, and his subordinates face a mass of concerns and unrest. Starting any new undertaking is difficult. But, I believe, the experience which the officer has accumulated will help him here.

Vladimir Alekseyevich graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy in 1972. Colonel Kukharets has both served in headquarters and commanded various subunits and units. And prior to his appointment as commander of the guard he commanded a combined unit. He is the holder of 10 awards.

He is helped to walk the thorny army path with assurance by his wife—a geography teacher—and his son—a teacher of French.

He was born under the sign of Virgo, that is, he is a hard worker, salt of the earth. It was with this person—not fortune's favorite—that our correspondent Anatoliy Smetanin sought an interview.

[Smetanin] Vladimir Alekseyevich, the "business" that you are taking under your command is quite unusual. What is the basis of it?

[Kukharets] The National Guard is being created on the basis of the Internal Troops. I will tell you that we will

have units in each oblast capital and large city. They will be mobile, highly organized subunits. This is why we are from the very outset seeking autonomy in financial, logistic, and military support. If this is accomplished, the guardsmen will not be put on the spot in other matters either.

[Smetanin] And where is it planned to train the personnel?

[Kukharets] The soldiers will undergo a three-month training course in special units.

Warrant officers and sergeants, in the warrant officer schools, and we will train officers in the present military training institutions.

Anticipating your question, I would like to say: Yes, in the formation of a national guard there are a number of difficulties and problems, which need to be resolved with the center. We are prepared for a civilized dialogue. A draft determining our mutual relations has already been drawn up. The two parties participated in what has been done on an equal basis. We will sign it soon, I believe.

[Smetanin] That is, the bureaucratic aspect of the question has been worked out, but what about guardsmen's code of honor, their personal gear and equipment, and billeting, and so forth?

[Kukharets] I would mention right away that each military unit will have its own banner and its own symbols, even, possibly, ones connected with the history and present day of the place where they are stationed.

A competition has currently been announced for the design of a uniform with regard for the national traditions and symbols of the Ukrainian people. Only Lvov artists, incidentally, have responded to our appeal. Are there no gifted persons in Kiev, Kharkov, or my own Dnepropetrovsk?! I would like them also to participate in the competition. Zaytsev is involved in this Russia, incidentally.

[Smetanin] Well, you know, Vladimir Alekseyevich, a uniform is a uniform, but what about the pay and social protection of the future guardsmen?

[Kukharets] We are now working on a system of contracts. Even soldiers on compulsory service will serve in accordance with contracts with us. The term for everyone will be three years.

As regards money. In Russia the salary of a regular guardsman has been set at 1,000 rubles [R], of officers, R2,000. Nor will we stint our guardsmen, I believe. Some guards' percentage on top of the salary will evidently be introduced also.... In a word, we are involved in and working on these questions in earnest.

[Smetanin] And what will the guardsmen's assignments be?

[Kukharets] They are specific. Primarily defense of the constitutional system, elimination of the effects of natural disasters in conjunction with civil defense subunits....

[Smetanin] And your armament also, evidently....

[Kukharets] ...absolutely military. We will have everything, even air defense and antitank weapons. Why? Well, take, for example, the guard of the United States, Italy, France—everywhere this is a component of the state's enhanced military potential. The more so in that we are not being created in a void. But unequivocally: The guardsmen's performance of police functions is ruled out!

[Smetanin] You have painted everything so compellingly, Vladimir Alekseyevich, that even I would like to join the National Guard.

[Kukharets] Be in no hurry as yet. The point is that at the first stage the basis of the guard will be composed of operational special motorized units. Then we will be joined by the remaining subunits of the internal forces following their transfer of their functions to the appropriate departments. And then it will be a question of volunteers.

[Smetanin] Nonetheless, many people will, I believe, be expressing a desire to join your banners. And for this reason allow me, dear comrade commander, to congratulate you on the birth of the National Guard and your appointment to this responsible position. Success to you in everything!

### Building of Ukraine Military Viewed

92UM0298B Kiev VECHEHNIY KIEV in Russian  
19 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Smirnov, candidate of technical sciences: "Need We Be in Any Hurry?"]

[Text] The building of the armed forces is without exaggeration national building, the cause of the entire people. And cannot be either started or completed without an idea unifying the nation. It is that people should believe with heart and soul that with their own army life for them really will start to get better. And it is here that there arises with all seriousness the question: Does the republic society have the strength for shouldering the burden of its own military spending?

In the search for an answer let us agree that Ukraine was, is, and will be (for the transitional period) a subject of the Union system of collective security. A system which is efficient enough, if it is prudently managed. It is far easier accomplishing radical military reform under these conditions. Why do I put the emphasis on this?

It is already clear that our armed forces will adopt a two-tier structure and control. The strategic forces will remain the prerogative of a central military command, and the republic army formations will be subordinate to

our Defense Ministry. Even given this condition, should military reform—in terms of goals and timeframe—be scattered in national apartments? Yes, the republic is more interested than anyone else in ensuring that radical military reform begin as quickly as possible and proceed in breadth and in depth. And the interest is a dual one here. First, reformed strategic defense forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine would entail for the republic fewer costs than is the case now. Second, given the organization of its own armed forces, they would be joined by people who already have army experience. So let them multiply it in the present army formations in the course of the reform.

The presented arguments indicate that we should be in no particular hurry to create our own army. But not just this. There is in addition the main reason—finances.

There are already as of this time studies on how much a national army more than 350,000 men strong would cost. Thus, according to the first studies, the share of the military-industrial complex should not exceed four percent of gross national product (GNP). This figure was cited in an interview by Vitaliy Chechilo, chairman of the Rukh Military Board and first deputy chairman of the Ukraine Officers Union. How should we view it? Four percent is, of course, six times less than the share of GNP which the Union military-industrial complex devours. But we do not know either in percentages or in absolute figures what contribution to so giant a Moloch Ukraine makes. There is no chance of comparison, therefore. And what can the wooden ruble, which has ceased to be a true measure of income and expenditure, now tell us? In addition, any comparison should be as proper as possible. Six percent of GNP is spent on defense in the United States, for example. But something else needs to be considered also: What the Americans can permit themselves now will be beyond our reach for a long time to come.

Such a concept as "gross national product" is a pretty incomprehensible subject for the ordinary man. Nor does he have any need to know it, generally. There are far more down-to-earth concepts like, for example, "consumer basket" and "living standard" ("quality of life" in the West). But it is against these that the Soviet authorities have stumbled when it has been necessary to infuse them with actual content, that is, to show quantitative and qualitative indicators. The minimum wage level indicator has still not been enshrined in standardized form. Income indexing has not been introduced. This is where there is immense work to be done. It would be better to start here, perhaps? Then questions of defense building would be decided more quickly and sensibly also. People become richer not when they take away and redistribute but when they produce. But for this they must necessarily have incentives....

I would observe for the umpteenth time that members of parliament easily and quickly decide questions connected with the expenditure side of the budget. And become practically incapable when it is a question of its

revenue side. So it is with the national army also. It has been proclaimed for all to hear. But where are the mechanisms which would infuse this document with actual content?

The minister of defense of Ukraine should have a telling say here also, I believe. One newspaper called him "minister without portfolio." This is not in the least bit offensive. But nothing is served by his not having his own information-analysis service. He can only be on top of things when his staff is intellectually superior to the allied Union ministry. There are justifiable fears that this will not be the case any time soon. It is impermissible for an independent democratic state to drag along in the rear of events; it is necessary to unflinchingly anticipate them and display profound sagacity. An efficient team of ministerial assistants with a high intellectual level is capable of this.

General K.P. Morozov's endeavor to investigate personally all that concerns the armed forces is understandable. And this should be welcomed. But he will not be able to manage without experienced experts, advisers, and assistants. After all, someone has to validly defend the interests of the army and explain to the legislators all the nuances. It is necessary simultaneously to place before the members of parliament the problems which exist in the armed forces. Well-founded decisions cannot be adopted without consideration of the latter either.

#### **Ukraine Parliament on Defense Structure**

92UM0253B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 17 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Defense Concept of Ukraine Has Been Adopted"]

[Text] The Ukrainian parliament adopted a concept of defense and of building the armed forces of the republic which it is planned will consist of three armed services: ground forces, air force and air defense troops, and naval forces. The border guard, national guard, and civil defense troops also belong to the ground forces. As established, their total strength should not exceed 400,000 to 420,000 men.

#### **Military Developments in Ukraine**

##### **Kravchuk Becomes Commander in Chief**

92UM0239A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Dec 91 p 1

[Report by Colonel A. Polyakov: "Defense Ukases of the President of Ukraine"]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has issued two ukases concerning the republic's defenses. According to the first, the president assumes the duties of commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This does not apply to the troops which are part of the strategic deterrent forces.

The second decree is entitled "Armed Forces of Ukraine." The president decrees in it the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the basis of the forces of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet. The decree emphasizes that the strategic deterrent forces will not become a part of the Ukrainian Army.

The armed forces will be commanded by a defense minister directly subordinate to the Ukrainian president. Administrative control of the troops of the USSR Armed Forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine prior to the completion of the process of the formation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be transferred to him.

As Ukrainian Television reported, citing an overseas foreign agency, with these decrees the president of Ukraine preempts possible actions by the center.

#### **Commanders, Kravchuk Discuss Ukrainian Army**

92UM0239B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 14 Dec 91 p 1

[Untitled TASS report]

[Text] Questions of the organizational development of national armed forces in accordance with the laws enacted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were discussed on 12 December at a meeting with Leonid Kravchuk. The president of Ukraine conversed with the commanders of the military districts and the Black Sea Fleet and also with the command of the combined units deployed on the territory of the republic.

#### **Ukrainian 'Self-Defense' Unit Forms**

92UM0239C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 14 Dec 91 p 2

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Druzhkov: "Repetition of the UPA?"]

[Text] The first Ukrainian National Self Defense detachment has already been formed in Lvov. Its members recently took the oath on the text of the 10 commandments of a Ukrainian nationalist. The main commander is Yu. Shukhevich, son of the former commander in chief of the UPA (the wartime Ukrainian Insurgent Army—Ed.).

As he told the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAINU, the new formation sets as its goal defense of the nation. To some extent Ukrainian National Self Defense is to substitute for civil rights bodies under the conditions of the disintegration of the empire, and in the event of the occupation of Ukraine, to be the body around which the repulse of the occupation forces could be organized. Ukrainian National Self Defense also plans to assist casualties at times of natural disasters and organize a struggle against criminal elements. Simultaneously it is also an organ of pressure on the government in the business of creating the Ukrainian armed forces.

The registration of Ukrainian National Self Defense volunteers is under way currently in the city center.

**Shaposhnikov on Army Status, Lobov Removal**

*PM1712113191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 17 Dec 91 First Edition p 1*

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladyn report:  
"Army Beyond Political Games, Marshal of Aviation  
Ye. Shaposhnikov Said At Meeting With Journalists"]

[Text] Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, USSR defense minister, met representatives of a number of mass media 13 December. Answering journalists' questions, he drew attention to the groundlessness of predictions of an impending military coup that have been heard too often over the last few days. The minister said with utmost responsibility that the situation within the troops is calm and manageable, like that within the country today. There are and there can be no preparations for a putsch among officers or in the Army as a whole.

Broaching the question of the nuclear forces, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov said that these kinds of weapons, both strategic and tactical, are under unified control in accordance with the previously announced schedule. None of the presidents of the sovereign states can use them in any way,

The talk also turned to the recent decrees issued by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, who has proclaimed himself commander in chief of this independent republic's armed forces. In the USSR defense minister's opinion, the head of any sovereign state is entitled to do that. But transferring units of the USSR Armed Forces stationed on any of the former Soviet republics' territory under their jurisdiction is another matter entirely.

Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov and Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk had a long and thorough discussion on this subject, as a result of which they agreed not to take hasty, rash steps in this area. If that process is essential to Ukraine, it must be carried out in a civilized manner and the phased nature of the steps to be taken formulated, along with the relevant timeframes and mechanisms. To this end Colonel General B. Pyankov flew from the Defense Ministry to Kiev 13 December, accompanied by a group of generals and officers from the General Staff.

The latest events in the region of the city of Dubossary were not ignored either; according to the central military department's data, a group of OMON [special purpose militia detachment] men traveling by bus from Kishinev captured Dnestr guardsmen here. This sparked off an exchange of fire. There were several fatalities on both sides. Representatives of the Prosecutor's Office flew from Kishinev to the scene of the clash, along with an investigative group. The situation there has now stabilized and it should not be fueled. The USSR Armed Forces will not interfere in conflicts within or between republics. There are forces of internal order there to tackle this.

We now have a host of presidents and each one will fight for his authority. Do we really need the Armed Forces to be dragged into this fight? That turn of events would be unacceptable.

In the light of recent events, the minister stressed, we must ponder some law either on collective security or on joint defense. At present the country's surviving central management structures and the Defense Ministry are working on the draft of such a document.

In conditions where Union organs of power are virtually not operational, the most acceptable option is for Russia to allocate funds for the upkeep of the Army. But it is necessary to avoid a situation where servicemen have to choose between anyone. That is up to politicians, it is up to them to decide. It is up to Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, USSR defense minister, to prevent the Army's being involved in political games.

Along with the draft agreement on a defensive union, a document is being formulated on the status of the Armed Forces on the territory of those republics that do not want to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. It will stipulate every nuance relating to issues of troop units staying outside the commonwealth.

All manner of attacks, for instance during the movement of individual military vehicles and small groups of servicemen, are regrettably an everyday reality at present in the Transcaucasus, particularly in Georgia. The defense minister has ordered the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District to ensure that such movements are escorted by an increased guard involving the use of armored hardware. This measure is designed to avert more attacks.

During his meeting with journalists, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov also broached an extremely delicate matter. It concerned the statement by Army General V. Lobov that appeared recently in some newspapers regarding his being relieved of the post of chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister. These articles are regrettable since they present the readers with a version of the facts that has no bearing on reality, the defense minister said.

Various options were considered during the formulation of principled positions on the preparation and implementation of military reform and the radical transformation of the Armed Forces, including that to which Army Gen. V. Lobov cleaves. After they had been carefully studied and discussed, the Defense Ministry Collegium adopted a decision, which the USSR defense minister reported back to the USSR State Council and the USSR president and which they then approved.

But even after this, Army Gen. V. Lobov, while giving his verbal agreement to this decision, in fact continued to pursue both in his practical work and in the mass media a line of breaking up the top echelon of the military command into two parallel structures—that is, a line that is not only objectively unproductive and



threatens to remove the General Staff and Armed Forces from the defense minister's control, but also one that violates the principle of unity of command. In this context, despite the USSR defense minister's directive on radically reducing the numerical strength of and optimizing the central apparatus, steps were taken to excessively increase the staff of the General Staff chief's apparatus.

This seriously retarded the reform of the Armed Forces and brought about increasing disorganization in the work of the General Staff and the entire central apparatus and the disorientation of officer cadres. Naturally, this could not go on. In the course of a frank and comradely discussion, Vladimir Nikolayevich admitted the wrongfulness of his actions and agreed to submit a request to be relieved of his post. Some time later he said that he would not do that. However it is quite obvious that the decision to relieve Army Gen. V. Lobov of his post was essential and it was done.

The defense minister views attempts to hype up the situation and fuel unhealthy passions over it as unconstructive and unacceptable both morally and ethically and as far as responsibility for preserving the unity of the officers corps and stability within the Army and Navy are concerned—something that is important at this difficult time for the country and the Armed Forces.

### New Defense Ministry Appointments

#### Decree on Chief of General Staff

92UM0213A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 1

[“Decree of the President of the USSR Concerning the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces”]

[Text] To appoint Colonel-General Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, on relieving General of the Army Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov of this position.

[Signed] President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics M. Gorbachev

[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 7 December 1991

#### Samsonov Biographical Data

92UM0213B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: “Colonel-General Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov”]

[Text] He was born on 10 November 1941 in Dukhovnitskiy sovkhov, Dukhovnitskiy Rayon, Saratov Oblast.

He graduated in 1964 from the Far Eastern Higher Combined Arms Command School.

He began service in the position of platoon commander of naval infantry of an independent regiment of naval infantry of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. He was the commander of a company in this same regiment. In 1972, after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he was appointed chief of staff of a motorized infantry regiment. Afterwards, he was commander of a motorized infantry regiment and the chief of staff of a tank division.

In 1981, after graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, he was appointed commander of a motorized infantry division of the Transcaucasus Military District. Subsequently, he was chief of staff of an army, the commander of an army, and the chief of staff of the Transcaucasus Military District.

In 1990, he was appointed Commander of the Leningrad Military District.

Married, Two children.

### Rear Services Chief Fuzhenko Biography

92UM0213C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: “Colonel-General Ivan Vasilyevich Fuzhenko”]

[Text] By USSR presidential decree, Colonel-General Ivan Vasilyevich Fuzhenko is appointed USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Rear Services of the USSR. General of the Army Vladimir Mikhaylovich Arkhipov is relieved of this position.

He was born 5 June 1937 in the village of Subbottsy, Znamenskiy Rayon, Kirovograd Oblast.

In 1957, he graduated from the Odessa Military School.

He began service with the troops as commander of an infantry platoon. Afterwards, he was commander of a company, deputy commander of a battalion, and commander of a battalion. In 1970, after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he was appointed commander of a motorized infantry regiment.

In 1976, from the position of commander of a motorized infantry division, he entered the Military Academy of the General Staff. After graduating in 1978, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Baltic Military District. Subsequently, he was the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, the Commander of an army, the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Western Group of Forces, and the First Deputy Commander of the Turkestan Military District.

In 1989, he was appointed Commander of the Turkestan Military District.

Married. Two children.

### District Commander Named for Leningrad

92UM0224C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "New Appointments"]

[Text] By USSR presidential ukase dated 7 December 1991, Lieutenant General Sergey Pavlovich Seleznev was appointed commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

#### Lieutenant General S.P. Seleznev

S.P. Seleznev was born on 10 July 1944 in a peasant family in the village of Russkaya Ivanovka, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy Rayon, Odessa Oblast. He is Russian. In 1965, he graduated from the Odessa General Military Command School. S.P. Seleznev began his service with the troops in the position of commander of a training platoon in a separate training motorized infantry regiment. Upon graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1974, he was appointed deputy commander of a motorized infantry regiment. In 1978, he became a regiment commander, and subsequently a deputy division commander and division commander.

In 1985, upon graduating from the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, he was appointed first deputy army commander. In 1989, S.P. Seleznev became army commander. In 1991, he was appointed chief of staff—first deputy commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

S.P. Seleznev was promoted to the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel ahead of schedule. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (for successfully executing a mission to provide international aid to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), the Orders of the Red Star and For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces, II and III Degree.

S.P. Seleznev is married, and has a daughter and a son.

### Army Paper Profiles New Turkistan MD Commander

PM1912112391 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 18 Dec 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed biographical details of Lieutenant General Georgiy Grigoryevich Kondratyev, newly appointed commander of Turkistan Military District: "New Appointments. Lieutenant General G.G. Kondratyev"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Georgiy Grigoryevich Kondratyev has been appointed commander of the Turkistan Military District by a decree of the USSR President dated 7 December 1991.

He was born 17 November 1944 in Bryansk Oblast's Klinty City, and he is Russian. In 1965 he graduated

with distinction from the Kharkov Guards Tank Command Institute. He started his service in the troops as commander of a tank platoon. He was then commander of a tank company.

In 1973, following his graduation with distinction from the Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy Military Academy of Armored Troops, he was chief of staff of a regiment. In 1974 he became a regiment commander, and in 1978 deputy commander of a division and then commander of a division.

In 1985 he graduated with distinction and a gold medal from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy and was appointed first deputy commander of the Turkistan Military District Army. In 1987 he became commander of the army, and in 1989 became first deputy commander of Turkistan Military District.

He has been awarded the orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and "For Service to the Motherland and the USSR Armed Forces" Second and Third Class. He is married with two children.

### Transcaucasus MD Report Itemizes Stolen Weapons

92UM0267A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "From the Chief Directorate for Military Counterintelligence: 364 Assault Rifles Stolen in Transcaucasus Military District in One Year"]

[Text] According to information provided to our correspondent by the Chief Directorate for Military Counterintelligence, on 14 December 11 assault rifles were found missing in a unit stationed in the city of Shamkhor (Azerbaijan). Operational-investigative actions by the military counterintelligence brought positive results. On the same day, Ensign Vladimir Marfin, this unit's commander, was detained in Baku. The ensign stated that he had committed the theft for personal gain. One assault rifle and 74,000 rubles which Marfin received for the sold weapons have been confiscated from him. Two assault rifles have been returned to the unit from the city of Agdam; the search continues for the remaining eight rifles.

It is good to see that the actions of military counterintelligence in stopping this crime has met with understanding at the republic law enforcement organs. As Captain 2d Rank Aleksandr Zdanovich, chief of the public liaison group of the military intelligence, told our correspondent, one wants to hope that this will soon become the prevalent position of the local law enforcement organs. A decisive termination of criminal actions related to weapons theft is first and foremost in the interests of Azerbaijan and other republics where the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District are stationed. According to military counterintelligence, since



the beginning of the year 364 assault rifles, 12 machine-guns, 400 handguns, 616 grenades, and four carbines had been stolen in this district alone.

### **Business Training For WGF Troops In Germany**

*92UM0256A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Dec 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Chistyakov, for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Computer Games in Fuhrstenberg"]

[Text] Fuhrstenberg, Berlin and Bonn—"And so, at present our firm's warehouse holds 25,000 marks' worth of inventory. However, our customers are refusing to buy our goods at the old price. The situation is threatening," said professor Kluge. "And now we have to decide whether the firm, in order to overcome these temporary difficulties, should take out a short-term bank loan."

This scene would appear to be an ordinary "business meeting," were it not for a number of special details. The strategy for rescuing the firm, which in reality doesn't exist, was being devised by people wearing Soviet military uniforms—officers of the Fuhrstenberg garrison of the Western Group of Forces. Yes, this was a kind of game for adults, and a very complex one.

But the officers at Fuhrstenberg by no means consider what they are doing to be a game. They take a very serious attitude toward the activities of the managers' school that has begun functioning under the garrison officers' club. The command, the officers, and members of their families are convinced of the need to use every opportunity to acquire new knowledge and skills. After all, many of the officers of the Western Group of Forces will be forced to leave the Soviet Army in the coming years and to begin a new, civilian life—and in very difficult economic conditions.

"In our view, training servicemen in civilian specialties is an important and essential task," said Major General Yuriy Ivanushkin in a conversation with me. "The knowledge acquired will undoubtedly help those who will have to leave army service to better adapt to the new conditions in which they will be living. And we are trying, insofar as possible, to meet the needs of all who want to learn. For understandable reasons, we are giving priority to officers and members of their families from the units to be withdrawn from German territory first."

One of the chief participants in organizing seminars and courses for the Soviet officers from Fuhrstenberg and a number of other garrisons is the Berlin-based firm Spree-Akademie. It is headed by the young and energetic entrepreneur Yaroslav Pialek, a specialist in computer technology and data processing. As a first step, Spree-Akademie has begun teaching the fundamentals of working with personal computers. As some course graduates told me, the learning sessions are organized with military precision, and the organizers saw to everything, not leaving out a single detail.

Of course, it never even entered their minds to teach their students "on their fingers," as is often the case in our country. A special and fully self-contained computer classroom had been delivered to Fuhrstenberg. The instructors—who speak excellent Russian, incidentally—are putting primary emphasis on instilling practical skills. The students in the courses receive textbooks, technical literature, and reference materials dealing with the new equipment.

"Within a short time 140 officers and 38 members of their families have already received certificates of graduation from the Spree-Akademie courses," said Major Viktor Slobodenyuk, head of the garrison officers' club. "And now, new lists of candidates who want to enroll in the courses are appearing on my desk every day. For example, in one subunit, 20 people are competing for two slots. This is what convinces us of the need to continue the work and to expand it."

Y. Pialek recounted: "We looked at various ways of organizing instruction. We could have set up several small groups whose students would receive intensive instruction over one month or longer. But in that event, the overwhelming majority of those who want to study would have been left 'overboard.' Therefore, with the concurrence of the commanding officers, we chose a different tack that allows us to teach the greatest possible number of students. We're offering short-term courses; within a few days of very intensive instruction, the officers receive a certain amount of basic knowledge and skills that will subsequently enable them to make further progress, including progress on an independent basis."

In early December, the garrison began another series of classes that has also attracted many prospective students. The German instructors are telling officers and members of their families about the fundamentals of management and about various aspects of operating private firms. The experience of the former GDR, which since unification with the Federal Republic has moved rapidly forward on the path of a market economy, is of special interest to us. After all, people there are now working to solve (in many cases successfully) the very problems that are going to appear on our agenda in the near future.

Despite the seeming "dryness" of the subject, the classes are interesting and are held in a creative atmosphere. In a few days, the students, playing the role of entrepreneurs, can experience dramatic "ups" and "downs," find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, or unexpectedly reap windfall profits. Concrete examples allow them to grasp the "mechanics" of operating a private firm, to study the functioning of its numerous links, and to become familiar with all manner of "reefs" that lie in wait for the businessman in the market sea. The theoretical knowledge is all the more convincing by virtue of the fact that the lecturers have first-hand business experience. Most of them have themselves traversed that entire thorny path, beginning with the registration of their own firms.

Consequently, one needn't doubt the usefulness of the efforts under way in the Western Group of Forces to train officers in civilian specialties. The question is one of how to broaden the scope and effectiveness of these efforts.

Mr. Pialek and I had a detailed discussion of one possible option. Spree-Akademie would be prepared to send portable self-contained computer classrooms, along with highly skilled instructors, directly to various garrisons. According to preliminary calculations, in just one month of work, two small groups of lecturers could teach the fundamentals of using a computer, basic management principles, and perhaps other specialties to up to 500 servicemen and members of their families. After completing a 30-day tour, the classroom equipment could be turned over to the Soviet side so that our own instructors, after receiving training in Germany, could continue to use it for teaching purposes. This would make it possible to set up a whole network of standardized training centers in a short time and to organize their effective operation. And in the view of Spree-Akademie's director, they could be used in teaching classes in more complex subjects in the future.

And one final thing. As we know, the federal government has appropriated a considerable sum of money—200 million marks—for teaching civilian specialties to officers of the Western Group of Forces and members of their families. The effectiveness with which this money is used depends not only and not so much on the German side as on our own desire and ability to solve the complex problems that confront the segment of our society wearing greatcoats.

#### Expenditures on Arms Continue to Decrease

92UM0288A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 3 Dec 91 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "Outlays on Armaments Continue To Decline"]

[Text] According to information from the USSR Ministry of Defense, in 1991 outlays on purchasing armaments and materiel dropped by 23 percent, or 7.2 billion rubles [R] compared to 1990. The same trend will persist in 1992: Some R6.9 billion will be released from the defense budget. This means that in 1992, military production will be reduced by a factor of two compared to 1989. The USSR Ministry of Defense communicated some statistics which describe the rate of reduction of the delivery of materiel and weapons from the moment the implementation of a USSR defensive doctrine began: strategic missiles—by 40 percent; sea-launched ballistic missiles—by 54 percent; tanks—by 66 percent; armored vehicles—by 80 percent; artillery systems—by 59 percent; combat planes—by 50 percent.

#### Cases of HIV Infection in Army Reported

92UM0288B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 3 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Mukhin (ARMIYA magazine)—special to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "HIV Positive Individuals Serve in the Soviet Army. They Are Kept Under Continuous Medical Observation"]

[Text] Until recently, data on the incidence of AIDS in the USSR Armed Forces were contradictory and dubious. They were dubious because the mass media disseminated unverified information whereas the military department came up with evasive answers to sharp questions.

Medical Service Colonel A. Prokudin, chief of the AIDS prevention team of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate, painted a somewhat clearer picture.

Since 1986, 11 servicemen infected with the AIDS virus have been registered in the Soviet Union, which accounts for about 1.5 percent of the total number of carriers of the virus discovered in our country. At the same time, the physicians have a special object for alarm and concern—foreign citizens taking instruction at the military educational establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense. As of today, 119 carriers of the virus have been registered among them. In keeping with our legislation, all these individuals have been expelled from our country.

According to data provided by Academician V. Pokrovskiy, president of the Academy of Medical Sciences, we anticipate having more than 6,000 carriers of the virus in our country in 1991, 24,000 in 1992, and between 1 and 1.5 million by the year 2000. A prediction of the possible rate of growth in the number of HIV positive individuals among Soviet servicemen may be compiled in keeping with the overall projection of the incidence of AIDS prepared by the USSR Ministry of Health.

However, for now military physicians refrain from categorical statements and any specific numbers. The possible high number of HIV positive servicemen poses a direct threat to the combat readiness of the Armed Forces; this cannot be allowed to happen. In view of this, quite extensive measures aimed at preventing the spread of this lethal disease are already being planned and taken.

Unlike other countries, the system of disease control in the USSR Armed Forces includes registration of not only the cases of the AIDS disease but also all cases of being infected with HIV. For example, scientific research and diagnostic laboratories which engage in studying and discovering infection operate at the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov, in central and district hospitals, and in a number of garrison hospitals.

According to the rules in effect for medical examinations, these laboratories should, on a compulsory basis, test donors, medical specialists working in laboratories diagnosing the HIV infection, individuals belonging to the so-called high risk group, foreign citizens, and Soviet citizens and military personnel returning from business trips abroad for AIDS.

In discussing the issues of AIDS in the Army, we cannot fail to touch on the moral dimension of the issue. Human mentality is such that, having learned about an infected fellow servicemen, others would not touch him with a 10-foot pole. Conflicts and acute moral and psychological tensions in military collectives are quite possible. This is why military physicians do not notify either

commanders or other officials that HIV-positive servicemen are serving in their units or small units. At present, medical personnel of the unit and other military treatment facilities of the USSR Ministry of Defense provide all monitoring of such individuals. Under Soviet legislation, they must keep information about HIV-positive individuals confidential.

At present, several HIV-positive servicemen are in service with the USSR Armed Forces. They are under continuous medical monitoring, and they discharge their official responsibilities without harming those around them. In particular, these responsibilities include strict obligations on the part of the HIV infected individuals to practice more stringent precautions.

### Need for Improving Aviation Reserves Outlined

92UM0249A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel K. Tikhanovich, under the rubric: "Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Will Aviation Have a Reserve?"]

[Text] Recently demands for the closure of aviation training centers are constantly being heard and these centers are being denounced as unnecessary and burdensome for the Ministry of Defense budget and for the country as a whole. As support for these demands, they cite the significant reduction of the Air Force that is occurring at the present time and the large detachment of military pilots that is being released into the reserve. These pilots along with those flying cadres who have already been trained by these aviation centers will be enough for a minimum of five to seven years. For greater persuasiveness, some "experts" cite the new military doctrine that presupposes, in their opinion, that there will be a significantly smaller number of reserve flying personnel than right now.

At first glance, everything would appear to be correct. But if you delve into the essence of the matter, you understand that this is nothing other than the next self-deception.

Aviation combat operations during the Great Patriotic War, and also during the Persian Gulf and other armed conflicts, attest to the fact that regardless of whether they are defensive or offensive in nature, you need to have a large reserve of pilots to attain supremacy in the air in order to immediately replace possible losses. While considering the fast-moving nature of modern war, there will not be any time to train flying cadres in a combat situation and consequently we need to be involved with that today. If the training of reserve pilots is completely terminated, the existing reserve will be diminished from year to year and we will already be compelled to restore what we are currently destroying in the near future.

I think that hardly anyone will begin to dispute the fact that we can view a pilot as a highly skilled specialist only in the event that he flies regularly and in that type of aircraft or helicopter in which he will have to fight. The system that exists today prefers to retrain the majority of pilots which will be extremely difficult to do in a combat situation.

If we are seriously concerned about the country's defense capability, we need to really think about what kind of conditions we are placing ourselves in, more correctly, what kind of conditions we have already placed ourselves in today. In two to three years under the current approach, the existing reserve of military pilots will naturally become disqualified and who then will sit in the cockpits of combat aircraft? When the "roast" begins to smell, it will be too late to make up for what has been lost. In this connection, it would not hurt to turn to the experience of the Western countries. There, as we all

know, they know how to count money but they do not complain about spending millions to train reserve military pilots and to maintain their combat proficiency at the proper level.

While speaking about all of this, I am not at all appealing to maintain the aviation training centers and the entire reserve pilot training system in the form in which they exist right now. Their radical reorganization is long overdue.

Have you seen what we have been training reserve pilots in for the last 10 years? In old Czech-made L-29 aircraft. But this aircraft is only suitable for initial training. Reserve pilot retraining is also conducted in these same L-29's. The question arises—whom do we want to deceive? It turns out that we are deceiving ourselves. And if you consider the fact that the military commissariats that are called upon to track the retraining frequency of flying and technical personnel in the majority of cases cannot handle the assigned mission, the picture turns out to be quite sad.

Having discussed the situation that has developed in our collective, we came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to organize training of a broad circle of specialists based on already existing aviation training centers: pilots for fighter and fighter-bomber aviation, junior aviation specialists, parachutists, rescue personnel, etc. Conduct pilot retraining not only in L-29 and L-39 trainer aircraft, but also in SU-25 and other types of combat aircraft. Organize courses (school) for training air assault teams—rescue personnel, both amateurs and professionals—based at a center. Work more aggressively with civilian youth. For this purpose, organize a parachute section, model airplane clubs, and develop aircraft and glider sports and hang-gliding.

Under the condition of precise organization, all of these suggestions are quite feasible. I am convinced: If training and retraining of reserve pilots and aviation specialists is conducted based on reorganized aviation training centers, we will only gain from this and practically no additional funds will be needed here.

### System for Training PVO Radar Troops Criticized

92UM0263A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Dec 91 First edition p 1

[Article by Air Defense Radio Technical Troops Chief Lieutenant-General G. Dubrov: "We Cannot Continue To Train Like This"]

[Text] The existing PVO [air defense] radio technical troop specialist education and training system is obsolete. It does not provide intensification of the learning process or an increase of quantitative indices. It is possible to cite among the causes decreased terms of service, increased economic work in units and subunits,

the complex nature of the combat missions being performed by the troops, the shortage of officers and warrant officers and the shortage of training time. Inspections indicate: training for specialists and entire subunits is at times carried out through "superficial training" or rush jobs, especially before a departure to the ranges.

The unwieldiness of planning and reporting documents do not leave officers the time to really teach subordinates, they engender formalism and embellishment of results, and they arouse negative attitudes toward combat training in personnel. This situation compels commanders to think not about how to better organize the training of their subordinates, but how to get out of the situation that has developed and how to account to higher levels of authority. All of this has given rise to an unsound "training" system in the troops: soldiers and sergeants improve their training based on transferring experience among themselves that is often distorted.

This requires steps to fundamentally restructure the education system. Training of subunits and units is a combination of steps that have been directed at the formation of military collectives that are capable of carrying out the combat missions assigned to them under any circumstances. Therefore, we need to seek a solution to the problem by merging combat service, combat training and the daily activities of the troops into a single process. The artificial division into subjects, all the more so under conditions of limited time, will not ensure dynamic training.

We need to shift from the lecture and classroom method of teaching (except in training units) to exclusively practical training of specialists and crews at combat posts (work sites). The existing subunit and combat command and control organ training system in the troops must become part of the unified teamwork and coordination combat training process before performing combat alert duty or duty itself, providing combat firing

for missileers and aviators, training the duty detail, performing routine maintenance and repair of weapons, or performing various types of teaching, training, and marches, that is, everything that provides training for the successful conduct of battle. We need to emphasize plans that bring subunits and units to various levels of readiness and combat employment and that provide commanders the maximum amount of time for direct practical training of subordinates.

The new approach to training troops will allow maximum simplification of planning, recording and accounting, abolish the multitude of existing documents and replace them with just daily routine and plans-schedules for working out combat teamwork and coordination training lessons. It will entail a review of opinions on organizing monitoring the progress of combat training. The need to create "traditional" classes, test benches, etc., is no longer relevant since training will be conducted at combat work locations and at barracks training facilities with a future shift to automated training based on existing automated systems, personal computers and simulators.

Several of the approaches mentioned above have been proven experimentally at PVO division-sized units. According to officers reactions, the proposed training system is the most acceptable at the present time. The results also attest to that. If 20 percent of the radio-technical units of the PVO division-sized unit commanded by Officer V. Golovko had good evaluations for the winter period of the 1990 training year, it is already 80 percent for that same period during the 1991 training year.

The involvement of scientific-research institutions, educational institutions, and utilization of the experience of foreign armies is necessary to successfully complete the searches, experiments, development of new courses and programs, and the shift to the new training system.



### Division of Former USSR Fleet Decried

92UM0247A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 17 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Pyrkh under the rubric "A Cry of Desperation": "Citizen of Russia, Hold Your Wallet Open Wide—It Will Be Easier To Steal Your Assets From It This Way"]

[Text] Several days ago the Russian Information Agency carried a report which overwhelmed Siberians. Deputy USSR Minister of the Maritime Fleet Gennadiy Gerasimov told the world that the maritime fleet of the former USSR has now been completely divided among the republics, and from now on each vessel will ply the oceans of the world flying its own sovereign flag. This news was by far not just a curiosity item for the workers of the Abakan Railway Car Building Plant who make containers for freight transportation by sea. How come—we sort of worked together, but we will sail the seas separately...

Indeed, as the deputy minister communicated, out of the 18 shipping lines of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, three went to the Baltic states, an equal number to Ukraine, and Georgia and Azerbaijan got one each.

Is this "divvying up" fair? It is for the Balts, but not for Kazakhstan or Turkmenia, Kyrgyzstan, or, say, Russia, which provided more convertible currency than anyone else to the all-state coffers which, as is known, paid for the building of our domestic fleet. The Baltic republics, which have become independent, have received 10.2 percent of the value of the fixed assets of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet (their need for import and export shipping being three percent, as the deputy minister observed). For example, the entire (!) refrigerator vessel fleet of the country, a large-tonnage fleet of bulk liquid vessels, and part of the tanker fleet went to Latvia; that is, precisely what is particularly in demand in international freight markets, and is particularly highly paid.

Therefore, hard currency will now have to be forked over for maritime shipping if, for example, Russia needs to deliver meat or butter purchased "on the other side," or wishes to make its children happy with bananas or lemons. Never mind that this freight will be carried by vessels which in their time were purchased with Russian oil, gas, or timber...

Ukraine now owns a tremendous fleet of bulk carriers and virtually the entire passenger fleet; it got close to one-third of the entire former Union fleet.

They have even put the Navy of the country "on the chopping block" now! They are squandering and wasting the wealth created through the labors of many generations of Soviet people. For example, in Tallinn 25 junked trawls were recently sold, and Baltic seamen got 18,000 rubles as a result of this brilliant commercial operation. Meanwhile, each of these trawls contains about a ton of

copper which is in short supply, and the price for which, in the world market, ranges between \$1,500 and \$3,000 per ton!

It is hard to understand why on earth the citizens of Russia, who have virtually lost access to the sea anyway, and in the seventh year of perestroika, have been set back to the era of the first Romanovs, must be the only ones to pay for an experiment visited on us in 1917.

### Controversy over Ship Names Viewed

92UM0296A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
1 Jan 92 p 4

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Luchko, Northern Fleet: "The Nameless Cruiser: The Ships Are Not at Fault Because People Think Differently Today than Yesterday"]

[Text] Unlike people, ships receive names long before their birth. A centuries-old tradition is to mark a plaque with the name and firmly affix it to the frame of the ship forever before it is overgrown with sides, superstructures, weapons and equipment. In the recent past, ships bore names with an ideological tint, but now, for some reason, they are "renouncing" them.

Can you imagine if all the Michaels in Russia suddenly took the name Boris just because that is the current balance of forces in the political arena? But it turns out that you can behave that way with ships. A nameless aircraft carrying cruiser, which in the past had been named Baku, is anchored in the middle of Kola Bay. It was named for the capital of a currently sovereign state and that is why they suggested the cruiser be named Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov. Now there is no Union; it is good that they did not manage to cast the new letters because they would have had to once again cut off the old ones before a subsequent renaming. But really, the ship was not named in honor of the capital of a foreign state, but took the name from the leader of a destroyer squadron who covered himself with glory during the last war. And how is it to be now with the names of other "capitals," like Kiev or Minsk?

But TAKR [heavy aircraft carrying cruiser] Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov is unluckiest of all—it has been renamed four times before its entry into service. Is this the last? But, really, on the "passport," on the marked plaque, there is a very different name. What will our distant progeny think of our era, having dug up from the ship's graveyard a rusty frame crowned with names that contradict each other?

Not so long ago, the Officers Assembly of the former Baku decided to request that the Russian Supreme Soviet return the name to the ship that corresponds to the one it had when the keel was laid. The name to which the cruiser and crew have a complete right. It is certainly time to stop shifting from one extreme to the other, exchanging one set of ideological symbols of servility for another. Ships' lifespans are short and they take the

names "that are inappropriate for the political moment" with them to their graves. Be that as it may, it is still not time to finally refuse to build new ships. Look, let the new ships receive names that will stand firm both under democracy and Partocracy. Those same names by which we know the fleet today; let them remain as they are. The ships which bear these names have the right not to be considered guilty for what people think today as opposed to what they thought just five years ago.

### Northern Fleet Preparations for Winter

92UM0250A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel S.F. Pykhach, chief of the maritime engineering service of the Northern Fleet, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 2d Rank P. Ishchenko, in the column "The Economy and We"; place and date not given: "Garrisons Are Asking for Heat"]

[Text] How do the Army and the Navy welcome the advent of winter? We think that this issue is of interest not only to a team of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA journalists who undertook to examine this issue, but also to all our readers.

Forecasts notwithstanding, this winter has not yet shown its harsh disposition. However, such forecasts have hardly any relevance for the North: There are no mild winters there.

Our permanent Northern Fleet correspondent approached Colonel S. Pykhach, chief of the maritime engineering service of the fleet, with a request to discuss how military settlements are being prepared for the winter season.

[Ishchenko] Semen Fedorovich, an alarming report came to the editorial office from our reader O. Motsak in a remote garrison. The letter contains an entire list of problems which the garrison encountered in the face of the cold. The author sums it up: "In our area, the winter season lasts from October until May, and the city is not prepared for it."

[Pykhach] There is no escaping the facts: About 90 percent of what is described in the letter from O. Motsak is in line with the truth, or rather, was as of the moment the letter was written, because by now the situation has been taken care of.

Boiler plants have been fixed, and heat mains have been repaired; the technical condition of these facilities is even better than in previous years. A sewage main is back in operation. Incidentally, its obstruction by the residents of houses and sailors living in barracks was a prominent reason why it was damaged. The roads, the poor condition of which the author also mentions, have for the most part been restored to normal condition.

The letter says that the issue of acquiring 130 tons of chloride of lime intended for the decontamination of drinking water has not been resolved. This number exceeds by almost one order of magnitude the annual need for chloride of lime of not only the garrison, but also the adjacent settlement. It is hard to understand where it came from. At present, there are no problems at all with lime deliveries.

However, I cannot agree more with the author of the letter concerning an extraordinary episode with a five-storied residential building. The garrison command moved the tenants residing there out by agreement with the local authorities who wished to use it for a polyclinic and other settlement services. As it turned out, the settlement soviet has neither funds nor materials to refurbish the building. At present, it is vacant, whereas there are still many servicemen without housing in the garrison. This is to say nothing about the fact that a vacant house hooked up to the heat and water supply system of the entire street is dangerous: In the event of an accident, a great many families will be left without heat and light. It has now been resolved to do major repairs on this house next year, and to allocate it to people on the waiting list thereafter.

[Ishchenko] Could you tell us what the situation is in other garrisons and military settlements?

[Pykhach] In terms of a general assessment, the fleet is well prepared for the winter. Headquarters for managing preparations for the winter were set up in all garrisons. Such headquarters operated with the greatest precision and dispatch in submarine fleet and air force garrisons. At the same time, a number of small garrisons are not in the best of shape as they embark on a winter season. An inspection in the garrison commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. Sinitsyn indicated that auxiliary breakdown teams exist on paper only, and the system of prevention, elimination, and localization of accidents at communal facilities does not conform to the requirements in effect. As a result, even the heat supply to a kindergarten was turned off there for a while. Naturally, those guilty were punished, and Captain 1st Rank V. Sinitsyn was removed from his position for failing to prepare for winter.

[Ishchenko] Are you sure that no unexpected weather will catch you by surprise?

[Pykhach] I believe it will not. In any event, the maritime engineering service is doing everything it can to this end. However, we are prepared to fight the elements of nature, whereas other elements—those of the market—may, under certain circumstances, upset the already well established mechanism of communal facilities of the fleet. What do I mean? First of all, the absence of adequate investment. Actually, all of their units and subunits have been placed "in the card file" by the banks; in other words, they are debtors and live on credit. Since we have no money, we cannot sign contracts for the delivery of materials which are necessary even for

the current maintenance of buildings and structures. As of today, we have not signed a single contract with suppliers. This is without precedent! Never mind this, we have to take out bank loans even to pay wages to our employees. The uncertain financial situation and the absence of funds bring about, in particular, the outflow of skilled cadres.

The maritime engineering service needs to receive no less than 18 million rubles before the end of the year. However, even this will be enough only to pay back the debts and meet the most urgent needs. Setting up some stocks for the next year is out of the question. The Navy command and the Ministry of Defense are well aware of our troubles, but they are strapped for funds, too. Since we do not have an opportunity to make money, we need centralized deliveries of materials at firm prices. After all, we cannot buy pipes, for example, at an exchange at prices exceeding state prices by a factor of 10.

We would like a transition to a market economy not to become, for the Navy and the Army, a situation whereby they cut off the air supply to a person and tell him: "Go on living." We will not be able to survive without aid from the state, especially above the polar circle where winter with its frost and storms will make no allowances at all for our calamitous situation.

#### **New Mooring for New Northern Fleet Aircraft Carrier**

*92UM0268A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Dec 91 First edition p 3*

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Masalskiy: "A Mooring for the Aircraft Carrier: What Awaits 'Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov' in the Northern Fleet"]

[Text] The precedent has been set: Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov will become the first domestically produced aircraft carrier to receive its permanent mooring where it is based. The mooring installation is as unique as the ship itself: for the first time, not only in our experience, but possibly in world experience, the five huge pontoons which form the mooring are not arranged perpendicularly but parallel to the shore line.

Today, only a few days before the new aircraft carrier's arrival in the fleet, the assembly of the mooring complex has basically been completed. In the words of the builders, the two recently constructed reinforced concrete structures for securing the ship have a fourfold safety factor. And on the whole, a great deal of resources have been spent so that the floating behemoth with a 60,000 ton displacement will not spin around like a weather vane on the roadstead but stand firmly at the mooring. But they are only sufficient to put the aircraft carrier "under cover" and no more. Say, electrical power from the shore will be supplied according to a temporary schedule—the shift to organic operations is planned only after several months. It is not yet time to talk about the

shore-supplied water and steam: the new boiler-room has just been added to next year's major construction list. And a new substation is also needed. We need to lay a vehicle road and water pipes to the mooring... According to the most modest construction estimates and month-old prices, this will be five times more expensive than the mooring equipment already erected.

"And if we talk about time periods, there is already several years work here," thinks Lieutenant Colonel A. Zinoviyev, chief engineer of the builders- hydraulic engineers unit. "But, the floating mooring for the new ship should have already been completely turned over at the end of last year."

"We had to build it directly 'from sight'," complained Lieutenant Colonel V. Bugasov, head of UNR [office of the work supervisor]-general contracting. "The project design and cost estimate documentation arrived just three weeks prior to the beginning of construction on the reinforced concrete structures."

There was one other serious cause of the extended construction period, the lack of planned logistics.

"Today, they have stripped us down to the last penny," says G. Shkrabil, deputy chief of the fleet construction directorate for logistics support. "Planned state deliveries from many regions are being disrupted, and on average prices for building materials on the free market are 10 times higher than state prices..."

To be sure, the shortage of money and price increases have aggravated many of the fleet's problems, including those connected with the construction of the moorings. But they precisely aggravated but did not engender the problems as it may appear. A brief digression into history confirms: the cart was placed before the horse in the Northern Fleet, the country's youngest fleet. The Northern Flotilla was created in the summer of 1933 and at that time the first detachment of warships arrived at Kola Bay. But construction of the fleet's main base in the Polar Region was just beginning at that time and it could actually receive ships only two years later. But even in 1940 the Northern Fleet had not received all of the ships built for it because of the austere basing locations.

Of course, there were reasons at that time: the country was preparing for war. Today, the old, abnormal proportions in fleet development when the "shore" hopelessly lags behind the "sea" remain as before. This lag has very graphically manifested itself with the construction of large aircraft carrying ships.

Fifteen years ago, the lead aircraft carrying cruiser Kiev arrived at the North Sea roadstead. But even the largest mooring at the fleet's main base could in no way be adapted for this ship's mooring lines. And the cruiser remained homeless and "lived" at the roadstead for many years. But the roadstead mooring turned out to be not the safest place. Two years after the Kiev arrived in the fleet, a sharp gust of wind tore off the trunk buoy and

carried the ship into the moorings. Fortunately, a catastrophe did not occur. At that time, the fleet urgently formed a commission to select a new all-weather basing site for the Kiev. Colonel D. Denin had the opportunity to work on it and he recalls:

"We investigated all the favorable inlets and coves in Murmansk, the White Sea and even Novaya Zemlya before we made our selection. We put together a technical-economic substantiation and made all the required calculations. But only 10 percent of the required funds were allocated for construction of the new basing facility..."

With such financing, no wonder the facility turned into a long-term construction project. Ten years have passed since the accident. The new aircraft carrying cruiser Baku (currently Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov) arrived in the Northern Fleet in December 1988. And from the first day the "new kid" had to partake of all the "delights" of roadstead basing which had befallen its older counterpart.

While the question was being resolved about equipping a mooring complex for aircraft carrying cruisers, and while new ships were being built with vertical-takeoff aircraft, and now already with horizontal takeoff aircraft on-board, the Kiev was, like a seriously ill patient in an oxygen tent, continually confined within the walls of the ship repair plant. And just renaming it Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov did not add to the ship's "health"—after all, the mooring site in the roadstead wears out equipment prematurely. And now rumors about the possibility of temporarily putting these ships into mothballs do not seem to be so groundless. For comparison: the term of operational use and service for an aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy is 40 years.

The miserly, penny-pinching savings for basing support for aircraft carrying cruisers is threatening to turn into and is already turning into not just material losses, but is also discrediting the very idea of large aircraft carrying

cruisers and the possibility of operating them under Polar conditions. And the switchmen, that is, the members of the crews of these ships, will once again have to take the rap for everything. But, really, the developers of the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov and those people responsible for providing it with all types of equipment in port have already done quite a bit to make the seamen's work not too easy. By way of illustration, just connecting the TAKR to the onshore electric supply, according to experts' calculations, will take 8-10 hours of dangerous work from the viewpoint of electrical accidents. The reason—they did not provide for high capacity electrical power cables for the ship.

Even when the aircraft carrier is anchored at the mooring, loading and unloading operations will be substantially impeded since the hoists used for these purposes are, by virtue of their locations, totally unequipped with the appropriate shore equipment.

The situation with supply vessels—tugs, tankers and water carriers—is no better. Judging by everything, they simply forgot about them during the construction of the aircraft carrier. And although an aircraft carrier mooring logistics supply subunit has now been established, it is at the expense of the Northern Fleet's already limited resources.

In our country, there are many opponents to the idea of building large aircraft carrying cruisers. They set forth the most varied arguments: some undoubtedly weighty and others frankly demagogic. And it is evident that conducting naval operations under current conditions without powerful aircraft carrying cruisers is just like playing chess without a queen, especially since we are voluntarily choosing the black pieces in accordance with our new defensive doctrine. The paradox is that it is those people who develop these unique ships who are turning out to be the most consistent serious opponents of aircraft carrying cruisers, intentionally or unintentionally, and... they are dooming them to a paltry existence.



**President, Kobets Roles in Nuclear Control**  
*92P50065A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
*in Russian 26 Nov 91 p 1*

["Postfactum" item: "Who Controls the Nuclear Briefcases?"]

[Text] According to informal information received from Yeltsin's closest associates, General Kobets controls only the second step in the use of strategic nuclear weapons, but not what people have taken to calling the "nuclear briefcase" (the set of primary basic commands for the immediate use of nuclear weapons). General Kobets, who is in fact in charge of defense matters for Russia, received possession of a set of coded commands [shifrokomandy] after the August events in Moscow. About 80% of the Soviet Union's strategic weapons are based on Russian territory. At the present time, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the USSR defense minister, has no access to a "nuclear briefcase." Thus, control over two of the three "nuclear briefcases" belongs to the USSR president and the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

**Missile Troops 'Ecological' Units Formed**  
*92UM0299A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
*1 Jan 92 p 4*

[Report by Colonel V. Kharlamov: "Ecologists on the Test Ranges"]

[Text] An ecology subunit has been set up in the Strategic Rocket Forces. We describe the work of these military ecologists.

The need to create a special subunit to monitor environmental protection has been particularly felt during the course of the elimination of missiles in accordance with the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

By order of the commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces an ecological company has been created. Its staff is made up mainly of experts from chemical subunits who are familiar with the procedure for collecting samples of contaminated substances from the air and the soil. Special machines have been put at their disposal for chemical reconnaissance, along with radio sets and other essential equipment.

The work of the ecological company has been carried out immediately before, during, and after completion of the explosive demolition of missiles.

Before each explosive demolition the ecologists analyze the meteorological situation. Here they consider everything—wind speed and the possibility of phenomena that might pose a threat or cause amplification of the shock wave. If these data do not fall within the calculated values, the special work is canceled.

For two hours before the explosive demolition background samples are collected from the air, and even before that some 50 chemical reconnaissance vehicles and other vehicles traverse routes according to the wind direction. They disperse to carry out their work along a route 80 to 120 kilometers long. As a rule, two or three helicopters are also allocated for ecological support. Some 150 people are involved constantly in these measures.

After explosive demolition of the missiles, control readings are taken, giving due consideration to the calculated time for the arrival of the cloud. In general this work is quite laborious and requires considerable effort. Thus, on days when the explosive demolitions are taking place the ecologists have to work for 10 hours at a stretch in the field, in the wind, regardless of the heat or of the frost, depending on the time of year.

Even on regular days the experts in the company do not sit round idly. Their concerns include seasonal work, for example. In the summer they collect water, soil, and plant samples, in the winter, samples of snow, and in the fall, samples of grass, hay, silage, tomatoes, water melons and musk melons... This is all done in accordance with scientifically sound methodology, giving due consideration to the recommendations of the scientists. It is worth mentioning that together with the scientific institutions, for example, the Tayfun Scientific-Production Association and the former USSR Ministry of Health Institute of Biophysics, the missile troops have entered into contracts to organize ecological-hygiene escorts and to monitor environmental contamination.

When talking about the work of the military ecologists, we should put in a good word for Lieutenant General N. Mazyarkin, Major General V. Tonkiye and Major General V. Astafyev, Colonel A. Palchikov, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Subbotin. They have devoted a great deal of effort and energy to this new business for the troops—ecological work.

Of course, the commander of the ecological company, Major V. Ivanyut, and his subordinates, also deserve respect. All the practical work has been laid on their shoulders. Now they have the great experience that is necessary for them in their day-to-day activity and that is useful to all other ecological subunits. And there is no doubt that there is a need to create them, and not only on the range at Kapustin Yar. They will be needed in future work to eliminate the nuclear missile arsenal.



**Northern Group Housing Needs Unmet***92UM0219C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Dec 91 p 2*

[Letter from Ensign O. Sargsyan, Leningrad Military District: "Judge for Yourself..."]

[Text] During the relocation of the Northern Group of Troops, we were promised that all would be provided with apartments; in reality, the last four months many married officers and ensigns have lived in dormitories without their wives and children. I have a family of five; for the moment, they live in Chelyabinsk Oblast; my wife does not work and is supported by my mother who is a pensioner. At the same time, I cannot even help them financially, since my cash pay is enough only to cover the cost of the dormitory and the cafeteria food.

My superiors advise me to rent an apartment in a neighboring locality. But it is 30 km away, the bus goes only three times a day, and there are several kilometers to walk from the company to the bus route. In addition, there is no way to leave at all in the evening, after the work is done.

I have submitted my resignation request; it has been going through the chain in the district for a month now, and I do not have any news, although I had been promised a priority discharge. I am not alone in this. You can judge for yourself what mood we are in and how we carry on our service.

**Belarus Military Housing Finished***92UM0219B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Dec 91 p 2*

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko, Belorussian Military District: "'Enka' Plus 'Haka'"]

[Text] Construction of a cantonment for families of officers and petty officers being withdrawn from Germany is nearing completion in the town of Borisovo in Belarus. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has reported on previous occasions, the construction is done by Enka, a private Turkish company.

Now in the same Minsk Oblast, in Maryina Gorka, ground for a new cantonment was broken two months ago. This one is being built by the Finnish joint-stock society Haka.

To our surprise, we saw only a few people when we arrived at the construction site. This could be explained: most of the work being done at this point is digging the foundation ditches for the buildings. Nevertheless, we were amazed by the scale of work being conducted: It was in progress across the entire territory of the future cantonment, which is about 10 hectares.

"The timeframe for the construction is one year and three months," Matti Maakinen, director of the Haka

joint-stock society, told us. "The first workers arrived at the end of September; the cantonment will be finished by the end of next year. Unlike you, we do not build in stages—one building after another; we will work on the entire complex, and will deliver a turnkey cantonment. According to the plan, there will be 11 high-rise residential buildings, a hospital, a school, a shopping center, a day-care center with a pool, and various auxiliary structures. We are working here together with Leningraders—specialists from the Monolitstroy construction association; they are the ones who prepared the design documentation. So far, we have only 200 construction workers here; eventually, there will be 1,500."

Haka is a construction organization well known in our country. The Finnish contractor participated in the construction of a video recorder plant in Voronezh, a railroad car repair depot near Leningrad, the Fedorov Ophthalmologic Center, and a residential district in Pulkovo... They get very high marks for the quality of their construction and fulfillment of contractual terms. The company values its reputation very much. This means new orders and thus new profits.

As Matti Maakinen told us, so far everything is going according to plan here in Maryina Gorka. There was a slight delay on the Leningrad side with design documentation, so the pouring of concrete had to be delayed. But now everything is back on track: the documentation has arrived, and the pouring of concrete into the foundation of the first residential building will start in a few days.

It should be noted that plumbing and other fixtures, as well as decorative materials, will be supplied from abroad, mostly from Finland. Leningrad will supply reinforcements for ferro-concrete constructions, and Belarus will supply inert materials: sand, crushed stone, and gravel...

It should also be mentioned that the construction site where Finnish and Leningrad specialists work differs considerably—on the side of the better—from those we have seen before: permanent access roads, solidly built locker buildings, varied equipment that permits mechanization of tasks, even the simplest ones... The company takes care of its people, and creates a favorable environment for their work and rest.

Very soon, by the end of 1992, servicemen of the Belorussian Military District will receive a wonderful gift—780 apartments.

**Col Gen Chekov on Problems of Homeless Servicemen***92UM0229A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
12 Dec 91 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel General N. Chekov, USSR deputy defense minister for construction and billeting of troops, by V. Izgarshev; place and date not given: "Armed, But Homeless"]

[Text]

[Izgarshev] Nikolay Vasilyevich, we arranged this meeting last month. So we will consider it planned, as your department is accustomed to saying. Although there is another reason for the meeting also. A regrettable mistake was made in yesterday's issue of PRAVDA. At the very last moment, having taken on trust the words of a respected people's deputy, the duty shift named you also as being among the persons dismissed from office. We sincerely apologize to you and our readers.

[Chekov] He who does no work makes no mistakes, as they say. I accept the apologies. But there's no point raking over what is gone, and I am ready to answer your questions. As I understand it, it will be a question of the military's most difficult and most important problem at present—housing.

[Izgarshev] Yes. As military readers write to us, they have no more acute problem than the lack of a roof over their heads. How many families of military personnel are currently on the list of those without apartments?

[Chekov] As of the start of the latter half of this year 185,700 servicemen's families were without housing. Nor, I believe, will the latter half of the year make cardinal changes in the provision of military personnel with accommodations. Although this year the Defense Ministry is, from its own forces and resources, renting out 100,000 square meters more housing than last year. In addition, foreign firms will build 1,500 apartments for Deutschmarks.

[Izgarshev] What is preventing the military from fulfilling the housing program?

[Chekov] The same thing as under civilian conditions. It all now comes down to material and technical supply. There is no glass, no paint, no plumbing. Further, all our clients are in debt to the contractors. There are approximately one billion rubles which have not been paid for work that has been done. And as a result the construction organizations cannot settle with the supplier plants for materials, structures, and equipment.

[Izgarshev] And the coming market, prices?

[Chekov] At the start of the year the cost-increase factor was planned at 1.53. It has in fact constituted 2.5 and more. We asked the Union Government for supplementary appropriations for housing construction. Twice we knocked on important doors, seeing that the market would entail an increase in the cost of accommodations. But we saw no decisions. Literally just yesterday we were allocated half of the monies we had sought. We must be thankful for small mercies, as they say.... We are trying to pay off the debt to the construction workers before the year's end.

[Izgarshev] Is it not because of these arrears, as some construction workers write to PRAVDA, that the soldier, having served two years in a construction unit, returns

home and asks his parents to send to the unit to pay off the loss several dozen and, at times, a whole 100 rubles?

[Chekov] This is not because of the arrears but because of the bungling by certain commanders of financially autonomous subunits. We are struggling resolutely and uncompromisingly against these facts.

[Izgarshev] What will the coming year bring our homeless officers' families?

[Chekov] The Defense Ministry Board recently examined the claim for capital investments in the coming year. In the total balance 67 percent of resources will be allocated for the construction of housing and social and cultural amenities. This is eight percent more than in the current year and 15 percent more than last year. We are planning to put up 400,000 square meters of housing more than this year. Foreign firms will build 350,000 square meters more housing for us for Deutschmarks than currently. Our proposals were supported among the leaders of the country and Russia.

[Izgarshev] Did you attend the meeting with the president of Russia? Did you speak?

[Chekov] I asked a question and briefly, in two or three minutes, reported to Boris Nikolayevich our concerns and the construction workers' problems. President Yeltsin came for the first time, as far as I know, to the Defense Ministry building, to the meeting hall of the Defense Ministry Board. The president of Russia's speech made a profound impression on everyone, I believe. It was concise, showed a knowledge of what he was talking about and analyzed the progress and prospects of military construction. We obtained precise, specific answers to all the questions we put. But we are getting away from the subject of the discussion, it seems.

[Izgarshev] Nikolay Vasilyevich, the following procedure prevailed before the war: When an officer arrived at his new place of service, his commanding officer would present him with the key to an apartment. Will we live to see this?

[Chekov] Well, the key not to an apartment but, more often than not, to a room. But there were no such relocations at that time, and the Army was, in terms of numbers, smaller than ours. But this is not the main thing. We have essentially no official apartments at this time. An officer released into the reserve is in no hurry to leave the garrison. Where would he go? Where is he expected? There is a decree on people who have been discharged being granted apartments within a three-month period. But who is fulfilling it and where within three years even?

[Izgarshev] The wholehearted wishes of the people of PRAVDA and all its readers are that the military construction soldiers present people with shoulder boards more often with the happiness of a home.

[Chekov] Thank you.

**Defense Aide on 'Housing Catastrophe'**

92UM0225A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Dec 91 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General L.N. Kotov, first deputy chief of construction and troop billeting, by Major I. Ivanyuk; place and date not given: "The Housing Catastrophe, or Why There Will Be Fewer Apartments Than Planned"]

[Text] Lieutenant General L. Kotov, first deputy chief of construction and troop billeting, answers questions put by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Ivanyuk] Lev Nikolayevich, this is a busy time for military construction personnel. The results of operations for the year will be summed up very soon. What will you say, in light of this, to thousands of servicemen who have no roofs over their heads? According to official statistics, there are almost 200,000 of them at present...

[Kotov] Indeed. We are also aware that actually there are more of them. According to calculations, 57,000 servicemen from among those serving with the Western Group of Forces have no apartments in the Motherland, and there are 14,000 such servicemen in the Northern Group of Forces. At present, it is hard to estimate how many officers, warrant officers, and men in extended service, who do not have housing, will leave the Baltics. All of these factors were not taken into account when we adopted the program "Housing-2000."

Frankly, the situation borders on catastrophe: If we total up the above numbers it will turn out that approximately one serviceman in four in the army and the navy does not have an apartment. Such a situation does not exist in any ministry or region. We cannot disregard the fact that when we developed the housing program, housing was provided by executive committees. Likewise, local organs resolved the issue of resettling people from military settlements that were off-limits or remote. By now, resolutions which apply in this matter have been "devalued." We also received a good number of apartments through contributions of funds. Now, even if we invest funds, we receive just one-half of the square meters we are entitled to. The reason is that construction organizations of the national economy fulfill between 60 and 70 percent of the plan.

[Ivanyuk] One would think that it would have now been understood by all that the Ministry of Defense will have to count on its own resources first of all. What is the status of plan fulfillment by military construction personnel?

[Kotov] Of course, we prepared in advance for shouldering an extra burden with regard to housing construction. In 1990, 46 percent of capital investment was allocated for this purposes, and this was considered to be a lot, whereas this year it is as high as 60 percent. We are planning to allocate to housing construction two-thirds of all appropriated funds. However, as they put it,

financing is not even half of it. Other resources are also required in order to boost the volume of operations so substantially. In view of this, emergency measures have been taken to enhance our own construction facilities. The accomplishments are graphically reflected by the following statistics. In 1989, the Main Directorate of the Construction Industry of the Ministry of Defense produced 320 houses, whereas this year as many as 500. The increment has been largely secured due to improving the organization of production and the rational assignment of the output assortment to enterprises. Next year, we are planning to produce elements for as many as 560 houses in the same facilities, taking advantage of the pace we have built up.

Alas, this does not save the day. We counted on meeting the needs for additional housing in conjunction with the pullout of Soviet troops from abroad, from internal resources, but this was predicated on deliveries of construction materials by the national economy proceeding smoothly. The severance of economic relations in the country affected the work of military construction personnel most painfully.

Capital investment for the housing program of this year was not provided in full either. In essence, we failed to receive 1.8 billion rubles [R]. As a result, we have not had the funds with which to settle with the enterprises of the national economy for their deliveries for two months now. That is to say, it is not a higher volume of operations that is at issue; at present, we are not given even the financial resources which were provided for in the plan for the fourth quarter. Accordingly, there is nothing to pay wages to the people with...

[Ivanyuk] That is, you want to say that the annual plan will not be fulfilled?

[Kotov] Unfortunately, there is no longer any doubt as to this. Overall, we will do no worse than last year, when military construction personnel commissioned 3.3 million square meters of residential space; however, there will not be any extra on top of this, which we counted on.

The situation is also very alarming because for now, we do not see clear prospects for the coming year either. To this day, there is no clarity at all with regard to financing; correspondingly, not a gram of material resources has been allocated to us. As far as direct contracts with suppliers are concerned, we now have only seven percent of what had been coordinated by the beginning of December last year.

In this matter, you have to take the peculiarity of our work into account. Construction organizations of the national economy structure their plans on the basis of specific contracts bolstered by material resources, whereas the military construction personnel cannot afford this. There is a particular task, and it must be accomplished at any price. As far as plans for housing construction next year are concerned, the military construction personnel must build 67,000 apartments and

provide more than 12,000 slots in dormitories. At present, all of these plans are in danger of failing.

[Ivanyuk] Lev Nikolayevich, here is another question which N. Rachkova, a representative of the Committee of Parents of Servicemen "Movement Against Violence," who heads the sector of living conditions and has been instrumental in preparing this interview, asked you to respond to through the newspaper: What is going to happen to soldiers, what are their living conditions going to be?

[Kotov] Naturally, we plan not only to erect residential buildings for officers and warrant officers, but also to build military settlements with all the attendant social infrastructure—bath and laundry combines, medical facilities, clubs, and schools. How could it be otherwise—the number of soldiers coming back from abroad goes into tens of thousands annually. Accordingly more resources are allocated to put them up than before. However, the issues which I have mentioned come up in this sphere quite as acutely. This is why I will say frankly that there will be difficulties, and considerable difficulties at that. Accommodations in the barracks will consist of bunk beds only; possibly, for a period of time, they will have to live in tents. This is happening when the construction of barracks rather than residential buildings is at issue. Now let us imagine what would happen if the army switched overnight to the contractual mode of enlistment as some reformers propose, and full-fledged housing had to be provided for professional soldiers and their families... The question is where to get this housing; we would be lucky to solve the housing problem of the current professional servicemen in the next 20 years.

The following reassures me personally to a degree in this regard: In previous years, more attention was paid to accommodating the personnel, after all, than to solving the housing problems of officers. A place in the barracks has generally always been guaranteed to a soldier. It is another matter whether he felt comfortable, or not quite comfortable in these barracks; a lot depends in this matter not only on the construction personnel, but also on specific officers in a military unit. I believe that at present our main task is to pay back our debts, if I may put it so, to officers, warrant officers, petty officers, and generals. After all, compulsory military service ends quickly, whereas these people devote their entire lives to defending the motherland; moreover, their families and children should not suffer from residential hardship.

[Ivanyuk] Do you see a way out of the existing situation?

[Kotov] As I have tried to indicate above, solving housing and some other social problems of the army and the navy is at present inconceivable without military construction personnel. We recognize that the effectiveness of their work could be better. Incidentally, we have prepared pertinent proposals for the reorganization of military construction units into construction and technical units, and it has been months since they were submitted to the president of the USSR. We considered

it important to not only improve the effectiveness of the operation of these units and the prestige of the service through these measures, but also to set forth the legal status of the military construction personnel.

If military construction units in their present format are "set adrift" in the sea of pure market relations, they will not survive. On one hand, the program of operations assigned by the Ministry of Defense is dictated by a harsh necessity—there is no way to build any less. On the other hand, this is the limit. You cannot bite off more than you can chew. We do not have reserves in order to compete; we have resources for the plan of the Ministry of Defense, and even then not everything. The availability of certain items is only 70 percent.

I believe that under current circumstances, specific quotas should be allocated to military construction at the union-and-republic or republic level. A lot will depend in this matter on Russia; it is precisely in this republic that the bulk of the construction program of the Ministry of Defense, or more precisely, 74.3 percent of it, is concentrated. Several days ago, we sent a letter with specific proposals to President of Russia B. Yeltsin personally.

[Ivanyuk] Well, let us hope that the approach of the Russian leadership to problems, the resolution of which hundreds of thousands of servicemen await, will be constructive. However, in the greater scheme of things, is it all that necessary to solve apartment problems in the army and the navy? Could it be that the time has come to change our approach to these problems?

[Kotov] I understand what you are talking about. Indeed, it has so happened that the state has repudiated virtually all responsibility for the residential situation of the people who safeguard the interests of this state. Of course, it is not proper for the Ministry of Defense to resort to "self-service" in this sphere. Let us look at officers. As I see it, they should be given official residential space strictly in keeping with their rank and the composition of their families. Apartments may have one, two, or three rooms, and no more. Before officers are discharged to the reserves, they must be given apartments at the places of residence they elect.

There is another problem too: At present, we have to serve entire cities which develop around garrisons. In many of these cities, more than one-half of the inhabitants are no longer affiliated with the Armed Forces, but they have nowhere to go. This is why rear services and billeting and maintenance elements are also concerned with their living conditions to a considerable degree,

[Ivanyuk] Perhaps, it would be cheaper for military construction personnel to erect houses in the central belt of the country for those discharged to the reserves rather than build new housing in such garrisons, especially where this is expensive, for example, in the North?

[Kotov] This is not as easy as it appears at first sight. As practice shows, we need two to three apartments in order to vacate one apartment in a closed military settlement:



By the time an officer is discharged, his children grow up and start their own families. However, this undoubtedly makes sense. For example, the Northern Fleet has now been given a "spot" for such construction. However, people from, for example, Kamchatka are not particularly eager to move anywhere at all... In short, there are no universal solutions in this sphere, just as everywhere else. We will try to be flexible in searching for solutions to these problems.

[Ivanyuk] Together with all our readers, we hope that the critical situation which the military construction personnel are facing and, correspondingly, the implementation of the housing program in the army and the navy, will not be ignored by the leadership of the Union and the sovereign republics.

#### **Navy Rear Services Chief Heads Privatized Supply Company**

*PM1912110791 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 18 Dec 91 First Edition p 4*

[TASS correspondent A. Danilin report: "'Nevikon' for the Seamen"]

[Text] The Navy's "Nevikon" joint stock company has been officially registered. As Admiral Igor Makhonin, deputy commander in chief for Naval Rear Services, chief of Rear Services, and the company's chairman of the board, told your TASS correspondent, the company was formed on the basis of the formation of authorized capital—10 million rubles [R] out of the resources of the shareholders—the Navy and the "Bulat" joint stock company. The Navy has the controlling shareholding.

The purpose of creating the "Nevikon" joint stock company is to promote the resolution of social problems of military seamen in the face of the market economy and to develop the Navy's infrastructure. The basic directions in the activity of the joint stock company are the creation of individual production capacities to manufacture consumer goods and other industrial output, and the creation of a commercial fleet, transport companies, and complexes for the production and processing of meat and other agricultural produce.

At present, the admiral noted, the elaboration of a Soviet-U.S. program is being completed within the framework of the "Nevikon" joint stock company to create a construction infrastructure in the fleets which could provide 30,000 apartments for servicemen and naval workers and employees in the next few years. A program has been outlined to supplement the resources for the provision of pensions out of deductions from the company's fund.

Commenting on reports in the press on the sinking of surface ships and submarines sold for scrap abroad, I.G. Makhonin stressed that the Navy has nothing to do with these occurrences. In accordance with the established procedure in the country, the fleets hand over written-off ships to enterprises in the "Vtormet" state organization. These enterprises and certain joint enterprises are sometimes involved in their sale abroad for currency. In our view, the admiral said, civilian organizations carrying out such commercial operations are displaying complete incompetence in safety terms and so are sinking ships under tow.

I think that the creation of "Nevikon" will resolve many problems that are restraining commercial activity in the Navy, and will raise its efficiency in the Navy's interests, Admiral I. Makhonin concluded.



### Spring Draft Problems

92UM0217A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Dec 91 p 1

[Interview with Major General L. Grinchenko, chief of a directorate of the staff of the Odessa Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel N. Mulyar; place and date not given: "There Are Volunteers Even"]

[Text] We are accustomed to the call-up for military service proceeding with difficulty in the majority of regions of the country. What will happen next? How will the fall draft be completed, and will the inventory levels of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff be met? This was the subject of our correspondent's interview with Major General L. Grinchenko, chief of a directorate of the staff of the Odessa Military District.

[Grinchenko] The draft from the oblasts on whose territory the district is located, is proceeding in organized fashion and is not causing us any great concern. The legislative instruments of Ukraine helped defuse the tension. According to these, the conscripts are now accorded the right of serving closer to home. This was supported in the General Staff also. We are manning the construction units, on the other hand, only on the territory of the republic. We are sending outside exclusively "volunteers," and then only after they have undergone training at training centers.

[Mulyar] Leonid Dorofeyevich, may those who so desire serve in other regions of the country?

[Grinchenko] Approximately 20 percent. I was talking recently with graduates of training subunits. They included Moldovans, Ukrainians, Azerbaijanis. And you know what they told me? They were ready to serve where they were sent. Just one person expressed a desire to be sent to Moldova.

[Mulyar] And how is selection of the candidates for service in the Transcaucasus going?

[Grinchenko] Only in volunteer fashion. First the conscript is drilled in a training subunit and acquires a military occupational specialty and then, if he declares a desire to serve there, he writes an application in his own hand, and we send him to this region. More than 800 volunteers have already been sent to the Transcaucasus. It is well known that they will receive there far higher pay than per the regular rates.

[Mulyar] And where is the fulfillment of the draft inventory level being handled best?

[Grinchenko] The draft is going well in Nikolayev Oblast, whose military commissariat is headed by Colonel V. Nesterov. In the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, where the military commissar is Major General A. Bolkov. As of the present time they have already sent to the army more than one-third of the conscripts. Things are going pretty well in Kherson and

Zaporozhye. Compared with last year, there has been a sharp reduction in conscript no-shows here. And yet the influence of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, who at draft time have usually called on the youth not to answer the call at the military commissariats, is strong in Zaporozhye. Now the state of affairs has changed. What has contributed to this?

First and foremost, the military commissariats have altered their style of work in this area, and there has come to be more glasnost. Parents can find out easily where and to what forces their son is being sent and where his future service will be. Having lifted the veil of secrecy, we have been better able to organize work on the draft and are achieving mutual trust with the parents. They are now sending off their sons to the call-up centers with an easy mind. A big part has been played here, of course, by the contacts of the staff of military commissariats and our administration with the committees of soldiers' mothers and other public organizations. The well-considered approach of the draft commissions to decisions on the fate of each conscript has been of considerable importance also, in my view.

[Mulyar] To what do you refer?

[Grinchenko] According to legislation of Ukraine, persons with children below the age of eight are not drafted. There is no such provision in Union law, on the other hand. How do we proceed in this connection? Whoever has a child, but who does not want a deferment, joins the army voluntarily. He writes an application to this end and has it certified in a notary's office, after which we draft the young man for service. All this, plus the order of the USSR defense minister on tightening the requirements concerning medical selection of conscripts has facilitated our work also.

In addition, we have many examples of the parents themselves putting pressure on their sons if the latter endeavors to evade the army.

I would like to mention the following detail also. By a decision of the commander, the recruits are allocated the best premises. Subunit commanders are required the day after the recruits' arrival at their units to write their parents a letter informing them in what occupational specialty their son will serve, how he will get there, and so forth. Parents are invited to attend their son's oath of enlistment ceremony. Visitors' rooms are being expanded and equipped at the units. Soldiers serving close to home can now meet their parents more often. The latter, in turn, the commanders. Such contacts, in our view, help to ensure not only an exchange of information but also to influence a strengthening of discipline.

[Mulyar] As I understand it from what you say, there are no problems as yet with the draft in Ukraine, but how is it going in Moldova?

[Grinchenko] It is difficult to answer this question. In accordance with an order of the president of the republic, in Moldova conscripts are being called up at the present time only for the border and internal forces inasmuch as the latter are to be the basis of the creation of a national army. It is contemplated including here deserters also, of whom there are now approximately 5,000 in the republic.

[Mulyar] Leonid Dorofeyevich, our readers would be interested in learning, I believe, how conscripts from Moldova themselves view army service. Has their opinion been studied?

[Grinchenko] Yes. According to the data of sociologists, who polled more than 12,000 persons, 7,000 expressed a desire to serve in the unified USSR Armed Forces, and 5,594 agree only to alternative service. The following detail is interesting: 60 percent of the young men are prepared to perform their military duty anywhere in the country and in any arm of the service, but there is no ordinance of the republic government on this score.

[Mulyar] And how are things in such regions of Moldova as Gagauzia and the Dnestr area?

[Grinchenko] These parts of the republic are living in accordance with Union legislation, and there are here, as in Ukraine, no particular problems with the draft, and the draft commissions are actively at work. Money, transport, and people have been allocated from the local budget for servicing the draft. Of 1,400 persons polled in the Dnestr region, only 100 expressed a desire for alternative service, and the other conscripts will be sent to various arms of the service.

### Naval Specialist Shortages Noted

92UM0219A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Dec 91 p 2

[Report on comments by Captain 1st Rank B. Golubev, the new commander of the training detachment imeni F.S. Oktyabrskogo, by Lieutenant V. Yeranossyan, Black Sea Fleet, under the rubric: "Combat Readiness: A Timely Alarm": "Navy Specialists Through Barter?"]

[Text] When we say the word "shortage," everything is clear. Everything is in short supply these days. Butter, sugar, electric appliances, automobiles. This endless list has been rightfully complemented by one more term, not easily understood by civilians—RTS ((Radio-Technical Service)) specialist. After his assignment to the training detachment imeni F.S. Oktyabrskogo, the new commander, Captain 1st Rank B. Golubev has encountered a shortage of specialists in radio-technical service—hydroacoustics—who are supposed to train the cadets.

"I no longer believe that the situation can be changed for the better," the commander does not try to hide his pessimism. "There are two officer-specialists for two companies of sonarmen. There are supposed to be 12. There is also a shortage of warrant officers."

At this point, class and training hours have to be divided between the two officers—specialists in acoustics. The command does not see any other solution. The officers cannot be in several places at the same time, of course, but, bless them, they do understand that they are the only resources and are carrying a fivefold load.

Everybody is aware of the problem, from the detachment commander to the fleet command. Still, there does not seem to be a way to resolve it. They have already started inviting radio-technical service specialists from other armed services.

"We will change their uniform and retrain them. Then they will teach the cadets..." says Captain 1st Rank V. Golubev.

This is in the future. What about today?

### Protection for Servicemen After Discharge

92UM0244A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Frontov, candidate of technical sciences, and M. Matskovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Behind the Shield of Social Guarantees: Who Will Safeguard the Interests of the Defenders of the Motherland and How?"]

[Text] Sociopolitical events which are impetuously unfolding in our country have put the servicemen in an extremely difficult situation. The republics do not want to give them consideration and take care of them the way they used to. The republics do not want to feed and clothe them. The "man with the gun" ended up sort of outside the law, as he is continuously humiliated, lacks any prospects in the service or in civilian life, goes hungry himself, and is aware of the calamitous situation of his family; he is in a position of either an exile or an uninvited guest on what used to be "his native," Soviet land.

It is easy to appreciate how explosive the situation existing in the Armed Forces is, and how serious a political challenge it raises for those who are responsible for policy development and implementation, and not only in our country. Without any exaggeration, the issue of Soviet servicemen is now an issue with international ramifications. It needs to be resolved immediately. The army consists of hundreds of thousands of educated and disciplined officers who have been through a formidable school of life. A considerable segment of them have experience in operating sophisticated modern materiel. Using their potential effectively in civilian pursuits is a task of tremendous social significance, especially in a market environment. A program of social protection for the servicemen and members of their families should be worked out, and its implementation should begin as soon as possible; this program should make it possible for them to look to the future with confidence while giving their undivided attention to performing their military

duty and, most importantly, it should make it possible for them to lead a worthy life after being discharged to the reserves.

A lot has been said about various aspects of social protection for servicemen. However, there is no clear-cut concept in this matter. Who should protect the people in the state service and after this service is completed, and how? Is it legitimate to raise this issue? As we see it, it is legitimate. We should primarily be talking about a system of social guarantees for the people who devoted their lives to defending the Motherland.

We believe that the social protection program should apply both to active servicemen, and those in the reserves or retired. Social guarantees for servicemen should be affirmed at the level of state-to-state agreements and in the legislation of the sovereign states. They should not depend on "shifts" in political and economic life.

At the same time, it is already clear that the state is not in a position to solve these problems without tapping funds from outside the budget. What additional sources of financing for a social protection program for former servicemen may there be? This is a quite complex issue which requires additional study. However, it is already clear that, for example, vacated segments of land formerly used for defense needs may become a formidable reserve for using the labor of those discharged to the reserves as farmers and setting up enterprises with various lines of business on these lands. We may also discuss funds which will be taken in as a result of commercial operations involving vacated real estate and retired combat materiel. Incidentally, such efforts are already underway; we trust that they will be put in order when a commercial center is set up at the Ministry of Defense. Specialized companies of former servicemen are already being formed, though so far they are very few.

We are convinced that state structures alone are not in a position to cope with the rapidly mounting difficulties in the lives of the servicemen and their adaptation to civilian life. It is impossible to accomplish the tasks described without creating a private enterprise sector in our country now. Our proposal is to give an officer or warrant officer still in the process of service, an opportunity to choose a sphere of operations after his discharge, and to assist former servicemen in setting up their own cooperative, private, and joint stock organizations which could work on the issues of social protection for the servicemen at an accelerated pace.

The state could assign to them state requisitions for housing construction, improving the living conditions of the servicemen, and so on. Given good labor organization, such organizations would provide additional opportunities for solving the problem of job placement of the former servicemen.

It would be feasible to consider the issue of taxes on these organizations being contributed to a special fund of social assistance for the former servicemen, rather than

to the budget. To our mind, a system of social security for servicemen could be a great help. As we see it, setting up this system in the Armed Forces would generate considerable funds for financing various projects for the social protection and psychological adjustment of the former servicemen.

There may be other sources of off-budget financing of social programs benefiting servicemen. It is important to combine a scientific approach with the extensive use of the experience of Western countries which have, over a long time, developed quite effective forms and methods of operation in this extremely important sphere of social security.

The development of comprehensive international cooperation may facilitate the resolution of complex problems which have faced the Soviet servicemen to a considerable degree due to the abrupt onset of a warmer climate in relations between the East and the West, and the elimination of the fear of the "Eastern threat" in Western countries. This is not about some sops on the part of the West, but merely the specific allocation of only a certain fraction of funds from immense moneys which the West will secure as a result of a considerable reduction of our Armed Forces and their switch to a markedly defensive doctrine.

An increasing number of governmental, scientific, private, and religious organizations are prepared to finance joint programs of social protection for former servicemen. This aid may be not only in the nature of information and familiarization (provision of special programs, study aids, and so on), but may also be of an utterly material nature (transfers of plants, production lines, and construction materials).

Of course, such aid may be provided only if convincing guarantees are given by our side, and if we succeed in creating a non-governmental organization which would coordinate the efforts of state structures, organizations and establishments of a political and military-industrial nature, private business, scientists, and representatives of international organizations which enjoy authority in the area of military research; for example, such as the RAND Corporation (United States).

Scientific support for solving the social problems of former servicemen could become the main direction of operation of such an organization, including, for example, a study of the dynamic development of social contradictions in the Armed Forces and the development of recommendations on resolving them, the development of specific projects for operations in this sphere, the development of draft legislative proposals, and others.

The International Center for Common Human Values is now in operation. For a long time, it has worked on issues of the social protection of servicemen, taking foreign experience into account. Work is underway on preparing an international conference on the topic "The Military in the Environment of Transition to a Market

Economy." About 60 private individuals and representatives of various organizations from the United States, West Europe, Japan, and other countries have already expressed interest in taking part in the conference. The conference is scheduled for March 1992. The plan is to discuss during the conference the theoretical issues of creating a model of social protection accounting for the peculiarities of our country, legal support for entrepreneurial activities by former servicemen after their discharge to the reserves, forms of business participation by servicemen, the role of the army in accomplishing regional socioeconomic programs, and many other issues.

We count on the publication of our article evoking interest in the military community, and on a response from all those who would like to facilitate the speediest possible resolution of the most acute socioeconomic problems facing former servicemen and their families.

**The authors have requested that the honorarium for this article be transferred to the Interpublic Fund for Humanitarian Aid to Servicemen "Defender of the Motherland."**

### Military Contract System

92UM0290A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 Dec 91 p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel A. Ivashchenko, commander of a signal regiment in the Turkestan Military District, by Colonel A. Ladin; date not given: "Contract Service"]

[Text] Our correspondent discussed the contract system of recruitment for the Armed Forces, the ways in which this concept will be carried out in the units, and the problems existing in this sphere with the commander of a signal regiment, Lieutenant Colonel A. Ivashchenko (Turkestan Military District).

[Ladin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, as is known, work is now being completed on draft amendments to the Law on the Comprehensive Military Service Obligation. The document incorporates the concept of contract service. What is your attitude toward this novelty?

[Ivashchenko] I support this approach to recruitment into the Armed Forces. I will say more: If the regiment subordinated to me consisted in its entirety of servicemen who would sign appropriate contracts with the military department, the effectiveness of our service would improve quite sharply...

[Ladin] So, is your regiment prepared to switch to the signing of such contracts come the New Year, for example, to sign such a contract with Reserve Sergeant Khlynov who sent a letter on this topic to "Soldier's House?"

[Ivashchenko] Unfortunately, I cannot at all say that we are ready. It is one thing to want something, and it is

another to proceed from the actual situation. I do not know how contract service looks from on high. As far as our regiment is concerned, no documents or clarifications regarding this have reached us yet. However, as I see it, no unit command will assume any obligations to those it does not know. In other words, if we go for contracts we should use the right to select specialists to the full extent.

Why am I fond of the idea of contract service? First, because I see that there is an opportunity to reinforce the collective with top-notch specialists. Second, the crew in radio rooms with sophisticated electronic contents, of which we have a great many in our regiment, may remain permanent for much longer than half a year, which is the case now. The people will have greater responsibility for the condition of materiel.

It appears to me that many current problems concerning the restoration of order in mutual relations between servicemen will disappear all by themselves. The selection of specialists in the process of signing contracts will bring about an improvement in the moral atmosphere in military collectives. No commander will have anything to do with criminal elements, do-nothings, and drunks. Clearly, nobody will foist such cadres on them anymore.

[Ladin] Indeed, but even now the commanders have a right to select individuals for extended service, for the positions of warrant officers. However, in reality it so happens that there is no choice. Most frequently, those who offer their services are accepted...

[Ivashchenko] I agree that this does happen, but why? There is no competition. I think that contract service should hold the promise of good money, even very good money, for those who intend to devote themselves to it.

[Ladin] However, in that case we may expect specialists who cannot make this kind of money in civilian life to rush into the Army. There will be lines and throngs in front of the gates of military units...

[Ivashchenko] I have not touched on the second half of the terms for contract service. Indeed, servicemen need to be paid well—for their dependability, initiative, the highest degree of professionalism, the ability to master several military occupations rather than just one, and the readiness to accomplish the assigned tasks under extreme conditions, rather than because of their pretty eyes and good figures. This is the kind of list we come up with. Now you tell me: Will just anybody be able to meet such requirements? So I assure you the lines will not be there for very long. However, there will certainly be individuals who will want to sign contracts with the Army and the Navy for decent position salaries.

[Ladin] Where are such individuals to be sought? Perhaps, we should recruit them through job placement offices?

[Ivashchenko] Why not? However, I think we should nonetheless emphasize the preparation of young people



for contract service directly in the Army environment. When they refer to the principle of mixed recruitment for the Army and the Navy, I infer that the, shall we say, non-contract segment of personnel in, for example, my regiment will consist of draftees. They will take special training until offers to sign contracts are made. During this period of time, each candidate will master a military occupation (a year will possibly be required for this). Commanders will size them up. Those who deserve a contract will be offered it; others will be discharged into the reserves.

[Ladin] So you view those who have signed contracts with the Armed Forces as the core of the Army and the Navy. Do you believe that auxiliary training units, schools, and centers should exist in addition?

[Ivashchenko] Yes; it is preferable to have them directly in regiments. However, other variants are also acceptable. It is important for the commander to deal with mature specialists who are well trained in all respects.

[Ladin] Are you aware of other approaches to implementing the concept of contract service?

[Ivashchenko] On the one hand, if we take the path of less stringent requirements for candidates, I am certain that we will not ensure any perceptible difference between the present-day and future Army.

On the other hand, if the military department fails to offer good terms to the candidates for contract service, the failure of the planned endeavors is assured. By "good terms," I do not mean just high pay, but also decent uniforms and good-quality barracks with all amenities for those who, while signing the contract, will have to agree to reside in the barracks. The interest in the new

form of service will be invariably high if it provides opportunities to improve skills and cross-train, a guarantee of employment in one's chosen profession, and reliable social protection in the event of an injury, mutilation, being wounded in combat, and so on. In a word, the people should be aware of quite tangible benefits.

[Ladin] In other words, should contracts be mutually beneficial?

[Ivashchenko] Absolutely. I hope very much that the terms of the contracts will be developed in-depth and ahead of time, taking into account the interests of both the military department and the person voluntarily devoting himself to the service.

[Ladin] Still, backtracking to the beginning of our interview, I would like to be specific: Is your regiment prepared to begin signing contracts from the New Year on?

[Ivashchenko] Perhaps, such haste is unnecessary. At a minimum, a year should be scheduled to prepare for a transition to the new form of service. We should at least begin to train the specialists from whom we will later select the first volunteers. After all, we intend to use the new approach to recruitment into combat collectives for a long time to come rather than just for a year. Therefore, let us act in a new way from the very beginning—in a businesslike, circumspect, and well thought-out way. Also, let us act with economic reason!

After all, preparatory efforts call for certain outlays. Are we ready for this? Meanwhile, we need to get going after the New Year. I have no doubt about this.

**Future of Military Training Institutions Considered**

92UM0281A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 19 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Natalya Dvoynishnikova: "Women Should Actively Work in the Army, and Military Educational Institutions Need to Resurrect the Traditions of the Russian Military School"]

[Text]

**The Army**

According to Major-General Yuri Goncharov, a Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions expert, armed forces strength reductions and changes in its structure, and also conversion of military industry requires sweeping changes in the officer cadre training system. He suggests shifting all military schools over to a five year course of study, and the course of study for training engineers in individual more complex and science-intensive specialties at schools should be increased to six years.

The main thing in restructuring the content of instruction should be humanizing military education and intensifying legal and financial-economic training for officers. VUZ's [military educational institutions] have to resurrect the lost traditions of the Russian military school which devoted paramount attention to the development of general culture and morals and fostering the honor and dignity of officers.

Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions workers have expressed serious concern with regard to the decisions of a number of republics of the former USSR on privatization and nationalization of armed forces property, including military educational institutions. There are 33 military educational institutions in Ukraine in particular, each of which is an element in a single military education system. Officers are trained in a whole series of military specialties only at these VUZ's and nowhere else. Among them are such powerful educational-scientific centers as the Military Engineering Radio-Technical Academy in Kharkov which trains specialists in the area of antimissile and space defense, the Naval Engineering School in Sevastopol which trains officers on nuclear power plants, and others. Each of

them has excellent science teaching cadres, a developed infrastructure and unique science facilities. Seventeen doctors and 248 candidates of science work at the Kharkov School for Missile Troops, which is not large by the standards of the average civilian VUZ. It is practically impossible to relocate such a VUZ to another city. And to subject it to conversion and in exchange erect another VUZ of equal value would require more than a decade and many billions in expenditures.

Political decisions will determine the fate of military educational institutions. However, with any decision, Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions personnel think that military academies and schools which train specialists for the strategic deterrent forces and primarily for the strategic nuclear forces must remain under the jurisdiction of the country's united armed forces.

The new economic situation that is emerging in the country is causing military educational institutions to face complex problems. Many restrictions which were probably justified under the conditions of a planned economy will tie VUZ's hand and foot during the shift to the market. In the opinion of VUZ leaders, under the new conditions, they need to be granted more rights and economic independence to give the VUZ's the ability to earn money and enjoy the fruits of their labor. The leading engineering VUZ's, the Air Force Engineering Academy imeni N.E. Zhukovskiy, the Space Engineering Institute imeni A.F. Mozhayskiy, and many others, have everything needed to train, on a contract basis, specialists of the highest caliber for the civilian sectors of industry. On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense could refuse to train officers in individual specialties with small numbers of specialists at its VUZ's and contract them out to civilian higher educational institutions.

The practice of such cooperation has been proven through experience with medical VUZ's. We should note that today the military doctor is the only military profession for which female officers are trained. Based on world experience, we should take a broader view of the problem of employing women in the army. They could serve successfully in many engineering positions, including those associated with the use of computers, at headquarters and rear services institutions. Right now, many letters from senior class members are arriving with requests to accept women into military schools.

### Conversion at Chelyabinsk-70 Nuclear Weapons Facility

92UM0231A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
25 Nov 91 Union edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Shcherbina:  
"Instead of the Bomb, Open Business"]

[Text] Snezhinsk in the Southern Urals was masked with the fictitious name "Chelyabinsk-70" for many decades.

It can now be openly stated that Snezhinsk was the birthplace and the producer of Soviet thermonuclear weapons. Born in the heat of the cold war, in March 1955, this Ural "town," "neither large nor small," within an extremely short time placed our nation's hands on that level of strategic nuclear parity which (along with Arzamas-16 on the Volga) kept mankind away from military catastrophe for almost a half-century.

This alone gives one an idea of the intellectual capability concentrated on this tiny piece of Ural land. Hundreds of prominent scientists (200 of them are holders of Lenin and State prizes!) and thousands of highly skilled specialists work at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), at design offices and experimental design plants located there. This powerful intellectual center has an enormous reserve of unutilized technology and know-how even today.

Professor Vladimir Zinov'yevich Nechay, VNIITF director, made an interesting and informative acknowledgment in one of his recent interviews:

"The kind of model scientific production center for which other areas of science were only recently striving has functioned here for almost 40 years. The system consists of the institute's theoretical scientific center, a number of design offices and plants. It is all compactly concentrated here on a single piece of land, all under the same control, with everyone working on a single problem in his own section. Over the decades of their operation these teams have "grown comfortable" with one another to an ideal degree. The very times have prepared us for performing scientific tasks on both a national and a global scale."

It is clear today that this legacy, built up with such hard work, could be destroyed irreversibly. This is because the Snezhinsk Scientific Production Complex, oriented until just recently toward the production of nuclear weapons, is now to be included in the conversion process.

Naturally, the Ural nuclear physicists and the unique and valuable specialists who have assembled around them understand well the spirit of the times, the upheavals in the economy and the changes in international relations, which demand commensurate action. Something else is difficult to understand. Just how can total conversion be announced without a precisely defined state program, strictly on a voluntary basis? The dilettantes who are proposing this strategy for improving the economy apparently naively believe that it is all the

same to yesterday's nuclear scientist what he does: make a nuclear bomb or a frying pan. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the fact that, while curtailing the basic production, glorified until just recently, the state has now drastically cut financing and, hinting that it will have to earn its own money, has left the VNIITF to "stay afloat on its own." The results have been lamentable. People are leaving.

This is particularly alarming because it is not just bombs which were "put together" at Snezhinsk. Understanding the nation's needs, it gradually accumulated experience in turning out science-intensive civilian products, invented unique items and even produced them in small quantities. Fiber-optics communication equipment was one such field. These are fundamentally new systems for transmitting all sorts of information, including video communication with a large traffic capacity, compact and resistant to interference. The Volokonno-Opticheskaya Tekhnika Association was established with 18 institutes, combines and plants. In slightly more than a year it produced unique equipment for the production of extremely high-quality glass fiber. Here is something we could take onto the world market without shame. However.... Listed as a state program, production was cut, and instead of the 350 million "planned" rubles only 20 million was allocated.

Things are also enormously difficult for the attempt to set up regular production of complex medical equipment, particularly computerized tomographs for precision diagnosis. The first such top-notch instruments—and they are expensive, costing around three million rubles—were produced for enterprises of the Kuzbass, Atomash and Magnitka with payment in advance. An association was set up for their expanded production, but its efforts are not enough to increase production of the instruments.

Unfortunately, in the situation in which the center is relinquishing its power and Russia is not yet able to take over everything, literally priceless Snezhinsk personnel are not being used because allocations for conversion have been halted. What can we do? I heard the most acceptable solution in the Chelyabinsk Oblast Ispolkom. Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Kaunov, who, along with his staff, is vigorously studying the "problem of the oblast's currency receptivity," had this to say:

"I can see three courses to take: participation in the conversion by our business, an infusion of foreign investment and the establishment of small enterprises in specific fields out of the VNIITF. Together, they could help us to preserve the intellectual capability of "70-people," make it the currency market of the oblast and, consequently, provide for the resolution of all the social problems of the city's 45,000-population...."

Special hopes are pinned on the Chelyabinsk general exchange. It was prepared two months ago to allocate the first 100 million rubles for Snezhinsk. Only one thing prevented this: the unexpected instigation of legal action

against exchange President E. Tenyakov and the resulting cessation of trading. There is hope, however, that this source of financing will soon begin flowing again. Incidentally, other representatives of Southern Ural business have indicated an interest in establishing business relations with the "70-people."

Foreign firms have also expressed an interest in civilian projects of the local nuclear specialists. A delegation from France arrived in Chelyabinsk literally the other day to establish business contacts. Its program includes a meeting with Snezhinsk representatives on the matter of cooperation in the production of complex medical equipment. Under what terms? This will become clear from the final documents.

Contact was established between the VNIITF and Israeli entrepreneurs even earlier, again through the agency of A. Kaunov. They found a common interest in the

production of broad-spectrum tomographs and the joint filling of a certain niche in the world market. The possibility of establishing cooperative relations with the German Siemens firm is not ruled out.

Naturally, the collectives of the VNIITF and its subdivisions, accustomed to state financing, are leery of private capital and joint-stock endeavor, which could "erode" the existing military-industrial structure. I feel that these apprehensions are invalid, however. The creative collectives and small enterprises set up for specific problems will merely detach from the main production operation, but, with the help of investments and engaging in the independent development and refinement of know-how, will continue to have genetic ties of kinship with it. Private business is therefore not the enemy. It will ultimately help the open-closed city not only to survive but also to resolve the many problems which have accumulated in various areas of life.

### **Military Counterintelligence Chief on Methods, Tasks**

92UM0266A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Dec 91 First edition p 3

[Interview with Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence Chief Major-General Yuriy Yemelyanovich Bulygin by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Commentator Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban: "State Security Does Not Need a Sword...Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence Chief Major-General Yuriy Yemelyanovich Bulygin answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Commentator Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban's Questions"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's dossier: General Bulygin was born and grew up in Voronezh and he graduated from the engineering-construction institute there. He has been with the state security organs since 1957. He has completed graduate work and defended his thesis. His primary area of scientific interest is management theory in the sphere of state security organ activities. He has been head of the Main Directorate of Military Counter-Intelligence since the end of August.

[Urban] Yuriy Yemelyanovich, you must certainly have guessed why I requested an interview with you. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has described the work of the state commission for the investigation of state security organ activities. And how will the fate of military counterintelligence be decided?

[Bulygin] At this time, there has been no specific decision.

[Urban] You certainly know that right now the newspapers are writing about the state security organs and specifically about the special departments. Do you not regret that you became a military counterintelligence agent?

[Bulygin] I will state it frankly and quite specifically: I have never regretted it, this work has given meaning to my life. But I hurt now.... Yes, you heard me correctly, I hurt. I cannot look without pain at how they are attempting to defame military counterintelligence agents and to portray them as bewildered, dishonorable and unscrupulous people who are involved with "sniffing around, spying and eavesdropping," but they are the ones who help to guard the army and navy and who risk their prestige among the "small time operators" and, at times, their lives among the "informers," "stoolies" and "stool pigeons." Having leafed through the pages of the newspapers of recent months and based on your question, it is easy to become convinced of this.

[Urban] Excuse me, but that is rather emotional. Here is a direct question for you. On monitoring telephone conversations.

[Bulygin] Well, let us jump right on this sort of telephone monitoring [wire-tapping] syndrome... Even leaders from the highest military echelons whom I have the opportunity to meet often either ask the question

directly or, with a knowing wink, let the remark drop: "All right," they say, "we know that you monitor us, we hear the clicking in the telephone receiver..." Clearly, the emergence of such fantasies, and you cannot say otherwise, has been largely assisted by the publication of articles on the investigation of the GKChP's [State Committee for the State of Emergency] activities.

Taking advantage of the opportunity, I am ready to vouch for military counterintelligence and to take an oath. We have never tasked, either then or now, special units to organize any type of missions to monitor the telephone conversations of the Armed Forces leadership.

[Urban] But can you really get by without such work methods?

[Bulygin] If you are talking, in principle, about the use of monitoring equipment, I am deeply convinced that neither we nor any other world intelligence services can get by without it. Answer me: could we expose a foreign agent, a corrupt person, or a criminal organization—they are really well-equipped technologically—without using operational equipment systems? I can reassure those who have a clear conscience: talk about what you want and as much as you want, including on the telephone, military counterintelligence does not threaten you at all.

[Urban] But how is it with the intelligence service, was there really never any informing for honor in Rus?

[Bulygin] Let us immediately define what we mean: informing, participation in crime prevention, protection of the Armed Forces and, ultimately, persons from subversive (secret and therefore especially covert) activities, and exposing and localizing threats to their security?

I will cite an example so that I can be understood. Recently, in a conversation with a USSR People's Deputy—a zealous critic of our intelligence service's operating methods, I asked him: "If someone warned us about someone who was preparing an attempt to assassinate you, essentially a terrorist act, but we were able to prevent the crime, could you bring yourself to call him a 'squealer'?" That is just the point! You have to bow from the waist to such people!

[Urban] Incidentally, how do you regard the very name "special departments"?

[Bulygin] I do not like the name "special departments" either. It is an ordinary organ of state administration for any normal country that is called upon, together with the military command and control organs and other law enforcement organs, to insure the security of the Armed Forces. Incidentally, we have already gotten away from that name.

But since the very concept of state (national) security, all the more so with regard to the Armed Forces, has not yet been defined by law, they could be called: the directorate of military counterintelligence, the military counterintelligence department, etc. Incidentally, it is time to stop



calling these positions in military counterintelligence operational agent and senior operational agent (to whom, for what?), especially since "operational" has an entirely different meaning in military matters.

[Urban] But what is your personal attitude toward the history of our state security organs?

[Bulygin] I decisively oppose, what they sometimes suggest, to disassociate ourselves from the past like from a nightmare, to forget it and, having broken up the current security organs (this in fact has already been done), to start over again with a clean slate. That cannot happen. We need a serious, objective, thorough analysis of the past, its dark and light (there really were some!) sides, not for the sake of breaking down those organs that are vitally necessary for each state and that insure its security, but for the sake of improving them and for the sake of the future.

Each agent, especially the young military counterintelligence agent, must clearly understand that he has tied his future to security organs that have had not only a heroic reputation in the past, but also a bad reputation. Therefore, we need his, his personally, efforts so that the security organs obtain only a good reputation. We do not need the next reorganization (we have already lived through quite a few of them, and I do not know a better way to tear down any cause than to conduct endless discussions about reorganization and to keep people in a suspended state) as much as we need, in my opinion, a new, if you wish, philosophy of counterintelligence.

The shield and sword have invariably been present on the security organ emblem—the "punishing sword of the revolution," symbolizing its repressive functions. So here, I would remove the sword from the emblem of the new reformed counterintelligence organs, having removed the repressive function from its sphere of activities and having transferred it to whomever is appropriate in a rule-of-law state. Only the shield would remain as a symbol that the security organs are obligated to protect people primarily from the intelligence and subversive activities, and I would stress this with all sharpness, of man.

[Urban] I think you have a lot of work now. It is hard to believe that intelligence collection is not currently being conducted against our army.

[Bulygin] The security organs in all countries have always conducted and will conduct the struggle against espionage. It is perfectly clear that foreign intelligence services will henceforth count on acquiring and using sources of information among people who possess state secrets. This is specifically confirmed in recent statements by R. Gates, the new CIA director, and finally, by our own experience.

For example, in September 1991, the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium convicted of treason to the Homeland a foreign intelligence service agent who had been detected and exposed by us.

Suffice it to say he gave the intelligence service more than 3,000 microfilm frames with highly important materials concerning the Armed Forces.

As you see, espionage has not "retired" at all, even under new historic conditions.

[Urban] But let us speak more in detail on "internal" factors.

[Bulygin] I agree. An impartial analysis shows that the security "threshold" of the Armed Forces under current conditions is largely declining not so much due to "external" threats (from foreign intelligence services and organizations) as due to "internal" threats—that have been caused by attempts to undermine moral- psychological potential, converting the Armed Forces into an arena of political confrontation and political ambition, and inciting nationalistic and regional passions. It is really no secret that against the background of a serious socio- economic situation and the disintegration of the state organism, the Armed Forces are in a state of deep crisis, uncertainty about their present position and the prospects for future development, and the lack of legislative acts on defense issues.

The increase of the sentiments of hopelessness and animosity is fraught with the open refusal to carry out the orders of the command and with group forms of protest. Attempts to involve personnel in the political struggle, often using unconstitutional methods, including those initiated by various structures of the organs of power, are a real threat to society. The crime situation is being aggravated by the theft of weapons and ammunition. Unfortunately, all of this is the reality of today.

Nuclear and chemical weapons safety problems have drastically worsened of late. At some military units, the storage time periods of even conventional ammunition exceed all conceivable limits. The weapons are beginning to disintegrate from age and they present a very serious threat to safety and to the lives of a large number of people under conditions of the overloaded capacity of depots. What are we dealing with here? With the enemy? There is no enemy, but a threat exists and we need to avert it.

Furthermore, we also cannot and will not stand idle from carrying out what at first glance may appear to be missions that are not inherent to military counterintelligence. We simply do not have the moral right to be inactive when they are killing officers, warrant officers and soldiers. On December 15, 1991 alone, extremists killed two compulsory service servicemen and wounded several more at Transcaucasus Military District units. I could continue the list of such cases.

[Urban] But in many cases the criminals are not found. I am not asking you to reveal operational information, but tell me, do you know their names?

[Bulygin] Yes, we know the family names of some of them. When we receive such information, we immediately send it to the command, to republic law enforcement organs and to the local authorities to search for the criminals. But their measures are not always timely and effective.

While considering that the procedural activities of military prosecutors who are investigating general criminal offenses are not always supported by operational-investigatory measures, in our opinion it might be advisable to create a military police which could play an important role in exposing and preventing these types of crimes.

[Urban] But now, if you will permit me, let us return to the question of the fate of military counterintelligence.

[Bulygin] The Armed Forces—is now not only what somehow still unites our republics-states. Society's most severe and painful problems are concentrated in the Armed Forces, they are fraught with an explosion, again multiplied by the power of weapons, including with tremendous destructive force. So, it is incorrect to look at military counterintelligence as just some sort of internal monitoring mechanism. It is organizationally part of the Armed Forces in all civilized states and that is profoundly significant because military counterintelligence activity and troop training are simply inseparable.

But at the current stage of renewal of our society, Armed Forces reform is accompanied by complex and sometimes painful processes that affect people. And no matter

how much you criticize its rate, you cannot rush ahead to solve the many urgent problems. This relates to attempts to simply designate a place for military counterintelligence organs in the commonwealth's security system prior to the acceptance of fundamental legislation on Armed Forces reform and their structural development within the framework of a unified defensive space.

If I may be frank, it is not really so important whether our place is determined to be part of the Inter-Republic Security Service, the RSFSR Federal Security Agency or the General Staff. Fundamentally, there is something else—the precise definition of the goal of military counterintelligence activities and the establishment of a reliable mechanism for cooperation with the command. In this connection, it would obviously be advisable to create a Council on Issues for Coordinating Joint Efforts in the Sphere of Ensuring the Security of the Armed Forces under the country's ministry of defense.

**FROM THE EDITOR:** After the interview was prepared for press, we learned about Russian Presidential Decree No. 289, dated 19 December, on the formation of the RSFSR Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs. It will be created based on the abolished USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Russian MVD, MSB [Inter-Republic Security Service] and Russian AFB [Federal Security Agency]. One can assume that military counterintelligence, as an MSB structure, will become part of the new RSFSR Ministry, but there still has not been a specific decision.

**Head of Ukrainian Military Counterintelligence Interviewed***92UM0107A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
17 Oct 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Colonel O. Skipalskyy, deputy chairman of the Union of Ukrainian Officers and acting head of the Directorate of Military Counterintelligence of the National Security Service of the Ukraine, by A. Lazareva; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Biography for the Reader": "Away with the Barricades!"]

[Text]

[Lazareva] Oleksandr Oleksandrovych, our newspaper has already reported that Ukraine has outstripped even the Union on the question of the KGB...

[Skipalskyy] Yes, by ruling of the Supreme Soviet the Ukrainian KGB under Union-republic jurisdiction has been dissolved and a National Security Service of a sovereign Ukraine has been created. This is an essentially legal act, and a commission for the reform of the former KGB is presently working jointly with the Commission on Questions of the Defense and State Security of Ukraine. They are carrying out very important work, in my opinion, to construct a security organ, which exists in every civilized state. For the first time in 74 years a Directorate of Military Counterintelligence has been created in Ukraine. Troops in Ukraine have been under different jurisdictions—at one time there was a Ukrainian Armed Forces—but we have never had our own counterintelligence on a state scale.

Our Supreme Soviet is the first among the parliaments of the former Union republics to pass such an important and unexpected ruling: To put military counterintelligence under the jurisdiction of the state security service for the defense of the Armed Forces. As a specialist, I am quite satisfied with this. Because stability in the Armed Forces means stability in the state.

In the full sense of the word the activities of the Union-level KGB since 1985 have not contributed to the development of democratic tendencies in the state. I am convinced that if the KGB had not concerned itself with the questions of the ideological security of the course of the Communist Party, the development of events would have been different. Democratically minded officers of the KGB could not understand how the declarations of Gorbachev concerning perestroika and democratization could coincide with the orders of Kryuchkov, which all democratic forces considered destructive. We broached these questions not only at service assemblies but also in the Supreme Soviet. The actions of Oleg Kalugin were not attacks made as a result of ambition, as the press viewed it, but a lack of understanding of the course which Kryuchkov was taking.

[Lazareva] Being more specific about the situation in Ukraine, was there any resistance or an opposition to the Union course among the people of the service themselves?

[Skipalskyy] I personally was working in Buryatia since 1985, and only since 1987 in Ukraine, but I was in the system of centralized military counterintelligence, which was under the jurisdiction of the Union. I can only say one thing. The position of the Ukrainian KGB and the position of the Union KGB were similar in many ways. They differed in that the people who lived all the time in Ukraine were much more loyal to events in the republic than was the policy in general of the leadership of the Third Main Directorate, under whose jurisdiction I was.

[Lazareva] How fair is the opinion that the KGB strictly adhered to the principle of "diluting" the staff with people from anywhere and everywhere?

[Skipalskyy] I can cite instances without giving away specifics. This is something I experienced myself. In 1987 I had to transfer to Ukraine (at the end of my higher educational institution I worked in the Far East for 11 years). I had to go home because my daughter had fallen ill. But one of the heads in Moscow, Stanislav Kachentsev, said, "We do not at all wish to transfer Skipalskyy where he wants to go. Because the head there is a Ukrainian. It is very dangerous for us to put two Ukrainians together." I must give him his due: They were right about the threat. It did indeed happen that the association of two Ukrainian colonels contributed to the fact that we defended the democratic tendencies in the Ukrainian KGB.

[Lazareva] Oleksandr Oleksandrovych, counterintelligence, so far as I know of it, consists of uncovering espionage. Have your colleagues not been watching their own fellow citizens too attentively?

[Skipalskyy] At base your question is a fair one. But, I stress, the profession of counterintelligence does not give one grounds to suspect everyone. There is intelligence and there is counterintelligence. It has always been that way. I will try to respond specifically. The absence of concrete results, given a desire to see results under conditions of a totalitarian system where everything is connected, is viewed not on the basis of a realistic reflection of events but in terms of how aggressively one is working. This pushes people to "react" when a suitable situation arises. If a member of counterintelligence were to free himself and to reject the slavish psychology, he would occupy himself with real things and not seek out and involve himself in any "case" which will permit him to ensure his existence.

[Lazareva] Is it then fair to assert that the Soviet KGB stood, in essence, for illegality?

[Skipalskyy] I would not put it so harshly. Many of my fellow employees were convinced that they were working to defend the interests of our Fatherland, which at that time was identified with the Union. There were units of

competent people who were fully aware of what was happening in society. In our circle of military counter-intelligence professionals many were somewhat amused by how certain party circles did not understand the situation and how they would inevitably have to lose. I suppose that the majority of the employees of the KGB—of the Union, Ukraine, and other republics—understood that the proposals of the party bureaucrats were a paradise and communism only for themselves. This understanding of theirs permitted them to reconstruct elements of democracy significantly sooner than during the times of Stalin, when our colleagues of that time actually trusted the regime. I personally am thankful to Dmytro Pavlychko in that he analyzed the events of 19-21 August and, when he recognized that many officers of the KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Armed Forces were on the side of democracy, said, "It is clear why the coup did not succeed."

[Lazareva] How do you personally view the possibility of the creation of a "totalitarian communist Ukraine"? One often hears such apprehensions today.

[Skipalskyy] I do not rule out the possibility that certain forces will try to unite, but that road has no prospects. I believe that the majority of common people, beginning with the peasants, members of kolkhozes [collective farms], and workers, will not choose that. The National Security Service must defend the Constitution of an independent Ukraine as well as full equality of citizens before the law. If this equal responsibility is not ensured, the likelihood of the actions about which you ask, and even bloodshed, will increase.

[Lazareva] How large a staff do you foresee for the national security service?

[Skipalskyy] I was present at a meeting where Mykola Holushko, the former chairman of the republic-level KGB, stated that the number of associates in Ukraine is close to 19,000. I believe that we have a possibility of reducing that number. But not today and not in the near future. These are people with families and children. So long as Ukraine is only struggling for its independence, reductions are not stipulated. Why? I will speak frankly. It would be dangerous to have a "fifth column" of former KGB professionals. And the majority of them, as I have said, are prepared to defend the interests of Ukraine. But there will only be an independent Ukraine when all the sectors of the population are united. I hope I will be forgiven by my democratic colleagues, one of whom I remain, but when I saw the fate of the publishing secretary of the former party Central Committee, who was left practically without the means to live, not only did I feel pity but I thought, "Why do common people not have any legal guarantees?" It was not only they who worked for "those at the top," but the entire ideological mechanism. It is for this very reason that I welcome all those who decided on 11 October to strike a powerful blow against that mechanism which was most recently called the KGB. That committee did not distinguish itself in any way from the People's Commissariat and the

GPU [State Political Directorate], and it destroyed all who were on the other side of the barricade.

In 1983 I found a situation in the state security system where careerists, in order to ensure their own promotions, ignored the fates of others. These fates were not something abstract for me: They were comrades with whom I was going fishing, vacationing, and drinking. But people began to accuse them of spying for a foreign state. I was nearby, a specialist who knew that this was nonsense. But the mechanism functioned. At that time I asked myself: When there is a specialist nearby able to determine who is or is not a spy but is unable to defend innocent people, then what is to happen? Since that time I have become even more convinced that the KGB system is an apparatus of violence. I hope my colleagues will forgive me, but there are careerists in the system of the KGB who trample not only on common people but even on their own colleagues. I have become convinced that there is no legal protection in society. The absence of economic protections is an additional burden—we are tied to our jobs by our wages. That is the Stalinist system—to bind a slave.

Since 1986 I have been stating this openly, addressing myself to Kryuchkov and to other structures, and joining my efforts with those of the democratic forces of my native Volhynia, the Lvov area, and the Party of Democratic Renewal. My decision is not something I arrived at overnight.

[Lazareva] Mr. Skipalskyy, advise me and our readers. Recently ARGUMENTY I FAKTY stupefied its readers with the candid acknowledgement that all telephone conversations are monitored. Must the citizens of a sovereign Ukraine be careful when they talk on the telephone?

[Skipalskyy] I expect that so long as reform continues, the citizens of Ukraine have nothing to fear. There should first and foremost be supervision by the parliament and its commissions, and all these actions should be conducted only with the permission of the procuracy. I believe that these automatic systems, which react to some concrete word, should no longer function. Because that amounts to suspicion of society in general and does not correspond to the Constitution of Ukraine. I am against that. At present the monitoring system is not functioning although, perhaps, the mechanism itself is being preserved.

[Lazareva] What kinds of words triggered the system?

[Skipalskyy] First and foremost, when the names of our leaders were mentioned two or three times. Then words which pertained to terrorist activities and diversionary activities, and to espionage.

[Lazareva] And will the "men in gray" continue to accompany every foreign tourist group?

[Skipalskyy] That is a remnant of the Stalinist "iron curtain" when every foreigner who arrived here was



suspect. I believe this too was an error, because foreign intelligence is much cleverer than our heads of the state security system. Why send out every one of our own citizens as intelligence agents? They do not do that. Expending all of one's efforts on suspecting everyone is the first sign of totalitarianism. One needs only a highly skilled system of intelligence; one should not waste money in vain when there are so many poor people around.

[Lazareva] Have specialists of foreign special services acted to recognize you yet?

[Skipalskyy] I have not associated with foreign colleagues on an official level yet—I have not received that authority from the government. But inasmuch as I am the deputy chairman of the Union of Ukrainian Officers (that is a public organization) we have already established contacts with many countries. Such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Canada, the United States, and others. The main thing now is for people to accept and recognize our new course.

#### **OMON Officers on Corruption, Persecution**

*92UM0293A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 17 Dec 91 p 3*

[Report on interviews with two former OMON members by S. Karkhanin; dates and places not given: "Notes From the Underground—They Are Taking Vengeance"]

[Text] These people do not even know each other, but they share a common misfortune. They called it the "Parfenov syndrome"—after the Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] member who was cast into death row only because through service duty and conscience he was trying to fulfill the laws of the USSR in Latvia. The collapse of the Union moved like an asphalt roller over the fates of those against whom nationalists and bigwigs of the shadow economy business have long dreamed of getting revenge. Today, in the republics, where my interlocutors previously worked, they have been declared criminals, and warrants have been issued for their arrest... Why? The answer is in the confessions of two members of the underground.

**V. VINOGRADOV**, former deputy chief in the Fight Against Organized Crime Department of the KGB of Moldova:

Corruption in the republic is blossoming like a multi-petaled flower. There is any number of examples. One of them is the story of the foreign trade association Mercury, which operated in the Ministry of Trade of Moldova under the management of V. Kulay, a major "shadow economy operator." They were sending abroad dry milk, tomato paste, vegetable oil, flour, honey, and laundry soap in exchange for fine cars and video sets for a narrow circle of buyers, including certain deputies and ministers. Because of the imperfection of our crime legislation, we could not undertake measures independently, and we reported all of this to parliament and to

the procuracy of the republic. The result proved to be unexpected: The traders in people's wealth did not suffer.

Another fact—the transactions of the former motor vehicle repair plant of the Council of Ministers, which gained the right to foreign trade activity through the successful assistance of the manager of the president's office, a relative of the prime minister. The plant concluded a contract for delivery at dumping prices to foreign firms of a dubious nature of aluminum and ferrous metals that Russia supplies Moldova. In this regard, a whole scandal broke out in parliament, and the deputies succeeded in dismissing M. Druk, who was premier at that time, and who persistently emphasized that he is a pupil of G. Popov... And when it became known that the affair with the transactions was exposed by employees of our department, it became clear: They will take revenge on us.

While continuing to work, we more and more frequently ran into a stone wall along the way. That is the way it was in the case of the international gang of smugglers that was active in Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland, and profiteering in computers brought them huge gains. But the relatives of the criminals did not conceal the fact that they were prepared to lay out any amount of money for the sake of the blessing of influential persons. And, it appears, that they accomplished what was planned. At least, V. Berlinskiy, the chairman of the commission of the Supreme Soviet to fight crime, did a lot so that G. Vartichan, the organizer of the gang of Kishinev residents, remained unpunished.

After placing his own people in key posts in the militia, Berlinskiy became almost omnipotent in Moldova, and the law enforcement organs operate on his orders. He also attempted to take us in hand, trying to get the KGB to supply him with compromising materials concerning other deputies and ministers. We did not have this kind of materials, but the chairman of the parliamentary commission did not believe it, and he harbored one more grievance.

Our fate was finally decided by information we received concerning an ocean cruise organized by the Istok association, headed by the not unknown Artem Tarasov, for prominent politicians, businessmen, and cultural figures. The hold of the steamship was loaded by the Moldavian cooperative Kishineu with thousands of bottles of wine, champagne, and cognac. All of this was sold directly in foreign ports for foreign currency. In addition to all of this, the son of the manager of the passenger section of the cruise, A. Plugaru, the current minister of national security of Moldova and chairman of the parliamentary commissions on ethics and on credentials, was arrested in Alexandria by Egyptian police, and he spent the night in the police station. We learned about all of this.

We were not content, and we continued the fight, and all of this annoyed the protectors of the mafia who now



occupy ministerial and parliamentary offices in Kishinev. A storm was to be expected. And it broke out. We came armed, just in case, to a meeting, necessitated by operational considerations, with several well-known repeat offenders. And immediately after this, at the prompting of several influential parliamentarians, criminal proceedings were instituted on the fact of "a marauding attack by State Security employees" on certain persons, as it was put in a television interview by the deputy minister. Orders were written for the arrest of four employees of the department, including me, on a charge of racketeering. It became necessary to leave the republic immediately. But even here, in Russia, the emissaries of Moldova do not leave us in peace.

And, also, I think it is hardly accidental that our country introduced entry fees for cooperation with Interpol in all directions of work except one—the fight against economic crimes. Is it not because international crime along this line would preclude the bribers and gangsters from seizing all power in the state?

**V. RAZVODOV, former chief of staff of the Vilnius OMON:**

They were already waiting for me in the office of the chief of the faculty of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy. Yu. Rachkauskas, a Lithuanian police employee, got up to meet me: "You must come with us to Vilnius." It became clear: A crazy version alleged that OMON participated in murders at customs posts in Medininkai, and I supplied weapons to armed workers' detachments, and he continues to elaborate. [as published] They will arrest me, and then it will be late and useless to prove that I am not to blame. Only one way out was left to me. I promised that I would return soon, gathered what was essential in the dormitory, and I left Moscow. Afterwards, friends told me that since that time suspicious persons in civilian clothes were on duty at the dormitory entrance.

Now, looking back to the two years of my service in the detachment, I still do not have any regret about anything. We did our work honorably. But in January, after the clash of law and order forces with demonstrators at the parliament, we made our choice, refusing to support the struggle of the Lithuanian Government with the people. Then, at our request, the detachment was resubordinated to Union authorities.

As previously, we fought against crime. We especially persistently suppressed the delivery of weapons to the republic from abroad, and this, as I realize it now, infuriated the leaders of Sajudis...

Provocations were started—firings on bases and searches in the apartments of the men. But after the tragedy at the Medininkai customs post, V. Landsbergis on the very next day, although the investigation had not been conducted yet, declared over radio: "A murder was committed by OMON members, these rabid wolves have to be brought to trial, and every honorable Lithuanian

must with all of his power harm the employees of the detachment and their families."

When the threat of a direct attack on our base arose, the commander, Boleslav Makutynovich, assembled the detachment: "Whoever does not want to take a risk, let him leave, no one will reproach him." Forty persons left, and 80 remained. True, the assault did not occur, but we received an ultimatum from the government: Either we leave the republic by ourselves, or 10,000 fighting men, the strike force of Sajudis, will throw us out of Vilnius. Rallies, pickets, and telephone calls of the prime minister were almost endless.

It became clear: We had to leave. We wanted to serve together in the future also, as people who hailed from Riga, especially since exactly at that time new detachments were being brought up to strength in Omsk and Sochi, and why not transfer us there? But the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Union preferred to disband the Vilnius OMON, and to break up our fighting fraternity. To this day, I do not know why this was necessary. Everyone had to fend for himself. It was proposed that I study, and so I became a student in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy in Moscow.

Meanwhile, depressing news was arriving from Lithuania. The home of Boleslav's mother was set on fire, and my family more than once found leaflets with threats on the door. I have three little children, and, of course, I am anxious for their fate, but where will you take them from Vilnius? The families of almost all of the men remained there. But the Landsbergis regime continued to be truculent. Through Ministry of Foreign Affairs channels, he succeeded in extraditing A. Smotkin, a former activist of the armed workers' detachment, from the territory of Belarus, charging Aleksandr with a deliberately false accusation. When a police capture party brought Smotkin to Lithuania, it handcuffed him to a bed and beat him unmercifully, and now he is in prison.

Union authorities have betrayed us, and that is why we are forced to hide. I personally no longer believe anyone. Whom can we expect to stick up for us? It seems that you have to rely only on yourself. And now we, former employees of the Vilnius and Riga detachments are preparing a draft appeal to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The gist of this document is that if our civic rights will not be guaranteed by political and legislative decisions and the threat to our families who remain in the Baltics is intensified, we will have to defend them ourselves. And we can defend ourselves. We are a peaceable people, but if we are forced to, we will once again take up arms.

**MVD Official Argues for Withdrawal from Transcaucasus**

92UM0243A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major General A. Kulikov, chief of a directorate and chief of the USSR MVD's Internal Forces for

the North Caucasus and the Transcaucasus: "We Are Considered Foreigners Here"]

[Text] The internal forces were previously intended usually for maintaining public order and the safety of the citizens. They have never before had to tackle nationality issues. But we have for about four years now found ourselves at the center of political passions which are blazing in the country on national grounds. We need to call things by their name: Civil war is underway in the Transcaucasus. Each day it is taking people's lives and destroying their dwellings. There is a growing belief that no one in the country is treating the problems of nationality policy seriously. There is in the parliaments merely a gabfest on this score and many slogans and appeals. Groups of delegates of various levels visit the flash points from time to time, but there have been no positive changes.

Yes, the nationality issue is a very complex, delicate matter. We realize this, but for all that it should be dealt with, in our opinion, by politicians and leaders of various levels. And systematically, what is more, not just occasionally. Meanwhile, however, the internal forces are being left to face the problems arising in this soil alone.

At the start of December the president of the USSR declared that things had not yet at this pivotal stage reached the point of great bloodshed (LITERATUR-NAYA GAZETA of 4 December 1991). In the past seven months, however, I have buried two of my deputies. Deputy commanders were not being lost at this rate during the Great Patriotic War even.

Blood is being spilled. Approximately 450 persons have been killed in the Transcaucasus in 11 months alone, these including 62 servicemen and officers of the internal affairs authorities, and approximately 700 have been wounded. And this only in the forces' control zone. But even these figures are close to half the average annual "Afghan" permanent losses.

Here, in the fire of interethnic conflict, you can see how much human life has been devalued. The leaders of the Transcaucasus republics, laying claim to UN membership, are unwilling to take a step accommodating one another or to sit down at the negotiating table. What is preventing them? National pride? Medieval nationalism, rather. No calls for a truce are to be seen in the republic papers—as before, a wall is being erected between peoples who have lived in peace for centuries.

The internal forces also are now being accused of many sins. The logic of the reasoning here is simple: "If you are on our territory, you must defend us and only us." This is the demand of both the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. In Georgia, on the contrary, we are being accused of defending only the Ossetian population. People are unwilling to understand that it is impossible posting a soldier at every home....

The attitude toward the servicemen has become not simply unfriendly, but openly hostile. The personnel are

being subjected to humiliation and taunts. In 1991 some 45 servicemen were taken hostage. Dozens of motor vehicles have been stolen. Gangster attacks have been carried out, and convoys with combat equipment and munitions have been captured. These operations have been led in both Armenia and Azerbaijan by members of the republics' supreme soviets. There is a similar attitude toward the forces in Georgia also. We in the Transcaucasus have become foreigners.

Personal verbal and written appeals to President of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov and to G. Bagratyan, acting prime minister of Armenia, for the return of the captured weapons and property and for an investigation of the instances of gangsterism have produced no results.

In the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] the forces are not being supplied with even their minimal needs. All forms of transport, air included, are being blocked. The personnel are in practice performing service and combat assignments under economic blockade conditions.

At the same time, however, upon learning of the possible withdrawal of forces from Karabakh, the president of Armenia immediately sent a telegram to Moscow requesting that this not take place. How are we to understand the president? On the one hand the sanctioning of the seizure of equipment and weapons (more than 230 small arms and approximately 20 pieces of combat equipment have been seized in the units this year in Yerevan alone), on the other, a request that we not leave.

An anti-army mood is intensifying among the population of Azerbaijan. Thus on 3 December two servicemen sent for fuel oil to an Azerbaijan locality were beaten up. The assailants were arrested, and criminal proceedings were instituted. The soldiers were hospitalized.

On 8 December, while checking that the guards protecting buildings of the KOR (special district of the border troops' subunit) were standing duty, Senior Lieutenant S. Zhuk, commander of a company in Khankendi, received a deep firearm wound in his left hand as a result of an armed attack on the part of Armenian militants. The criminals were arrested. Two assault rifles, a home-made handgun and ammunition were confiscated from them.

It is my profound conviction that the internal troops should be withdrawn from the NKAO. And this is why. The decision to commit the forces was made under entirely different conditions when the USSR was in existence. Now Armenia and Azerbaijan are independent states, and a different legal basis is needed for union internal forces to be stationed there. The creation of "demilitarized" zones, on the other hand, with the aid of the troops would only make the situation worse—the guilty parties would have someone to hide behind and someone to blame.

And, further, the practice of the use of the internal forces has shown that military forms of intervention have not resolved the problems of the population's security.

Losses are growing: 92 persons were killed and 134 wounded in 1990, of these 28 and 57 being servicemen and MVD officers. Some 185 persons have been killed and 248 wounded in 11 months of 1991. Servicemen and employees of the MVD—35 and 83, respectively.

One further argument. On 9 October of this year the Republic of Azerbaijan enacted a law on the armed forces, which in Article 2 specifies missions now being performed by our internal forces.

The troops need to be withdrawn for another reason also: We have simply no one with whom to replace the personnel. As of 20 November of this year the internal forces were by a decree of the president of the country split into republic and interregional forces. Which republics (sovereign states) will send their forces to the NKAO? None, I believe.

A political settlement of the conflict and the application of economic sanctions against those who violate the accords are needed. The people of Armenia and Azerbaijan must oblige their leaders to resume the process of negotiations commenced on the initiative of Russia and Kazakhstan. Time is being lost, and the focal point of interethnic discord is spreading and has already crossed the Main Caucasus Range and is encompassing the North Caucasus republics. But the Russian Parliament is repeating the mistakes of the union parliament, arguing approximately thus—perhaps it will abate. No, “perhaps” will not help on this occasion either. Having seized power, in Checheno-Ingushetia General D. Dudayev is speeding up the creation of his own armed forces. His actions are unlawful and unconstitutional. He “kicked out” a motorized militia battalion from the republic (his words), having first disarmed it,—he could not forgive it its two-month defense of the Republic of Checheno-Ingushetia MVD building, which was thus not captured by his national guard. He is bringing psychological pressure to bear on servicemen of the regiment of internal forces, demanding that it be manned by his local conscripts or that the arms and equipment be handed over.

Of course, we need to conduct a dialogue with Dudayev. It is he who really holds power in Checheno-Ingushetia.

A republic guard is being formed in North Ossetia also. Money is already being openly collected in the villages of Prigorodnyy Rayon for the purchase of weapons for the self-defense squads. The Cossacks of South Russia are demanding the creation of their own guard.

The Caucasus could flare up in even bigger flames of civil war. And the internal troops would in this situation be the sole force capable of preventing its spread. But are the internal forces ready to perform such difficult assignments? They are currently receiving only 30 percent of their due replenishment intake. In the armed prisoner escort units and subunits there is no one to mount guard at the corrective-labor institutions. Yet the heads of the kray and oblast administrations are requesting an increase in the numbers of the special motorized militia

units. These petitions are justified, but, for the reason indicated above, impracticable.

Lacking their own construction facilities, it is the second year now that the troops have acquired no accommodations. As a whole, more than 1,000 officers and warrant officers are without apartments in North Caucasus alone. These people are sorely in need of protection and concern for themselves and their families on the part of the Russian state. We are awaiting a Russian program for strengthening the internal forces.

So, who needs us in the Caucasus? We are surely needed by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the North Caucasus republics and krays also desire the deployment of internal forces' subunits. This is understandable, but the internal forces themselves have found themselves in a difficult situation. Who will help them?

#### **Barannikov Addresses Security Personnel**

*92UM0301A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Dec 92 p 1*

[Unattributed article: “Own Information”: “Clarification From the Minister”]

[Text] Colonel General V. Barannikov, RSFSR minister for security and internal affairs, has issued a proclamation to security and internal affairs organs personnel and servicemen of the Russian Internal Troops. In particular, the proclamation says:

Our republic, sovereign and independent Russia, has entered an extremely important stage of its history—a period of deep-reaching reforms in the economy and of fundamental change in the entire way of life of the peoples of Russia.

One of the necessary conditions for getting out of the current crisis situation is the strengthening of law and order in the republic. For this purpose, by decree of the RSFSR president 19 December 1991, the Russian Federation Ministry for Security and Internal Affairs has been created. This decision was necessitated by the need to substantially bolster the operational and service potential of the security and internal affairs organs. It should be specifically emphasized that this is not a mechanical merging of services and units. In the course of forming the new ministry and its organs, each unit's area of responsibility will be defined as specifically as possible, and the functional responsibilities of their staff clearly delimited.

Each staff member should rest assured that his rights will not be violated. All those who have the necessary experience and skills will continue their service and will continue to be eligible for all established norms and procedures for material welfare and for the rights, privileges, and preferences envisaged for certain categories of employees.

The republic leadership is taking other additional steps to strengthen the social protection of members of the law enforcement system.

NTIS  
ATTN PROCESS 103

2

5285 PORT ROYAL RD  
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

#### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.